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Abstract 
 
All over the common law world complaints are heard about the manner 
in which the courts decide the living arrangements for children when their 
parents separate. A large body of contributions from scholars and 
commentators from various disciplines exist, and are still being contributed, 
that highlights problems, critique outcomes, and make recommendations 
relating to these types of legal decisions. Will their work make a difference to 
legal outcomes and, if so, why?  
This thesis uses the socio-legal theory of Niklas Luhmann to show that 
it is because of how the legal system operates that the expectations of parents, 
scholars and interest groups, will invariably be disappointment and that 
ultimately what is required for these types of decisions, cannot be achieved by 
the legal system. Luhmann argued that the legal system operates in a closed, 
self-referential manner to produce its own messages as regards the values of 
legal and illegal. This manner of functioning is called autopoiesis. By its 
operations the system self-selects and simplifies information generated outside 
of the system in a manner that will stabilise normative expectations, which is 
all that the law does. Normative expectations are created with society in mind 
and not individuals. This challenges the individualistic approach that is 
required custody and contact decisions after parental separation. The research 
starts at the historical point when the common law legal system gained 
jurisdiction over children. The research follows the development of the 
‘welfare principle’ upon which custody decisions are based and illustrates the 
relevance and application of Luhmann’s theory. This study investigates the 
limitations of the legal system to make decisions about children’s welfare and 
best interests in the context of custody and contact decisions. 
 
 
ii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1   Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2   Law as an autopoietic social system..................................................... 6 
2.1  Introduction .............................................................................................. 6 
2.2  Law as an autopoietic social system......................................................... 7 
2.3  The elements and function of law ............................................................ 8 
2.4  Law’s operative closure.......................................................................... 11 
2.5  Courts as central to the legal system ...................................................... 18 
2.6  Cognitive openness................................................................................. 21 
2.7  Structural coupling ................................................................................. 22 
Chapter 3   Jurisdiction for the development of the welfare principle.................. 27 
3.1  Introduction ............................................................................................ 27 
3.2  Establishing law’s jurisdiction: parens patriae....................................... 27 
3.3  Probable and possible irritants ............................................................... 32 
Chapter 4   The English legal system and the custody of privileged children...... 37 
4.1  Introduction ............................................................................................ 37 
4.2  Establishing the patriarchal family......................................................... 37 
4.3  Custody of children post-divorce ........................................................... 40 
4.4  Children’s welfare as education and wealth........................................... 41 
4.5  Custody disputes and children’s best interests in the 19th century........ 47 
4.6  The thirty-five years after De Manneville.............................................. 53 
4.7  The Tender Years Doctrine .................................................................... 55 
Chapter 5   The rise of shared parenting – irritations and responses .................... 66 
5.1  Introduction ............................................................................................ 66 
5.2  A problem with child support................................................................. 66 
5.3  Maternal preference meets child support ............................................... 68 
5.4  The fathers’ rights movement................................................................. 75 
(a)  United Kingdom..................................................................................... 77 
(b)  Canada .................................................................................................... 79 
(c)  Australia ................................................................................................. 81 
(d)  New Zealand........................................................................................... 86 
5.6  The re-attached family............................................................................ 91 
5.7  The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child – an irritant? ............... 97 
5.8  The new normative expectation?.......................................................... 101 
Chapter 6   The structural coupling between law and social science.................. 105 
iii 
 
6.1       Introduction......................................................................................... 105 
6.2  Social science research within the legal system................................... 107 
6.3  The ‘psy’ experts .................................................................................. 125 
6.4  The inevitable results?.......................................................................... 135 
Chapter 7   Concluding discussion...................................................................... 137 
Bibliography........................................................................................................ 148 
1 
 
Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
Niklas Luhmann’s work is not well known throughout the professional 
Anglo-Saxon world1 whereas, after his death in November 1998, some of the 
multiple, extensive obituaries that were published in the European press, 
described him as “the most important social theorist of the 20th century”.2 His 
theory is abstract and radical. This thesis attempts to illustrate its relevance and 
application by applying it to actual events and developments as can be identified 
over a time period within the legal system. 
Within the context of custody3 and contact decisions, this research 
investigates and applies his proposition that the legal system, as one of society’s 
functionally differentiated social systems, operates autopoietically. This means 
that the law4 is closed in its operations and relies on its own ‘knowledge’ and 
programmes when it makes decisions about children’s lives. Developments and 
messages from the Autopoiesis is a theoretical approach to how society’s social 
systems operate and relate to their environments which comprise society and other 
social systems.5 Luhmann was first in theorising this proposition.6 Gunther 
Teubner is another protagonist of the theory7 but he later changed his paradigm. I 
will mainly focus on Luhmann’s work. His work was aimed at explaining 
society’s functional systems’ composition. The law was not the only social system 
                                                
1 Gotthard Bechmann and Nico Stehr “The legacy of Niklas Luhmann” (2002) Jan-Feb Society 67. 
2 Gotthard Bechmann and Nico Stehr “The legacy of Niklas Luhmann” above n 1 at 67. More 
works are steadily being produced in English to explain and elevate his contribution in English 
speaking society. Most recently see Hans-Georg Moeller Luhmann Explained: From souls to 
systems (Carus Publishing, Peru (IL), 2006); Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos Niklas 
Luhmann: Law, justice, society (Routledge, 2009).  
3 Custody is currently referred to as ‘day-to-day’ care in New Zealand under the Care of Children 
Act 2004, which came into force on 1 July 2005. This thesis is not exclusively focussed on New 
Zealand developments but includes other common law jurisdictions that decided on different 
semantics as regards ‘custody’ of children post parental separation. For the sake of simplicity 
‘custody’ will be used throughout this thesis and refers to where children will live and settle after 
their parents had separated.  
4 Luhmann used ‘the law’ and ‘legal system’ synonymously and it will be used the same in this 
thesis. 
5 Michael King “The ‘truth’ about autopoiesis” (1993) 20 (2)  J.L. Soc’y 218 at 219. 
6 For his most comprehensive work aimed at the law, see Niklas Luhmann A Sociological Theory 
of Law Martin Albrow (ed) Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow (trans) (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1985); Law as A Social System Klaus A Ziegert (trans) Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles 
and others (eds) (Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK), 2004) originally published in German as 
Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1993). 
7 Gunther Teubner Law as an Autopoietic System Zenon Bankowski (ed) Anne Bankowska and 
Ruth Adler (trans) (Blackwell, Oxford (UK), 1993). 
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of society that he explored.8 This thesis focuses on his work that was devoted to 
the legal system.  
Autopoietic theory is useful in that it raises awareness of how the law 
operates, and as such can highlight why the determination by law of CCDs causes 
so much frustration and disillusionment. Rather than submitting more suggestions 
or arguments about what the welfare and best interests of the child (the 
paramountcy principle) should consider, this thesis suggests that it is how the law 
operates, and the fact that the law has jurisdiction over these matters, that leads to 
the perceived and experienced problems.  
An autopoietic approach is also beneficial to explain why communications 
between the legal system and the other subsystems such as the social sciences, are 
so problematic and that messages from other systems are often distorted and 
misapplied. This research draws attention to the difficulties of maintaining the 
notion that the legal system is capable of meticulously deciding CCDs as it claims 
to do under an ‘individualistic’ approach. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
suggest or explore refutations of Luhmann’s theory. The intention is rather to 
attempt to show how this theory may apply to and explain actualities as they 
developed and are developing in the legal system. 
The focus is on CCDs in the absence of allegations of, or actual, abuse 
and/or violence. This does not exclude cases where high conflict and animosity 
between the parents exist. Because this thesis is specifically about CCDs and the 
operations of the legal system in this regard, the legal developments as regards 
divorce will not be discussed in detail.  
An autopoietic system is not closed off from its environment. It is only 
closed in its operations i.e. in how it will incorporate external ideas (if at all) into 
the law. Some environmental ‘irritations’9 (events, developments, and messages) 
that the legal system reacted to will be suggested in this thesis. However, it is 
much harder to prove connections – in particular if a system is closed – than to 
suggest them and therefore the environmental ‘irritants’ that I identify are not 
conclusive.  
                                                
8 Niklas Luhmann Social Systems John Bednarz Jr. (trans) (Stanford University Press, Stanford 
(CA), 1995). 
9 These need not always be negative; they can also be positive from the system’s perspective in 
that they confirm to the system that its choice of response is ‘right’. 
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The focus is not exclusively on New Zealand’s law in relation to CCDs. 
This is because the ‘legal system’ in this thesis refers to the common law legal 
system10 that was established in England and that transferred to the English 
colonies. The New Zealand approach to CCDs is not unique but has 
predominantly followed the approach in other common law countries. The lay-out 
of the thesis will be as follows. 
In Chapter 2 I will set out and explain the elements of Luhmann’s theory 
that will apply to this thesis. His theory is post-modern and positivist in its 
description of the legal system’s nature and operations. Thereafter, Chapters 3 
– 7 approach the developments in law from an autopoietic perspective only. 
Chapter 3 is a short chapter that determines the historical starting point of 
the Welfare and Best Interests of the Child (W&BIC) doctrine and applies the 
theory to this development. This starting point was the doctrine that provided 
that the courts act as parens patriae on behalf of the State. Thereafter the 
W&BIC doctrine developed from the courts’ exercising its parens patriae 
jurisdiction. I will highlight some of the developments in law’s environment 
that the legal system most likely elected to respond to.  
As a British colony New Zealand had a policy of adhering to the laws of 
England.11 The English law regarding divorce and custody of children was 
copied in New Zealand legislation and English case law was followed. 
Chapter 4 will discuss how the English legal system went to work to establish 
the patriarchal ‘rule of the father’ that was applied by law to uphold and 
protect a father’s custody of children. The law equated father custody to 
children’s best interests. Thereafter the impact of the first child custody 
legislation will be discussed up to the establishment of the Tender Years 
Doctrine from which a maternal preference by the courts evolved. Legislation 
in common law countries did not12 specify that mothers must be the preferred 
custodial parent after parental separation. It only ever suggested equal 
                                                
10 This is not to be taken as meaning that the common law legal system was/is unique or alone in 
its selection of certain ideas such as patriarchy and the political institution of the heterosexual 
family. It is merely beyond the scope of this thesis to include the legal developments of all western 
countries i.e. to include the civil law countries. Luhmann himself wrote and theorised about 
modern society as a world society and social systems as world systems.  
11English Laws Act 1858. 
12A few American states’ legislatures actually went so far as to codify the judicial maternal 
preference (after it had been produced by the courts). However for the great majority of states, it 
was only ever judicially imposed. 
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consideration of both parents. This preference was how the legal system 
elected to eventually interpret the legislation. Again, developments outside of 
law that were elected for response will be suggested. 
The legal emergence of shared parenting in CCDs will be explained from 
an autopoietic perspective in Chapter 5. Two events (‘irritations’) are 
particularly identifiable. One was the legislative introduction of child support 
legislation by the political system and second, the irritation caused by the 
fathers’ rights movement subsequently. I will identify the different ways in 
which the courts and the political system reacted to these events albeit that 
they may share the same ideology regarding the outcome of CCDs. From 
these two events/developments a new post-separation family13 ideal has 
emerged that is attempting to impose shared care post-separation as being in 
children’s best interests.  
In Chapter 6 I will discuss how the legal system structurally 
coupled/couples with social sciences in the twentieth century to decide what is 
best for children. This happened when the law needed to be seen to be more 
‘open’ in its operations and as ‘responsive’ to developments and research in 
social sciences. The latter subsystem of science caused intense 
perturbation/irritation for the legal system regarding children’s mental health 
and well-being after no-fault divorce was introduced. This ‘irritation’ could 
not be ignored. Some social science messages are selected and adapted within 
the legal system, which then renders them as being legally approved while 
other messages within these selected research studies are minimised or 
ignored. The law also maintains control over how social science evidence 
enters the system and over what a social scientist may or may not contribute.  
I conclude in Chapter 7 that the ‘shared care’ agenda currently offers a 
solution to both the political system and the legal system. The individualistic 
approach that the law claims to follow contradicts the reality that CCDs have 
over their history largely been decided based on the norms that the legal 
system decided to follow. First, the near absolute paternal custody, then an 
overwhelming maternal preference and currently the shared care norm that is 
                                                
13 Bren Neale and Carol Smart “In whose best interests? Theorising family life following parental 
separation or divorce” in Shelley Day Sclater and Christine Piper (eds) Undercurrents of Divorce 
(Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1999) 33 (discussing, in the UK context, the attempts that had started in 
the 1990s to introduce the ideals of the lasting, permanent original nuclear family after separation). 
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still being stabilised. The law operates by elected a norm, stabilising that norm 
and then follows that norm until it decides that a new norm must be 
established. In the process, complexities and realities must be ignored in order 
for the law to be predictable. A genuine individualistic approach may be 
beyond the scope of the legal system’s operations. This is however the only 
approach that can come close to best serving children’s welfare and interests 
in custody and contact decisions.  
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Chapter 2   Law as an autopoietic social system 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 ‘Autopoiesis’ is taken from Greek and means self-creation. In developing 
his theory on the autopoiesis of social systems, Luhmann was inspired by the 
work of Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela.14 They 
describe biological (living) systems/units that self-create (autopoiesis) and 
reproduced themselves from their own elements, that is, they are closed in their 
self-creation. Such systems’ dependence upon other systems outside of itself only 
apply in so far as those other systems constitute an environment in which the 
biological system is able to exist and self-create. All processes of/within 
biological autopoietic systems are produced by the system itself though, and the 
environment cannot directly determine these processes. Therefore autopoietic 
systems are operatively closed meaning that there are no operations entering the 
system from outside. This however does not mean that the system is oblivious to 
and unaffected by its environment, since it does require interaction with its 
environment to exchange energy, but the contact with the environment is 
regulated by the system, that is, the system determines, when, what and via which 
channels energy or matter is exchanged with its environment. 
Luhmann’s account of society was that it is a large, primary system that 
comprises several closed, self-referring and functionally specialised subsystems 
that each function in accordance with their own codes and own produced 
communications which make it difficult for systems to communicate across their 
boundaries. Autopoiesis rejects the premise that modern society revolves around 
the individual and his/her ‘free will but instead postulates that individuals are 
reconstructed within different social systems as epistemic subjects.15 This would 
apply to those acting with a given system, for example judges in the legal system 
(who must act as the system requires them to) or the parties to a legal dispute, 
                                                
14 Humberto R Maturana and Francisco J Varela Autopoiesis and Cognition: the realization of the 
living (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980); Humberto R Maturana “The organization of the living: a theory 
of the living organization” (1975) 7 International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 313; Humberto 
R Maturana and Francisco J Varela The Tree of Knowledge: The biological roots of human 
understanding (Shambhala, Boston, 1987) 75-82. 
15 Michael King “The ‘truth’ about autopoiesis” above n 5 at 228. 
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whose actions are given meaning in relation to the code and programmes of the 
system.  
 
2.2 Law as an autopoietic social system 
 
The theory of the autopoiesis of social systems sees functionally 
differentiation and closed systems formation as the basic characteristics of 
modern society. Law16, politics, science etc. are therefore differentiated social 
systems, which basically consist of closed communication networks within which 
meaning is assigned and its own operations determined.17 Each system functions 
autonomously in accordance with its own internal operations and codes.  
Autopoiesis, or self-reproduction in Luhmann’s theory, is a theoretical 
approach to explain how social systems operate and relate with their environment, 
the latter comprising other social systems and society at large.18 Law – like other 
autopoietic social systems – makes its own meaning by referring to its own 
produced network of communications. The most obvious is law’s operation of 
referring to precedent.  
While an autopoietic social system is closed in its operations it is 
cognitively open to its environment and is therefore aware of developments 
outside of itself.19 An autopoietic system therefore does not stand in isolation to 
other social systems and it will structurally couple, as it deems necessary, with 
other social systems but will always protect its own function and identity in 
relation to other social systems and society.20 Law, for example, needs the 
political system to produce legislation but how it applies legislation will be 
subject to the system’s meaning-making (statutory interpretation) and own 
decisions involving children. Because of the evolution of the W&BIC doctrine 
law eventually also coupled with the system of social science so as to extract 
                                                
16 In this thesis, as in the theory of Luhmann, ‘law’, ‘the law’ and ‘legal system’ are synonymous 
and refers to the system comprised of all legal communications. See Michael King and Chris 
Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2003) at 36. 
17 Gunther Teubner “How the law thinks: toward a constructivist epistemology of law” (1989) 23 
Law & Soc’y Rev 727 at 738. 
18 Michael King “The ‘truth’ about autopoiesis” above n 5 at 218. 
19 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness: on reality in the world of law” in Gunther Teubner (ed) 
Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1988) 335. 
20 Niklas Luhmann “The unity of the legal system” in Gunther Teubner (ed) Autopoietic Law: A 
new Approach to Law and Society (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1988) 12; “Operational closure and 
structural coupling  the differentiation of the legal system” (1991-1992) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1419. 
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information from that system on child welfare/development and reproduced it in 
a simplified (legal) form to rely on in CCDs. Where needed, the law could/can 
use this selected, re-produced information similar to how it uses precedent to 
confirm the legal correctness of decisions.21 The only threat to law’s efficacy, 
says Luhmann, is de-differentiation, meaning that law’s boundaries dissolve and 
its communications lose their unique legal quality.22 This corruption of law will 
occur when the legal system adopts alternative ways of making and providing 
meaning such as the application of codes or programmes from the systems of 
science, politics, or medicine/therapy.23 For this reason, the law must re-produce 
all information from its environment into legal communications signifying its 
legal status. The legal system, as all autopoietic social systems, is in this way 
highly reliant on its environment24 for stimulation (irritations or perturbations) in 
its own internal process of producing and adding to its communications network. 
The environment provides an array of options from which the law can select those 
to respond to. However, law remains autonomous and closed in performing and 
determining its own operations and only the system of law can determine what is 
or is not lawful or unlawful and what is law and what is not.   
2.3 The elements and function of law 
 
Within the theory of autopoietic social systems, law consists of any and all 
legal communications/messages, that is, it is a system that consists entirely of 
legal communications as its elements. All communications that relate to the 
binary code legal/illegal, law/non-law and/or lawful/unlawful comprise the legal 
system.25 The legal system however decides when an event in the environment 
can be given a value of the binary code. For example, controversially (see 
Chapter 3) the legal system declared children’s welfare and best interests to be a 
legal issue, that is, a matter that the legal system must decide. This happened 
when it developed and declared the doctrine (and legal fiction) of parens patriae 
based entirely on its own communications.  Once this happened, the law had no 
                                                
21 Michael King and Christine Piper How the Law Thinks About Children (2nded, Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 1995) at 52. 
22 Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
40-41. 
23 Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
41. 
24 Niklas Luhmann “Law as a social system” (1989) 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 136  at 139. 
25 Gunther Teubner Law as an Autopoietic System, above n 7 at 88. 
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escape but to decide cases that involve children’s futures, such as the custody of 
children, if parents cannot reach their own agreement.  
The vital function that Luhmann maintains law fulfils in society is that of 
stabilising normative expectations over time thereby providing stability and 
certainty, which consequently avoids the need for people to learn from 
experience.26 These expectations must be capable of being maintained even in 
cases of dispute. Law exploits conflicting perspectives so as to form and 
reproduce generalised behavioural expectations.27 This is made possible by, and is 
dependent on, the operational closure and cognitive openness of law. These 
expectations are given their meaning temporally (as relevant at certain time 
periods) through law’s communications.28 This happens when the law takes some 
information from its environment and re-produces it inside the legal system to 
ultimately provide normative expectations that will stand for as long as the law 
deems it to be fixed and despite them being disappointed.29 For example a 
normative expectation once was that a father’s absolute custody of his children 
was best for children despite the reality that it in many cases this was bad for 
children (disappointment of the expectation). Yet, for a long period the law 
upheld this norm despite activity in the political system that entered the world of 
law as legislation and that provided for a mother’s right to apply for custody of 
young children. Currently the shift is toward the norm that continued involvement 
of both parents is best for children despite the reality that mothers still do the 
brunt of child care and rearing post separation and that many fathers withdraw 
from their children’s lives (disappointment of expectation).  
Realities do not necessarily affect the norms of law. Indeed, the reality that 
the law itself cannot truly know what is best for children and that it ultimately can 
only be concerned with making procedurally correct legal decisions does not 
affect the normative expectation that these type of decisions are capable of being 
made by the legal system. Establishing normative expectations therefore do not 
require learning from experience such as cognitive expectations do. Cognitive 
                                                
26 Niklas Luhmann “The unity of the legal system” above n 20 at 27; Niklas Luhmann “Law as a 
social system” above n 24. 
27 Niklas Luhmann “The coding of the legal system” in Gunther Teubner and Alberto Febbrajo 
State, Law, and Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and autonomy in a new perspective 
(Guiffré, Milan 1992) 145 at 147. Emphasis added.  
28 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 143. 
29 Niklas Luhmann “The unity of the legal system” above n 20 at 19. 
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expectations amount to learning and accepting realities. However the law must 
provide society with relatively certain expectations and it must therefore simplify 
and ignore some realities so as to stand by its norms and retain stability – until it 
decides to change its norms. 
For Luhmann, law’s operative closure means that there can be no option of 
partial openness whatsoever30 and he therefore rebuts the idea that the legal 
system could effectively implement social engineering/change,31 which is not to 
say that such attempts, often by the political system, are not made. Law can 
merely create (normative) expectations but it is not very effective in producing 
behavioural changes or regulating conduct that is not open to the determination of 
legal/illegal.32 Thus for example law’s current attempt at creating the norm that 
parents should separate amicably can be created but whether parents do that is 
another matter. The rising litigation regarding custody is evidence of this. 
Equally, the expectation of regular contact with a non-resident parent can be 
established but whether this will turn out to be the case or indeed, whether the 
best interests of the child, will be well served is something that the law will not 
know and does not need to know. This is because legal decisions do not depend 
for their legality upon the future correctness of the decision.33 If it was made in 
accordance with the proper procedure and in reference to the relevant legislation, 
then the judge is lawfully entitled to use her/his discretion and whatever is 
decided is – if not appealed – legally correct.  
As one of various social systems the legal system also participates in 
society’s construction of reality34 yet without overtly communicating about or 
acknowledging this.35 Yet it creates and stabilises normative expectations about 
how things ought to be.  In order to offer stability, legal norms often must stand 
despite being counter-factual because actual experience “may negate normative 
learning by demonstrating that the norms have little ... validity as reliable 
                                                
30Niklas Luhmann “Coding of the legal system” above n 27. 
31 Niklas Luhmann “Problems with reflexive law” in Gunther Teubner and Alberto Febbrajo State, 
Law, and Economy as Autopoietic Systems above n 31 at 389. 
32 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness” above n 19 at 347; Niklas Luhmann “Limits of 
steering” (1997) 14 Theory Culture Society 41 generally. 
33 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 199. 
34 Niklas Luhmann “Law as a social system” above n 24 at 138; “Closure and openness” above n 
19 at 340. 
35 Niklas Luhmann “Operational closure and structural coupling” above n 20 at 1434. 
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indicators of future events.”36 Only the law itself can bring about changes to legal 
norms by replacing ‘stable’ expectations with other expectations to be temporarily 
stabilised again.37 Luhmann remarks:38 
 
If, ... in order to stabilize these temporal connections it becomes necessary to sustain 
expectations which do not in any way correspond to reality, but which are supposed to 
resist eventual disappointments, the social problematic grows radically. 
 
In current times law can rely on environmental activity such as by the fathers’ 
rights movement, liberal feminists, and social science research that encourage 
shared parenting but time will tell if how much this will correspond to reality.   
The problem of disappointments may be averted by law providing 
acceptable sounding reasons for its determination to uphold normative 
expectations such as its ability to promote children’s W&BIC, thereby avoiding 
damage to its various norms39 as they stand in various epochs. The rise of social 
science research made it possible for law to cite from it and to allow for those 
schooled in that system to provide ‘specialist reports’/expert evidence to the legal 
system. The law lends a normative quality to events and decides its legal 
relevance, exclusively relevant for law that is, but given the special status of legal 
‘normative quality’ it enables the system to form even “counterfactually stabilised 
expectations.”40 For society this means that it is possible to determine, in advance, 
whether an event is lawful or unlawful regardless of whether the norm itself is 
accurate in the environment.  
 
2.4 Law’s operative closure 
 
Law is normatively (operationally) closed meaning; “only the legal system 
can bestow normative quality on its elements and thereby constitute them as 
elements.”41  The quality of legal claims and subsequent decisions are derived 
from operations of the system and not from external sources unless such external 
                                                
36 Michael King and Chris Thornhill Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 53. 
37Ibid at 54. 
38 Niklas Luhmann Das Recht der Gesellschaft (SuhrkampVerlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1993) at 
129 cited in Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law 
above n 16 at 55.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Niklas Luhmann A Sociological theory of law above n 6 at 283. 
41 Niklas Luhmann “The unity of the legal system” above n 20 at 20. 
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sources have become legal norms, meaning internal “block acceptance” of a 
given external ‘truth’.42 This is similar to legislative facts i.e. when law accepts a 
communication in its environment as representing the ‘truth’ or as ‘general 
knowledge’. One example is when the legal system accepted the ‘psychological 
parent’ notion as espoused by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit43 in the 1970s.44 Law’s 
environment can thus contribute to change within the system but it does not 
determine the nature of the changes, given that the legal system itself processes 
information from its environment and then reproduces it to suit the system. 
Luhmann proposes that the relationship between law’s operative closure 
(or normative closure because law’s operations involve the creation of normative 
expectations) and its cognitive openness is hierarchical in that its normative 
closure trumps its cognitive openness.45 It is precisely in its constitution as a 
network of self-reproducing communications about the meaning of law where the 
legal system’s autonomy lays.46 This also ensures the system’s structural stability 
or unity thus making law autonomous i.e. it ensures the system’s ‘closedness’. 
Law can therefore “reach forwards or backwards” to its own operations in the 
process of producing its own operations47 and it keeps an eye on the future so to 
speak. It is therefore careful to set or change precedent. As will be evident, law 
can therefore change the meaning and norms underlying the W&BIC programme 
– as long the system itself makes those adjustments – and adapt its programmes to 
be able to signify what will be legally correct without recourse to the actual 
outcomes of its decisions.  
Operational closure has the effect that regardless of what outsiders to the 
legal system argue, for example that the system unjustly favours women for child 
custody after separation;48 that it harms mothers and children by responding to 
social science research;49 that it is anti-mothers and children’s rights;50 or that 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (New 
York, (NY), Free Press, 1973). 
44 See Peggy C Davis “ ‘There is a book out’ ...: an analysis of judicial absorption of legislative 
facts” (1987) 100 (May) Harv. L. Rev. 1539. 
45 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness” above n 19 at 341. 
46 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness” above n 19 at 340. 
47 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness: on reality in the world of law” above n 19 at 345. 
48 E.g. Cynthia McNeely “Lagging behind the times: parenthood, custody, and gender bias in the 
family court” (1998) 25 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 891 at 896ff.  
49 E.g. Mary Ann Mason From Fathers’ Property to Children’s Rights: The history of child 
custody in the United States (Columbia University Press, New York (NY), 1996). 
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children need fathers and fatherless children lead to great social problems and 
damaged children,51 the legal system will decide when, what to and how to react.  
  
a) The binary code of law  
 
What organises the autopoiesis of the legal system, as an inevitable 
outcome of its own operations, is its binary code that brings the continuous need 
to decide between legal rights and wrongs.52 The system verifies the consistency 
of its own operations by way of its binary scheme i.e. whether its operations can 
agree or not agree with its code.53 
As already mentioned, law’s binary code, which ensures its closure, is 
legal/illegal or lawful/unlawful.54 In most of the translated works of Luhmann the 
binary code of law is translated as legal/illegal and sometimes as lawful/unlawful. 
In the original German Luhmann uses Recht/Unrecht. This needs some further 
clarification. King and Thornhill explain55 that legal/illegal refers to law’s routine 
when information obtained from its environment is transformed or coded to have 
meaning as legal communications, positioning it on either the positive or the 
negative side of the code. Recht/Unrecht in German also includes what these 
scholars formulate as law/non-law.56 This refers to when the legal system 
determines and recognises communications as being legal issues or not. This 
latter formulation also refers to how law protects its unity as the social system 
called ‘law’, thus it refers “to communications which are recognized by the law as 
legal communications, that is, as relevant for law.”57 Once the legal system had 
determined that the courts, as representative of the State, had jurisdiction over 
children’s welfare, the path was set for the legal system to decide matters relating 
to children’s welfare: first via the notion of parens patriae and later, as divorce 
became legal, in custody cases. Children’s W&BIC thus became relevant for law. 
                                                                                                                                 
50 E.g. Martha Fineman The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies (Routledge, New York (NY), 1995). 
51 David G Blackenhorn Jr. Fatherless America: Confronting our most urgent social problem 
(HaperCollins, New York (NY), 1995). 
52Niklas Luhmann “Operational closure and structural coupling” above n 20 generally. 
53 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness: on reality in the world of law” above n 19 at 337. 
54Niklas Luhmann “The coding of the legal system” above n 27 at 145. 
55Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
55. 
56Ibid. 
57Ibid. (Emphasis in original); Niklas Luhmann “The unity of the legal system” above n 20 
generally. 
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The legal system’s code therefore also “enable[s] us to distinguish between 
belonging to the system and not belonging to the system...”58 and thus, whether 
we should turn to the law for a solution of a problem. The code must not be 
inflated with any moral valuations but should only be seen as the distinction 
between the ends of the code much like true/not true in the system of science does 
not denote any moral value either.59 The code is not a norm but a structure 
whereby recognition of whether the communication belongs to the system or not, 
and value attribution of legal/illegal is made possible.60 
As a closed system, only law can decide how an event should be coded in 
accordance with its binary code, and it must do so by always referring back to the 
results of its own operations as well as the consequences for its future 
operations.61 Examples include the practice of citing previous court decisions in 
court submissions and the practice of stare decisis followed by the courts. It 
recursively applies its operations to the results of its own operations and 
according to its own code. This has been the way in which the legal system 
protects its unity and consistency.  
Luhmann explains that the code is “invariant” and accordingly it does not itself 
offer any way for the system to adapt to its changing environment.62 While the 
code does enable us to distinguish whether a communication belongs to the 
system, it does not provide criteria, the ‘how’, by which the determination of legal 
and illegal come about.63  The code by itself is a tautology (legal is not illegal, and 
illegal is not legal) and if applied to itself, it is a paradox:64 legal is what the law 
says it is but there is no way to determine whether this is actually correct. For the 
law to be reflexive it has to confront the paradox by which it exists – that it is the 
system that ‘gives’ us legal/illegal values without any recourse to a higher system 
that can confirm its determinations and this includes legislation.65 
                                                
58 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 209. 
59Niklas Luhmann “The coding of the legal system” above n 27 at 146-47. 
60 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 101. 
61Niklas Luhmann “Law a social system” above n 24 at 139. 
62Niklas Luhmann “The coding of the legal system” above n 27 at 174; Niklas Luhmann Law as A 
Social System above n 6 at 190. 
63 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 192. 
64Niklas Luhmann “The coding of the legal system” above n 27 at 172-73; Niklas Luhmann Law 
as A Social System above n 6 at 191. 
65 Niklas Luhmann “Some problems with reflexive law” above n 31 at 411.  
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That only the legal system can decide if something is, or is not law or is 
legal/illegal, and in doing so relies on, and refers only to, its own self-reproduced 
communications is something that law needs to cover up from itself.66 
 
Through its operations the system repeatedly and continuously reaffirms its vision of the 
external world and its own situation within that constructed world, and so forever 
conceals the paradox of its own existence.67 
 
The courts’ responsibility to interpret legislation forces them to confront the 
primary paradox of the legal system namely that there is no intrinsic value that 
determines legal or illegal.68 A problem that the W&BIC doctrine poses – as 
regards its impact on children – is that the law itself is unable to determine 
children’s best interests. It can only declare the process (of a court hearing/court 
counselling/court mediation) and the actual decision that emerge from that as 
being legally correct. All that is left for law is to mystify itself by way of 
“[a]uthority, decorum, limitation of access to the mystery of law, texts to which 
one can refer, [and] the pomp of entries and exits of judges”69 in order to prevent 
the paradox from becoming obvious. It is also by way of conditional programmes 
that law obscures its paradox.  
 
b) Law’s programmes  
 
 The law needs to immunise itself against risk in the sense that its decisions will 
stand despite the future turning out to be different from the future anticipated at 
the time of a legal decision i.e. it immunises itself against disappointed 
expectations.70 The normative structure of law is not well adapted to risk since it 
stipulates how people ought to behave in an unknown future.71 For this, law 
develops programmes that can deal with the system’s vulnerability. Therefore: 
 
The typical from in which normative closure and cognitive openness are combined is 
that of a conditional programme. This form requires that normative rules for decision-
                                                
66Michael Kind and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law n 16 at 19-20, 
60. 
67Niklas Luhmann Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law n 16 at 20. 
68 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 282-83. 
69 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 284. 
70 John Paterson “Reflecting on reflexive law” in Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas 
Luhmann on Law and Politics: Critical appraisals and applications (Hart Publishing, Portland 
(OR), 2006) 13 at 19. 
71 Ibid. 
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making (which can be sustained only within the system) are phrased in such a way that a 
deduction of the decision from the facts (which have to be established cognitively) is 
possible: if fact a is given, decision x is legal.72 
 
Contrary to the move towards social engineering and the development of 
purposive/purpose specific programmes since the start of the twentieth century, 
law’s programmes are always reduced to conditional programmes.73 It is inherent 
to how the law operates. It adheres to the “if – then”74 formula, that is, the 
programme identifies the criteria (e.g. what must be taken into account/what will 
be relevant) necessary for the application of the binary code. Differently phrased; 
‘if [something] has occurred... then the law states that...’ As a closed system, the 
code therefore generates programmes that will support the legal system’s identity 
i.e. its code.75 Through its programmes, law can for example selectively 
reconstruct science, into universal knowledge, provider to the court of ‘truth’, in 
order to bring information from that social system into the legal system76 which is 
possible because an autopoietic social system is also cognitively open. This 
extends to “such imprecise and contested sciences as ... psychiatry”77 and social 
science which, based on who the court deems to be reliable experts (lawful) or not 
(unlawful), and distinguishing between reliable (lawful) and unreliable (unlawful) 
information, which then allows for the application of the code. The legal system 
decides what will suffice/be relevant and what will not.  Even where the binary 
code of law is not immediately evident for an outside observer in, for example, a 
court decision, it remains the code that generates the programme by which the 
legal system determines the criteria for coming to a decision of what will be 
lawful/unlawful and/or law/non-law.78 
Finally, conditional programmes prevent future facts – unknown at the 
time of making a decision – from having relevance as to what is ‘legal’ and/or 
‘illegal’. It is protective of the legal system in that future breakdown of the 
anticipated benefits of the legal decision at the time of its delivery, will not 
                                                
72 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n  6 at 111. Emphases in original. 
73 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6  at 196. 
74 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 197. 
75 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6  at 193. 
76Michael King and Chris Luhmann Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
60. 
77Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
60-61. 
78 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 193. 
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threaten law’s function of stabilising normative expectations.79 The ‘if – then’ 
formula of conditional programmes stands at the time of making the decision and 
therefore is deemed a valid decision regardless of whether the decision truly will 
turn out to be in the best interests of the child(ren) involved.  
The alternative form of programmes is what Luhmann calls purpose-
specific programmes.80 Purpose-specific programmes are based on present 
intentions that are projected onto the future and its success will be judged in the 
future based on its achievement (or not) of its purpose.81 Accordingly, the 
W&BIC doctrine is actually a purpose-specific programme. It is stating what the 
intention/outcome of the decision is, what it will achieve. This form of 
programme obviously runs the risk that the future will not turn out to be the way 
it is projected in the present. Luhmann acknowledges that there are purpose-
specific or purpose-oriented programmes in law but he maintains that they are 
still “nested”82 in conditional programmes where the system reduces complexities 
to the ‘if-then’ formula in order to reach decisions. Legal decisions cannot hinge 
on a future determination of what will be legally right or wrong. Judges are 
required to apply the code at the time of their decisions, and indeed they must 
make a decision. Judges “make their decisions according to the law, exclusively 
on the basis of what they see as the future at the moment of their decision.”83 
It is my contention that in western jurisdictions, W&BIC is now a 
purpose-specific programme introduced by the political system.via legislation. 
However, as will be discussed in chapter 4, the legal system via the courts had 
already started to move towards the norm that greater shared parenting will be 
good for children without legislative instruction. Ever since the introduction of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, legislatures84 have been 
adapting or introducing legislation that structured what the outcome of W&BIC 
should be. What this political impact means for children is that decisions about 
their lives after their parents’ separation are now made in accordance with 
political ideals and pressures which may have little to do with their actual day-to-
                                                
79Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
61. 
80 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 200.  
81 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 199. 
82 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 196. 
83 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 200. 
84 The outcomes envisioned by the Convention in relation to custody of children after separation, 
had already been legally introduced by legislatures in some countries and in states of the USA. 
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day welfare and best interests but much to do with the political system’s agenda in 
accordance with gaining or losing (political) power. The political system is 
governed by its code: government/opposition and its programmes are designed to 
either gain power or stay in power. Saving public money is one result that 
invariably increases governments’ esteem with the middle and upper classes. By 
still delegating CCDs to the legal system, but now with purpose-specific 
programmes/instruction, the political system protects itself against societal 
backlash, because the legal system is immune from potentially negative 
consequences and because decisions made in the legal system will remain legally 
correct regardless of the decision’s actual impact on children’s lives. The only risk 
for the political system is that the outcomes in the legal system are not necessarily 
in accordance with political ideals either, but then it remains free to amend the 
legislation in future and again will be seen as ‘doing something’ about perceived 
problems.  
Law is not very capable of steering human behaviour and it can merely set 
normative expectations despite people’s behaviour and preferences. It can legalise 
notions of shared parenting and co-parenting and provide opportunity for the 
contact parent to parent, but it can do nothing about how parents parent. And it is 
how parents parent that ultimately impacts on W&BIC. Not whether parents are 
legally acknowledged to have a ‘right’ to parent. Family law is infamous for not 
having much power to enforce its decisions upon the parties in CCDs. It is 
therefore very questionable whether the operations of the legal system can offer 
the change that the political system seeks, such as continued support (especially 
financially) and involvement from both parents post-separation in their children’s 
lives or that parents will co-operate and collaborate in accordance with the ideals 
of the new post-separation family.  
2.5 Courts as central to the legal system 
 
Luhmann argues courts occupy the centre position in the legal system with 
the other structures of law (such as legal practice and the legislature) occupying 
the periphery.85 Importantly he stresses that is not a hierarchical situation. He 
explains that courts’ position is justified due to the evolution of the legal system, 
                                                
85 Richard Nobles and David Schiff “Introduction” in Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System 
above n 6 at 30-31.  
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which came to demand that courts must actually decide all cases brought before 
them in line with the prohibition of the denial of justice.86 Constitutional law 
requires the courts to take responsibility for interpreting legislation and it is courts 
that then ultimately decide what is legal and illegal87 or, put differently, why and 
how something will be legal/illegal. 
Luhmann is of the view that the rules of organisation also apply to the 
courts.88 Within this particular arena of the legal system, judges have to adhere to 
the substantive standards of the organisation, its over-arching direction and 
beliefs within given epochs. Membership of an organisation such as the court 
system, which also functions bureaucratically due its hierarchical structure, 
provides incentives and deterrents for its members to make decisions in specified 
ways.89 Organisations have their own routines and discretion is often exercised in 
routine and repetitive ways.90 People who work in an organisation, experience the 
weight of established expectations from others in the organisation as to how they 
will make decisions and this contributes significantly to the uniformity of 
decisions.91 It is part of the desire for acceptance and peer esteem within the 
courts’ organisation. In the common law system judges are former barristers, and 
it is in the pursuit of their profession that they “acquire a strikingly homogeneous 
collection of attitudes, beliefs, and principles, which to them represents the public 
interest.”92 
Legislation belongs to both the social systems of politics (as Luhmann 
generally refers to the political system) and law. Luhmann argues that political 
trends towards and within the welfare state have had the effect of courts being 
challenged with purpose-specific conceptualisations in legislation93 and this is 
particularly true of the current state of the W&BIC doctrine where legislation has 
identified the elements that will be important in establishing W&BIC. However 
                                                
86 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 279. 
87Richard Nobles and David Schiff “Introduction” above n 85 at 31. 
88 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 293. 
89  “Introduction” in Keith Hawkins (ed) The Uses of Discretion (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
(UK), 1992) at 6. 
90 See e.g. Martha Feldman “Social limits to discretion: an organizational perspective” in Keith 
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91 Ibid. 
92 John Aneurin Grey Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary (3rd ed, Fontana Books, London, 1985) 
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the courts find a solution in the introduced principles of the legislation because it 
is helpful to again simplify complexity and complements the norms that the legal 
system were already visualising – shared parenting as equality. In reality, for a 
judge, an established purpose is merely a guideline for finding conditions that can 
support a decision in accordance with law’s code i.e. legal or illegal.94 Legislation 
can be purpose-specific in its formulation but still is subjected to law’s 
conditional programmes. Court decisions are, in the end, therefore never based on 
purpose-specific programmes.95 Of course judges are subject to strict procedural 
rules such as statutory interpretation but: 
 
[T]here can be no guarantee, ... that law will put into effect the policy agenda in 
the precise way that government intended, as this will always be contingent upon 
how judges choose to interpret legislation.96 
 
As will be seen, in the next chapter, when the political system introduced equal 
consideration of the parents in CCDs via legislation the courts did not overnight 
start to award some mothers custody of children (and bearing in mind that CCDs 
were far and few between and reserved for the wealthy). But once it did, instead 
of moving towards equality between the parents or more shared care it established 
the TYD doctrine that lead to mothers being overwhelmingly favoured in CCDs. 
Ultimately the meaning given/interpretation by the last judge, judges or 
majority of the last round of judges to have dealt with the specific litigants’ legal 
issues will be what the law/the court says it is. When it comes to legislation, the 
issue for the legal system is different than for the political system. Politics and 
law have different aims where the former needs to be perceived as having 
achieved its purpose, while the legal system is not subjected to determinations of 
the success of its decisions.97 Even if statutory interpretation may be relevant to 
determine parliament’s intentions (e.g. the “mischief rule”) in making legal 
decisions, this only applies to the resolution of ambiguities in the wording of the 
                                                
94 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 202. 
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96Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
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legislation. Still the ‘if – then’ formula applies in that if there is an ambiguity, 
then the courts may have recourse to parliamentary debates to clarify the mischief 
but it is not suggested that courts then take over responsibility for removing or 
decreasing the ‘mischief’.98 
Conditional programmes then include modes of interpretation such as the 
intentions of the legislature, but where the court is confronted with issues or 
recourse that have not been pre-determined, decisions still have to be made. 
Courts must transform indeterminacy into determinacy when needed and it is 
courts that have to “construct fictitiously the availability or unavailability of 
principles, where necessary.”99 Law’s conditional programmes extract 
information from the environment and reformulate it (programmes it) so as to 
convert it into legal communications100 to which the binary code can ultimately be 
applied. This is possible because the legal system is cognitively open to its 
environment. 
2.6 Cognitive openness 
  
As an autopoietic system, the legal system must be able to determine 
whether certain conditions have been met or not101 in relation to its constant 
production and reproduction of legal communications. Cognitive openness helps 
the law to co-ordinate its own continued operations with the actual differences in 
its environment.102 Lest one thinks that a sophisticated and omnipotent system 
such as the legal system is thankfully ‘open-minded’ it must be remembered that 
in autopoietic theory law’s openness is a condition of its closure and as 
Teubner103 reminds us: 
 
Any cognitive activity – be it theory or empirical research – is nothing but an 
internal construction by the cognizing unit; and every testing procedure that 
pretends to examine the validity of internal constructions against outside reality is 
only an internal comparison of different world constructions. 
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99 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 292. 
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Because of its function and status of being the creator of normative 
expectations, the law especially can hide its self-production and closure by way of 
its cognitive openness104 and in the form of its conditional programmes. Law too 
needs to stay in touch with its environment’s production of the legal system’s 
communications and it therefore uses language that is more or less consistent with 
its usage in the environment.105 Law could choose to evolve its understanding of 
‘childhood’ (as socially constructed since the seventeenth century106 with most 
historians agreeing that this process held pride of place in the eighteenth 
century107), ‘motherhood’ (e.g. by way of the Tender Years Doctrine) and the 
patriarchal father (making inroads into his once absolute right to custody). 
Cognitive awareness of its environment is crucial for the legal system’s evolution 
because it cannot apply its operations to its environment if it has no idea of events 
and developments within the environment – to which it may, or may not, have to 
apply its code and develop programmes that ultimately determine whether the law 
will allocate the value legal or illegal to an event or action. 
2.7 Structural coupling 
 
Luhmann applies the concept of structural coupling to social systems and 
sees it as explaining the system’s relationship with its environment.108 Autopoietic 
theory of social systems retains the idea of “highly selective connections between 
systems and [their] environments”.109 This does not mean that the coupling 
systems then contribute to each other’s operations in reproducing each system’s 
elements (communications) and networks110 but systems can cause 
perturbations/irritations/stimulation for each other. Rather than input-output 
between social systems structural coupling occurs where different systems 
repeatedly exchange communications.111 This occurs when a system experiences a 
perturbation/irritation in its environment (i.e. from another system) that enters the 
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‘perturbed’ system’s meaning-making operations, but only once the receiving 
system has determined how to and whether to produce its own communication in 
relation to the information received. It must be remembered that information in 
the environment is received and reproduced by autopoietic social systems wholly 
internally and therefore the same event will not necessarily be received by 
different systems in the same way.112 Once structural coupling occurs, 
developments within the system that causes/caused the perturbation are coupled to 
parallel but independent developments in the ‘perturbed’ system.113 
The legal system’s coupling with social science – specifically its work on 
children’s needs and parental relationships – is a prime example. Law could no 
longer claim its ability to decide what is best for children in CCDs without 
seemingly ‘co-operating’ with the new system that had emerged as ‘experts’ in 
precisely the area where law had been making decisions: children’s welfare. The 
rise in social science data/research findings had become an irritant in law’s 
environment that required coupling. What happens however is that the legal 
system extracts and selects some of the ideas from social science (for example that 
children suffer because of divorce since they see one parent less) that will suit 
law’s function of creating and stabilising  normative expectations, (shared 
parenting or the legality of ongoing relationships with both parents).  
All the environment/another social system does is trigger 
perturbations/irritations within the system. However, where different systems 
select the same event for response, structural coupling can occur which means 
there is a “twofold membership of events”.114 Both systems seemingly have 
children’s W&BIC in mind but may have different ideas of how that should be 
achieved. (E.g. conflict – litigation – is harmful for children, ongoing 
relationships with both parents is good for children). 
Structural coupling between social systems indicates a particular 
relationship between them and systems structurally couple if they presuppose 
specific qualities in another system and rely on these as available for use.115 For 
example, the legal system may view political communications in the form of 
legislation as an instrument that will allow and support the court to make better or 
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more decisions about when arrangements will be legally right or wrong, while the 
political system may view the legislation as a means to improve political 
problems (for example reduce social support spending) which will ensure greater 
political support from the voting public. With legislation being the point of 
structurally coupling between the legal and political systems,116 these two systems 
are mutually dependent and co-evolve.117 Increased complexities in the political 
system can have the effect of increased complexity in the legal system because 
these two systems are closely linked. This implies co-evolution but not 
synchronisation between the systems since they both remain autopoietic118 each 
operating with their own code and programmes.  
The political system in modern society has its own unique code by which 
it operates and its own unique function. The former is a two-level code: firstly its 
binaries are government/governed, which means that the political system 
identifies itself in relation to those it can exercise power over.119 With the long 
history of the nuclear family having been constructed and positioned as the basic 
organising unit and ‘foundation’ of society in the western paradigm, it needs little 
clarification as to whether the government sees itself as ‘governing’ families, thus 
that level of the code, is satisfied.120 Secondly the ‘government’ side of this 
binary then also operates in accordance with the split between government and 
opposition as expressed by political parties121 i.e. the second level of the political 
system’s code by which it operates is government/opposition. The consequence is 
of course that whenever the government expresses itself by exercising its power, 
it does so in contrast to its opposition that constantly competes for the power. 
Holding or gaining power is the code under which the political system operates.  
The function of the political system is to make collectively binding 
decisions (e.g. legislation, regulations and by-laws), which it does through the 
                                                
116 Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
70. 
117 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 382-383. 
118 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 383. 
119 Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
71. 
120 Parkinson also refers to and discusses the politicization of family law: Patrick Parkinson Family 
Law and the Indissolubility of Parenthood (Cambridge University Press, New York (NY), 2011) 
chapter 1. 
121 Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
72. 
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medium of power.122 It is the system in modern society that holds power and is 
responsible for making decisions that reaches across the boundaries of other 
systems thereby stimulating structural coupling between those systems affected. 
Since the creation of the concept of ‘rule of law’ and the doctrine of ‘the sources 
of law’ the political system’s power has been legitimised123 and thereafter the law 
offered an area for political creativity.124 Note also that the political system 
acknowledges the autonomy of the legal system when legislation or changes to 
legislation is anticipated by often calling for reports from the legal system, but 
recommendations made in such reports will not necessarily be followed by the 
political system. While politically desirable consequences may steer courts the 
autopoietic nature of differentiated functional systems’ operations means that the 
political system itself cannot pre-empt or determine how issues will be decided or 
choices made within those other social systems. By virtue of their self-reference 
(closure) they will operate in accordance with their own self-determined 
communications (for example in the legal system precedents, rules, doctrines, 
procedures i.e. its own conditional programmes). The legal system at times 
requires action (change in legislation) from the political system in order to cope 
with a changing environment and, conversely, the political system requires a 
forum to pass political problems on to and the legal system can deal with these by 
way of self-reference, by referring to established or newly introduced legal 
norms.125 The political system does provide broad orientations for the recipient 
systems on matters that the latter find it cannot adequately resolve without such 
orientations126 and do therefore heavily influence the formation of normative 
expectations. I suggest that this is what has happened as regard W&BIC.  
Importantly, changes in one system will not always result in the same 
changes in the other. For example, when no-fault divorce was first introduced by 
the political system via legislation, the aim was to reduce litigation and thus cut 
costs.127 However the legal system found itself with a huge increase in workload 
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and, in addition, with the loss of a primary programme it used to determine child 
custody, namely the behaviours of the parties that led to the divorce. When 
W&BIC was introduced by the legal system it was to justify deviation from 
normative expectation (father’s right to custody). However, eventually and over 
time the political system found itself spending large amounts on social 
support/benefits under the ‘mother principle’.   
By performing its function of stabilising normative expectations, the law 
aids the political system but it must be remembered, in accordance with the legal 
system’s internal determinations of the political system’s communications.  
Communications come about through a synthesis of selected information, 
and selective understanding (or misunderstanding).128 Luhmann explains that 
producing and delivering communication “is always a selective occurrence”129 
where the self-production of communications “grasps something out of the actual 
referential horizon ... and leaves other things aside”.130 The social system views 
its environment – comprised of other social systems – as a “horizon”.131  For 
Luhmann, the law must invariably simplify complex material in order to reduce it 
to norms, over time, which can be relied upon in order for society and its other 
systems to know what to anticipate as regards legal/illegal.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
128 Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16 at 
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129 Niklas Luhmann Social Systems above n 8 at 140. 
130 Ibid. (Emphases in original.) 
131 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness: on reality in the world of law” above n 19 at 337.  
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Chapter 3   Jurisdiction for the development of the welfare principle 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will explore how the law had initiated and developed the 
W&BIC doctrine and its first conditional programmes in relation to custody 
decisions. The starting point will be to determine how the common law legal 
system had established jurisdiction over children’s interests in founding the 
parens patriae doctrine. It is evident that this development had occurred 
autopoietically. I will then proceed by looking at the English law as inherited by 
New Zealand at the time of its colonisation by England. Thereafter some 
explorations as to the New Zealand legal system’s communications on the 
W&BIC principle will be offered. The way in which the legal system created and 
enabled the W&BIC doctrine to develop from within the legal system offers a fine 
example of its self-referential operations and closure as is inherent to autopoietic 
social systems. At the time when the first notions of W&BIC emerged, the law 
had already differentiated into one of society’s autonomous subsystems, which 
saw as its function the creation, and stabilisation of norms that will stand – over 
and within various epochs – despite disputes or actual experience.  
3.2 Establishing law’s jurisdiction: parens patriae 
 
The doctrine that the king –via the courts – is ‘parent of the country’ 
(parens patriae132) and must act as a wise parent in cases involving children, came 
about because of recursive errors within the legal system but due to law’s closure 
or self-reference it became entrenched as a legal issue to be determined by law 
regardless of the doctrine’s dubious emergence. The supreme duty (today) to 
uphold the welfare interests of children was first grounded in the private property 
                                                
132The parens patriae jurisdiction in respect of those people of ‘unsound mind’ is statutorily 
enshrined in New Zealand in the Judicature Act 1908, s 17. As regards children the jurisdiction 
was confirmed as a residual sovereign power in Pallin v Department of Social Welfare [1983] 
NZLR 266 (CA) at 272 per Cooke J. 
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interests of the nobility in feudal England.133 From the reign of Edward I (ending 
in 1307) the English Crown had claimed a specific wardship over ‘natural fools 
and idiots’, and minor heirs’ property rights where the father had died. This was 
codified in statute in 1324134 and the jurisdiction was eventually vested in the 
newly established Court of Wards and Liveries in 1540.135 It was the practice of 
that court to sell the wardship to mothers or equally often to strangers, suggesting 
that the wardship of minors was legally administered for financial gain to the 
Crown.136 Wardship of mentally disabled people and fatherless children’s land 
tenures preserved their estates but also advanced the king’s revenues that were 
collected on those. No mention was made of the Crown’s status as parent or father 
and Clark observes “English law seems singularly devoid of concern for children 
until at least 1535.”137 
The first time that the king was described as acting as a ‘father’ to those 
who lacked capacity was in 1567 by a law reporter called William Staunford.138 
Custer, after having done exhaustive research into the origins of the ‘parent’ status 
of the Crown believed that: “[t]he parenthetical as a father mentioned by 
Staunford may ultimately have given the doctrine of parens patriae its name”139 
and in fact no sources had established a responsibility for the welfare of children 
to that date. The Court of Wards and Liveries showed very little concern for the 
welfare of its wards and paid prime attention to the collection of revenues, which 
made the institution distinctly unpopular.140 For nearly a hundred years, the legal 
system could continue its operations regardless of its unpopularity (ignored 
perturbation) due to its autonomy and the closure of its operations but also 
because; politically the Crown did not intervene via legislation. Eventually 
                                                
133 See e.g. Lawrence Custer “The origins of the doctrine of parens patriae” (1978) 27 Emory L. J. 
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though, growing instability141 and violence about, inter alia, the feudal 
institutions, saw the Court of Wards and Liveries and the feudal system with its 
doctrine of tenure abolished in 1660.142 This did not bring an end to the legal 
notion/communication that the courts had a parental role in relation to those who 
lacked capacity although it was some time before the courts had an opportunity to 
raise it again. Legal principles/programmes and communications (e.g. judgments) 
stay part of the legal communications network until the system alters, expands or 
abolishes them. With the legal system’s establishment of the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy/legislative supremacy, the political system also has the 
power to proscribe legal doctrines by way of legislation. Nothing of the sort 
happened and the Crown must have therefore been content with what 
subsequently became the establishment of the parens patriae notion within the 
legal system.  
In 1696, Lord Somers, in the case of Falkland v Bertie143 held that infants 
and “ideots” were among several things that belonged to the Crown as ‘pater 
patriae’ and that they were formerly “to be removed to the Court of Wards by the 
statute; but upon the dissolution of that court came back again to the 
Chancery”.144 The oddity in that legal communication (judgment) is that general 
wardship over minors and the mentally disabled was never transferred to the 
Court of Wards and Liveries and therefore could not have been transferred to the 
Chancery Court. Where a father died prior to his heir’s majority, or a dispute 
arose as to the identity of the heir, or the nature of the land tenure, the Crown 
became interested in the child to ensure proper passage of wealth and, 
importantly, to collect tax on the property.145 Thus the Crown formerly had the 
feudal right of wardship under the tenure system over a minor’s property until the 
                                                
141 This was a time, in England, of great political instability and growing civil unrest that 
eventually, lead to The Glorious Revolution of 1688. Conflict arose in the realms of religion, 
politics, economics and law: political conflict between parliament and the Crown; religious 
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Harold J Berman Law and Revolution II: The impact of the protestant reformations on the western 
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minor reached majority but that system had been abolished nearly forty years 
before Falkland. Lord Somers cited no authority upon which he based his claim 
that the king was ‘pater patriae’ to all infants and Seymour observes that the 
parens patriae doctrine could just as well have been “plucked from the air.”146As 
Luhmann says, if the law cannot be found, it must be invented.147Custer argues 
that it is likely that Lord Somers was familiar with the work of Staunford, which 
was the only source that could be found as regards the Crown’s father status and 
responsibility.148 In any event, Falkland was the first jurisprudential assertion of 
the Crown’s parental status. 
As Luhmann explains, normative expectations are created and stabilised 
by the legal system over time. Twenty six years went by before Lord Somers’ 
communication was invoked by the Chancery court in the 1722 case of Eyre v 
Shafsbury149 a case which actually did involve the care and custody of minors. 
The conditional programme of precedent, “the hallmark of the modern English 
common law”150 had been established by then and therefore the operation of self-
reference; referring back to the system’s own communications as a ‘source’ of law 
and to establish authority. The court also took the opportunity to reassert its 
jurisdiction over children. However, this time the authority cited for finding that 
the Crown has responsibility for the care of infants was Beverley’s Case151 
decided in 1603.Coke reported that King’s Bench case which involved a claim of 
lack of capacity as a defence to avoid debt. Custer examined the original 
transcripts of that case and found that either Coke or his printer had inserted 
“enfant” instead of “ideot” where the Crown’s jurisdiction over mentally disabled 
people was stated in the 1610 edition. This error was repeated and even expanded 
upon in the translated English edition of 1658.152Custer also established that the 
error was not corrected until 1826 where, in that edition of Coke’s Reports, only 
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the word “idiot” is used throughout. Lord Macclesfield in Eyre chose to rely on 
this precedential ‘authority’ (rather than the non-precedential writing of 
Staunford) because “[s]omehow the old Beverley’s Case had been found, and ... 
used.”153 Thereafter Eyre became the precedent to be relied upon for upholding 
the Crown and the equity courts’ protective authority over minors.154 
Three years later in Shaftsbury v Shaftsbury155 Coke’s report was again 
invoked by Chancery but expanded upon as having compared the king’s 
protection of infants to the protection of idiots. This was a double error because 
the court “incorrectly restated even the misprinted report of [Beverley’s Case].”156 
As Custer points out, Coke never compared the parens patriae authority over 
children to that over ‘idiots’ but only mistakenly inserted “enfants” among the 
Crown’s prerogative powers.157 Moreover the Chancery court in Shaftsbury then 
established that the care of children had reverted to that court when the Court of 
Wards and Liveries had been abolished despite the fact that Chancery never 
exercised this jurisdiction prior the establishment of the Court of Wards and 
Liveries.158 The point here is that had it not been for law’s need to find authority 
within its own network of communications, (its closure) the error – once it was 
discovered – could have been rectified but this would probably have caused too 
much consternation in the environment – for those about whom decisions had 
already been made, and within the system and therefore the likely explanation is 
that continued assertion of law’s ability and expertise was preferred.  
Thereafter the court’s parens patriae authority in relation to minors became 
entrenched in the legal system. Instead of the doctrine having developed out of 
necessity and legal reasoning, the English judges, committed to the by then 
developed conditional programme of stare decises, (further adding to and ensuring 
the closure of the legal system) could find precedent in a printing error159and 
thereby firmly declaring parens patriae to be legal/lawful/law. By 1893 Lord 
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Esher in the case of R v Gyngall160 felt confident to claim this usage of parens 
patriae as having been exercised by the court “from time immemorial”.161 
This brief overview of the initial establishment of the legal system’s 
authority to decide what is best for children – and why society and other social 
systems to this day rely on the legal system to make these decisions after non-
legal alternatives prove ineffective – is a noteworthy example of how the legal 
system operates to produce and re-produce legal communications from within the 
system. From the (erroneously) induced parens patriae the W&BIC doctrine 
evolved, as law produced ever more communications regarding its scope and the 
law’s jurisdiction so that the court today apparently represents the wisdom of the 
legendary king Solomon. For example Cross J’s assertion has been relied upon by 
both the House of Lords and the English Court of Appeal.162 His honour said: 
 
[Parents in custody applications] ...  are committing their child to the protection of the 
court and asking the court to make such order as it thinks fit for its benefit.163 
 
From the start of the establishment of the legal system in New Zealand, parens 
patriae was one particular feature of the High Court’s jurisdiction and with the 
establishment of the Family Court the principles established under that doctrine 
continue to influence that court’s duty.164 
 
3.3 Probable and possible irritants 
 
What was going on in society at the time when the courts established its 
jurisdiction over children’s interests? What could have been the ‘irritations’ in its 
environment that the legal system chose to react to? No doubt the factors were 
multiple and open to interpretation165 (and speculation). Some however can be 
identified. The (former) Court of Wards and Liveries primarily operated to secure 
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revenue for the government.166 It is not the purpose here to delve into the corrupt 
and shameful practices that went on in the court which also added to its 
unpopularity and the eventual abolition167 under the Tenures Abolition Act 1660. 
Of relevance is that a major source of government revenue was under threat. 
Ways had to be found to protect that government interest.  
The Act explicitly gave fathers the power to appoint a guardian for an 
infant heir, who would act on behalf of the infant after the father’s death or even 
during his lifetime if the father made such a specification.168 Courts subsequently 
interpreted that statute as having displaced the mother’s guardianship by 
nurture.169 By involving courts in child custody – even as enforcers of fathers’ 
rights – the Act provided for judicial intervention which created a legal shift that 
would eventually undermine those rights.170 Fathers wanted to appoint guardians, 
not because they did not want their wives to have guardianship, but because the 
law had given a wife no legal power  by which she could manage the ‘family’ 
estate after her husband’s death or while he was still alive but for example needed 
to travel and have someone oversee his affairs. She would continue to care for the 
children while the appointed male guardian managed the children’s estates. This 
was then considered to serve the child’s interests. In this way guardianship as a 
legal issue was introduced. While the father was granted a legal means by which 
he could utilise his power via a legal instrument, a father’s absolute rights became 
subject to judicial interpretation and discretion and “the all-encompassing right of 
child custody was no longer the father’s, but that of the judge”.171 It is for this 
reason that the parens patriae doctrine was re-invented (reproduced as per 
Luhmann) in England i.e. to give the legal system wider jurisdiction to regulate 
guardianships.172 I say ‘re-invented’ because without insight into every court 
decision we can only rely on the first recorded court decision that actually 
                                                
166 See The National Archives (UK) for a concise summary of its history and functions at  
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in paternal custody” (1999) 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1344 at 1344. 
171 Sarah Abramowicz “English child custody law, 1660-1839: the origins of judicial intervention 
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survived but it seems plausible that parens patriae had been espoused by the law 
before Bertie v Falkland.173 Abramowicz also states that the court in Falkland 
“summoned up the doctrine of parens patriae, and in doing so described the 
doctrine as it had never been described before.”174 But the upshot was that parens 
patriae then became relevant to child custody primarily for the purpose of 
regulating testamentary guardianship at the time and not to other matters relating 
to children’s welfare and best interests. However, when mothers and their 
supporters began to agitate for maternal rights, the legal system fell back on the 
notion that a father’s rights were absolute despite the ability of judicial 
interference that parens patriae had established. 
Historians generally agree that profound changes occurred from the 
sixteenth century onwards that impacted upon the ideals and behaviour of 
families, family life and childhood.175The social background of the time was first 
the growing intellectual re-emergence of humanism which started during the 
Renaissance and that proclaimed, inter alia, that children held the key to the future 
of the State, and thus that their upbringing needed to be shaped accordingly. The 
family came to be seen as (potentially) a model of the State and because the State 
was dominated by men, fathers again had to be the crucial figures to govern and 
organise the family in a manner that would produce good citizens: obedient, 
religious, and upholding harmonious relationships.176 This led to a break with 
medieval practice where mothers were viewed as primary in the child’s life for 
especially the first seven years. In the religious system– andrising during the 
Reformation that followed the re-emergence of humanism – both Protestantism 
and Catholicism supported the notion that the family is a where children should be 
raised for the good of the State and the church, and both movements supported the 
education of children to fulfil their role as good citizens of the State and members 
of the church.177This was possibly a welcome stimulant in the legal system’s 
environment. Fathers, under the legal adoption of the Roman notions of patria 
potestas and pater familias, had to rule their families as the King did his subjects. 
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A father’s responsibility and authority was unlimited and the advice books on 
parenting that appeared – and which the upper classes and merchant families read 
– were aimed at fathers, advising them on child rearing practices.178 Desiderius 
Erasmus produced numerous works on the importance of early childhood 
education and stressed the crucial role of the father in shaping his son’s 
character179 while the mother had the role of nurturing. The Protestant Justus 
Menius wrote that “[t]he diligent rearing of children is the greatest service to the 
world, both in spiritual and temporal affairs, both for the present life and for 
posterity.”180 
It can be speculated, in light of the fact that the law is cognitively open to 
and aware of developments in its environment, that this movement in social 
thought and systems affected the legal system also. As will be discussed below, it 
most definitely did as regards a father’s absolute right to custody of his children. 
Judges may have also seen the law as playing an important role, where it could 
and via the doctrine of parens patriae, in ensuring that children receive proper 
education in addition to the established legal protection for the preservation of a 
child’s estate. Expanding the application of parens patriae to beyond the 
protection of just the child’s property could, in cases of guardianship after a 
testator’s (father) death, serve to protect and ensure children’s education. For 
example, where a will made no provision for the expense of the children’s 
education the court ordered such provision to be made from the deceased’s 
estate.181In Barwick v Barwick182 the executors of a will were ordered to put aside 
a specified amount of money for the children’s education and where a husband 
died making no provision for his (legitimate) unborn child, the court ordered that 
                                                
178 Philip Gavitt Charity and Children in Renaissance Florence: The Ospedale Degli Innocenti, 
1410-1536 (Studies in Medieval & Early Modern Civilization) (Ann Arbor, Northumberland, 
1990) at 275-279. 
179 It is unclear how much Erasmus thought daughters should partake in this education but some 
commentators felt it likely that he was primarily concerned with boys: see e.g. Hugh Cunningham 
Children & Childhood in Western Society since 1500 above n 107 at 44. This would make sense in 
accordance with the belief that the boy child had such an important role to play as a father in the 
future i.e. that more attention had to be given to him during upbringing and education. 
180Quoted in Steven E Ozment When Fathers Rules: Family life in Reformation Europe (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (MA), 1983) at 132. 
181Bright v Chappell, Tothill 6, 21 Eng. Rep. 106 (Ch. 1629-1630) Cited in Neil Howard Cogan 
“Juvenile law before and after the entrance of ‘parens patriae’” above n 138 at 152, n 25. 
182Tothill, 52, 21 Eng. Rep. 121 (Ch. 1601-1602). Cited in Neil Howard Cogan “Juvenile law 
before and after the entrance of ‘parens patriae’” above n 138 at 152, n 26. 
36 
 
the executors make provision for a sufficient allowance from the deceased’s 
estate.183 
This of course would have only had application for those who stood to 
inherit, thus as was the case for most of the law’s history, the operations of the 
legal system in settling disputes were only accessible to those with wealth and 
assets. Nonetheless, the law started to show concern for children’s education at 
least before Falkland184 in 1696.Due to the emergence of the thoughts on 
childhood education and its justification as being in the best interests of the State, 
the political system also moved to make schools more widely available to the 
laity185in order to allow for greater education of children. Therefore the 
importance and proposed benefits of educating children took hold and moved the 
religious system, the political system, and the legal system to choose to lend their 
weight in support. 
For the most part however, the court at that time, acting as ‘parent’ saw its 
role only in relation to issues surrounding children’s property and the protection 
thereof. Establishing and stabilising normative expectations take time and the 
legal system’s autonomy to expand on its own communications as to what will be 
legal/illegal is protected by its autopoiesis. It was however not until In re 
Spence186 that a court held that intervention to protect a child’s person from its 
parent or guardian, i.e. in the absence of property, was legal. 
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Chapter 4   The English legal system and the custody of privileged187 children 
4.1 Introduction 
New Zealand was colonised by England during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and legal practice was at first and for some time, taken from 
English practice.188 In fact New Zealand’s first statutes on matrimony and 
guardianship of children were near carbon copies of the English Acts.189 English 
law in this area retained its ecclesiastical character for centuries until the early 
years of the nineteenth-century.190 I will therefore start by looking at the 
developments in the English legal system that New Zealand inherited. The 
starting point is to look at how the law operated to legalise the ‘rule of the father’ 
which led to his unequivocal custody of children that was accepted as being in 
children’s best interests. This was done by legally controlling marriage and the 
position of husbands and wives. 
4.2 Establishing the patriarchal family 
 
A closer look at family relations in England under Anglo-Saxon law, prior 
to the Norman Conquest reveals that a wife and mother once had the right to leave 
a marriage, to take the children with her and to claim half of the marital 
property.191 Indeed marriage was a private agreement between a man and a 
woman with hardly any link with the church or the law.192 This is not to say that 
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husbands and wives were considered equals in all respects but customary practice 
offered significantly more protection and rights for married women than what the 
common law imposed on them.  
At the start of establishing the common law system, the English royal 
courts did not reveal the sources of the principles they applied as they started to 
re-shape local custom.193 It is accepted however that with the establishment of 
common law the English legal system also took principles and rules from the 
Roman legal system194 because, inter alia, many of the English judges and 
lawyers at the time were educated in Corpus Iuris Civilis in Europe.195 Pater 
Patriae was one principle taken from Roman law in order to establish the 
normative expectation of a father’s power over his children and their mother.196 It 
can be argued that the English legal system was in need of established conditional 
programmes or legal communications so as to provide established ideas as to what 
is legal/illegal or matters of law/non-law. Perhaps if, as Luhmann says, legal 
communications can only be produced by the/a legal system, then adopting them 
from another jurisdiction is acceptable just so long as they are legal 
communications. Subsequently the legal conditional programmes of precedent, 
stare decisis and the legally created fiction that judges simply declare the law 
guaranteed that judicial decisions would be presented as the product of reason.197 
Normative expectations do not reflect reality but merely state what ought to be 
with the joint sanction of ‘law’.  
 
Later, the so-called general immemorial custom of the realm, of which judges were the 
oracles, ... was pure fiction; ... It was in order to provide the Common law with a 
foundation in agreement with the traditional, canonical and Roman theories of the sources 
of law that this concept of general immemorial custom was ... invented. It was not based 
on any reality.198 
 
These conditional programmes (doctrines and rules) would protect the 
unity and closure of the system. The legal system had already differentiated into a 
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closed, autonomous system and society had no choice but to accept its autonomy. 
In other words, that only the legal system can decide if something is or is not 
legal/illegal had been accepted. It also confirms the paradox of law’s code, that is, 
that the code cannot be applied to itself. It thus cannot be determined whether the 
law’s application of its code as to what is legal or illegal or law/non-law is in fact 
ultimately right or an ‘über-truth’ at all. The law is what the law says it is.  
In addition, the growing power of the Christian Roman Catholic Church 
and the establishment of feudal law199 after the Norman Conquest changed 
women’s legal status for centuries to come. Roman Catholic canonists gradually 
incorporated the Christian theory of ‘unity’ into marriage and this became an 
available irritant in the legal system’s environment. The legal system ultimately 
chose to embrace this concept of unity between husband and wife thereby adding 
the value ‘legal’ to its institution200 and this was still underpinned even at the 
separation of canon and common law.201 
The law ‘structurally coupled’ with religion and reproduced the religious 
invention of husbands’ and wives’ unity as a legal conditional programme namely 
‘coverture’. Blackstone defined coverture as follows: 
 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she 
performs everything; and is therefore called in our law ... a feme-covert... under the 
protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her 
marriage is called her coverture ...202 
 
As said, this changed the legal position of English women with men and fathers 
placed in a superior and hierarchical position and women as basically mothers to 
legitimate (born within a legal marriage) heirs, submissive to their husbands and 
in need of men’s care – all made legal by and in accordance with ‘coverture’.203 
The ‘unity’ of English husband and wives as proclaimed by the Roman Catholic 
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church was what Luhmann called a block acceptance,204 reproduced as the legal 
rule of coverture. 
4.3 Custody of children post-divorce 
 
Judges in England up to the second half of the nineteenth century readily 
enforced a father’s unlimited right to custody of his children where he had not 
forfeited his paternal rights through some legally accepted misconduct, such as 
cruelty, lack education or financial support of the child.205 Cruelty had to be 
directed at the child, not the mother, and be shown to be a danger to life and limb. 
The law on custody of children used as its starting point again, the Roman legal 
doctrine of paternal power (patria potestas) which was widely accepted and 
applied as giving a father absolute rights to his children as his chattels.206 When 
the courts were eventually faced with disputes about the custody of children in 
inter-spousal disputes, the father was lawfully deemed to be the primary right-
holder – both economically and as to his right to benefit from his children’s 
services.207 This was upheld without mention of what will be best for the 
child(ren) at the time because questioning a father’s ‘natural’ right and position 
was unacceptable, thus legally wrong, according to law’s binary code, while 
upholding his position was legally right.208 Not even after his death could the 
mother or the children legally expect that she will be allowed custody of her 
children for if the father appointed a testamentary guardian, the father’s will 
would override her position,209 such as it was, and that appointed guardian would 
be responsible for the children. For all the criticism that can and has been evoked 
about this programme of law, one thing remains indisputable: the law on custody 
of children was very clear in terms of what was legal/illegal and society knew 
what to expect i.e. the normative expectation that was created by the law was 
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patent. Because coverture was so strict,210 and legal remedies rare, mothers and 
fathers very rarely turned to the courts for custody of their children before the 
nineteenth century.211It was not until the late nineteenth century that mothers 
actually began to achieve custody in more sufficient numbers and the law began 
to express something akin to maternal rights to custody of children.212As far as the 
law was concerned, because a father was deemed to be so superior and he held all 
the legal rights in the marriage under coverture his custody and guardianship 
would by default best serve the children’s interest. 
 
4.4 Children’s welfare as education and wealth 
 
The law of guardianship originally evolved so as to protect a parent’s 
(father’s) interests in the marriage of his heir because legal protection was 
afforded to the father’s proprietary interests in his child’s marriage.213 This was 
later extended to any economic interest in the child.214 Children’s economic 
interests were protected by law so as to ensure legal transference of family wealth 
to them and thereby the protection of the family fortune.215 The law is keenly 
focussed on ensuring children’s private maintenance and in that way it shares at 
least some values with the political system that appears to have a history of 
avoiding State relief to the poor or needy. In cases of wealth or property the 
organisation of the family often controls the distribution and transference of 
economic power in society.216 
During the eighteenth century there emerged a trend to interfere with the 
superior right of the father.217 Conditional programmes were created by the courts 
that legalised some grounds upon which the court could interfere with the father’s 
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rights. From the available case reports there appears to have arisen some judicial 
reasoning that did consider children’s interests to be more important than those of 
their parents.218 The basis of these decisions was never that the mother had a right 
to the custody of her child that displaced the father’s right, but rather that the 
father had lost his own rights to custody.219 Later (in the early nineteenth century) 
when custody became an issue of competing maternal and paternal rights judges 
ruled in favour of fathers, holding that paternal custody rights are superior to 
maternal rights. Petit identified the following grounds upon which the court could 
interfere with paternal custody.220 
 First was the ‘unfitness in character or conduct’ of the father. This 
required extreme immorality, cruelty, or bad character on the part of the father 
before the court would interfere. Reported cases include a father of bad character 
who, in addition, was incarcerated for the level of abuse he perpetrated on his 
wife; a father who was immoral and adulterous and deliberately taught his 
children to use obscene language; a father who was an outspoken atheist and who 
the court considered would lead his children to be immoral.  
Second there was distinct indication that the court would protect the 
children’s economic interests. Examples include a father who did not provide for 
his children’s support and thus was treated as if he had abandoned his lawful right 
to their custody; intervention to keep a child in the home of a wealthy relative if 
removing it would be detrimental to its social and economic position; refusal to 
grant a father custody after he had given it to another and the children were 
beneficiaries of a substantial inheritance. The courts also repeatedly interfered 
with parents or guardians who wanted their children to marry a person that was 
their social or economic inferiors.221  
Clearly material well-being was of consideration to the court which relates 
to the third ground. Lack of means played a contributory role i.e. alone it would 
not be sufficient for the court to interfere with the father’s rights but together with 
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concurring grounds such as desertion or poor character it would be considered. 
The fourth ground was where a father entered an agreement with a third party to 
take over his parental duties. These agreements would be treated as binding if the 
father acted upon it. The fifth ground was where a father had intention to leave the 
jurisdiction and the child was a ward of court.  
The court’s concern for the welfare and best interests of children regarding 
interference with the father’s custody still revolved to a significant extent around 
the child’s possession of property, its financial support and its education.222 
Prevention of the loss of financial interests and assets was an event that the law 
would not hesitate to protect. Where a child had no property or land rights to 
protect, the court would not generally interfere.223 Eldon LC explained: 
 
It is not, however, from any want of jurisdiction that [the court] does not act, ...when 
there is not property, but from a want of means to exercise its jurisdiction, because the 
court cannot take on itself the maintenance of all the children in the Kingdom.224 
 
 As discussed above, prior to the Tenures Abolition Act 1660 child custody 
law in England was primarily a spin-off of the laws of inheritance and land 
ownership. The law regarding the custody of children who did not stand to inherit 
a landed estate was negligible and hardly ever invoked guardianship matters.225 
Such children’s guardianship was known as guardianship by nurture and fell to 
both parents, lasting until the children reached the age of fourteen.226 For children 
who stood to inherit, the guardianship ‘by nature’ was that of the father, who 
could legally delegate his guardianship, also to the mother by his will and 
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testament.227 It lasted until the child turned twenty-one. The message from law 
was arguably that the law’s protection of children’s interests was largely based on 
their material resources i.e. to protect those (taxable) resources. 
 The courts interpreted the Tenures Abolition Act 1660 to have given it 
jurisdiction over the appointed guardian in matters of education, religion, 
domicile, marriage of the minor until the age of twenty-one, dispensation of the 
child’s property and access of the mother to the child where a guardian had the 
child in his possession.228 However the Act itself did not provide express guidance 
in this regard. The source of the court’s jurisdiction remained only the invented 
parens patriae doctrine. As Luhmann argues, the courts are central to the legal 
system. Also, from Luhmann’s perspective, it can be argued that legislature 
preferred to avoid providing guidance. He reasoned that this is because the 
political system benefits from the fact that the determination of what will be 
legally wrong and legally right happens in the legal system.229 The courts must 
transform indeterminacy into determinacy.230 The political system prefers to avoid 
the risk of its binding decisions via legislation turning out to be either impractical 
or a failure because programmes/decisions by the political systems are purpose 
specific and their success (or not) can be determined in the future and could, if 
unpopular, risk a loss of power. Courts must decide and they do not have the 
option of resorting to a declaration that the law could not be found within the 
system – a consequence of the operative closure of the legal system, i.e. that the 
law cannot turn to its environment for help in making a legal decision.231 
 From the very first cases heard in relation to the actions of a testamentary 
guardian, the court stated that it had authority to regulate fathers as well,232 not 
only the appointed guardian, while the Act itself had no wording to this effect. I 
suggest the courts wanted, at least inter alia, to establish a legal means to coerce 
fathers into their responsibilities as parents/bread earners to ensure for the 
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financial provision for children and so avoid State expense (if children become 
destitute) and to guarantee revenue (in the form of estate and land taxes). 
Financial provision extended also to children’s education, which had become 
highly valued in upper-class society by then as discussed above. Education was 
the means by which to mould and create future good citizens. Judges were 
necessarily influenced by their own education and would therefore have taken on 
board the necessity of education for a future ‘civil’ society. But it would seem that 
fathers did not always act the way the legal system and the upper classes wanted 
them to. 
 Indeed the first cases in which the court found it be justified to terminate a 
fathers’ parental rights involved situations where the father was seen by the court 
to have waived or sold his legal rights over his children in exchange for a legacy 
of property to himself or to his children via whom he would still have access to 
the legacy.233 In Ex parte Hopkins234 the court was forced by its own established 
rules (self-reference) regarding a father’s protected guardianship to uphold the 
father’s guardianship because, on the facts, the father had not waived or sold his 
legal rights relating to the children. The father had taken money from the legacy 
provided by the affluent deceased sponsors of his children while they (the 
testators) had appointed a guardian to care for the three children and to manage 
the legacy. The guardianship of the children was then disputed and the father 
wanted to take ‘possession of’ the children. While compelled to uphold his 
guardianship, the court refused that the father take possession of the children on 
the ground that he had not applied for a writ of habeas corpus and then also 
prohibited the father from attempting to take possession of his children by force. 
The court subsequently made a new rule in Butler v. Freeman235 deciding that a 
father was as equally subject to the law’s regulation as a testamentary guardian 
was. Literally two days later, the court held that a father is deemed to have waived 
his guardianship if he agreed to a testator’s appointment of a guardian to manage a 
legacy on behalf of a beneficiary under the testator’s will.236 In Lyons v Blenkin237 
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the court went so far as to find an implied waiver of the father’s rights where he 
had not entered into any express agreement of an appointed guardian but 
acquiesced to a legacy – a hefty fortune – for his children.  
The emotional, behavioural, and psychological well-being of the child 
played no part in determining children’s welfare because, arguably, the social 
sciences had not yet been established. In sync with coverture, a father’s right to 
custody and guardianship in relation to the mother during his lifetime remained 
near absolute except where he was very abusive, immoral or grossly irresponsible, 
as interpreted by the law. The Romantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelley was removed 
from custody because of his atheism.238 However in Blisset’s Case239 the mother 
was awarded custody despite the father’s objection, in order to further the child’s 
education and, indeed her welfare. Note however that the father was in financial 
distress and was considered to be improper. Lord Mansfield based the award of 
custody to the mother on, inter alia, the right of the public to oversee the 
education of its citizens, and accordingly to do what was best for the child.240 
Education as significant for the determination of welfare and best interests had, by 
then, become an important factor to the courts. The father had obtained a writ of 
habeas corpus (the correct legal procedure) to recover his child from the mother’s 
care. Lord Mansfield said: 
 
The natural right is with the father; but if the father is a bankrupt, if he contributed 
nothing for the child or family, and if he be improper, for such conduct as was suggested 
at the Judge’s Chambers, the court will not think it right that the child should be with 
him.241 
 
Nonetheless, in addition to patriarchal values and principles, the law usually 
followed and protected the financial and property interests of the children and in 
most disputes between spouses, men generally had more resources at their 
disposal since they were the bread earners and had proper work experience to 
secure better incomes with which to support and educate the children. The rules of 
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coverture also prevented a married woman from independently disposing of her 
property and therefore undermined her ability to use her capital for the benefit of 
her children. 
 However social perturbation was on the way to which law eventually had to 
respond to, despite the fact that “in English law, practices quickly become rigid – 
as the twig is bent, so the tree doth grow.”242 The legal norm of coverture was 
never fully realised, as is true of normative expectations, regarding the patriarch’s 
protective and provisional duties because in reality there were substantial 
divergence in the actual practices of society and for England this included its 
colonies.243 Husbands and fathers were often found to be abusive and/or avoiding 
family responsibility, behaviour that the rule of coverture desperately attempted to 
deny. And the value of children and childhood had changed and they were less 
seen by society as the father’s property. Their emotional well-being had become 
increasingly important. But the social and legal consequences of the doctrine of 
coverture were invasive and have carried over into the present because law, for so 
long, clung to its patriarchal norms, refusing to, or unable to ‘learn’ from 
experience i.e. from what realities in its environment had come to show.  
  
4.5 Custody disputes and children’s best interests in the 19th century 
 
 The case of the De Manneville couple in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century resulted in two court hearings: Rex v De Manneville244 and De Manneville 
v De Manneville.245 They were the first in a series of cases that led to the 
enactment of the Custody and Infants Act 1839. The case involved a wife’s 
application for a writ of habeas corpus against her husband for snatching their 
eight-month-old child from her after she had left her husband. The case did not 
involve physical abuse, gross impropriety (as defined by the courts), or serious 
financial inability on the part of the father. When faced with this inter-spousal 
dispute about the custody of a child both the King’s Bench and Chancery refused 
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the mother’s application for custody and would not interfere with the father’s 
right even though the child was still breastfeeding. The mother’s legal 
representatives raised arguments as to the child’s age and it being in need of its 
mother’s nurture, that the father was in a much less favourable financial position 
than the mother, and that the court had jurisdiction to disturb the father’s power 
and rights if the child’s interests demanded that246 yet all without legal 
acceptance. This legal affirmation was made despite changing social attitudes in 
law’s environment about childhood and what is deemed to be good for 
children247as well as the importance of the maternal role. Other 
irritations/stimulants in the social environment were, briefly, as follows.  
 Swiss philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose political philosophy, as is 
well known, would eventually play a motivating factor in the French 
Revolution,248 published the book  Émile in 1762.249 While a fictional work, this 
book was a treatise on the nature of education while he acknowledged and 
referenced John Locke in this work as his predecessor.250 As such Rousseau also 
echoed the ideas about children (that they can/must be shaped and that they are 
‘naturally’ innocent) that had already formed in the previous century and that they 
needed to be directed by appropriate care and education to become good citizens. 
But Rousseau was also determined to change society’s knowledge of childhood 
and his approach was radical at the time.251 He attacked the tradition that fathers 
are the guardians of child-rearing and wrote: 
  
You say mothers spoil their children, and no doubt that is wrong, but it is worse to 
deprave them as you do. The mother wants her child to be happy now ... if her 
method is wrong, she must be taught better. Ambition, avarice, tyranny, the 
mistaken foresight of fathers, their neglect, their harshness, are a hundredfold more 
harmful to the child than the blind affection of the mother.252 
 
Rousseau’s work (including his political writing) was anxiously banned from 
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publication in France by the political system. This did not mean that the social 
agitation died down or disappeared because of it, as the French Revolution 
eventually showed. His work was published in Holland and made its way into 
France and Great Britain – the latter where he fled to and settled for some time.  
 Émile’s (and his other work) popularity has been explained as having 
provided a “romantic, emotional, and unorthodox approach to life – an escape for 
which that generation was searching.”253 Rousseau’s ideas were widely supported 
among the literate and upper classes but, as always, there was a contradiction 
between a romantic idealised view of childhood embedded in eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment and the brutal reality of most children’s lives endured as a result 
of, inter alia, the English Poor Laws. Moving forward to the nineteenth century, 
when the plight of the poor had not improved, we only need to think of the works 
of popular authors such as Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist (1838) with its child 
protagonist born into poverty and subjected to the brutalities of the Workhouse 
system, and Charles Kingsley’s The Water Babies (1862-1863) about small boys 
working as chimney sweeps and dying as a result, to see this contradiction dealt 
with by novelists.254  
 It would be the affluent and powerful middle class that emerged due to the 
Industrial Revolution who would sway (eventually) the political system and it 
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became this class that would set societal trends.255 There are commentators who 
have described Rousseau’s influence on the notion of childhood and parental 
practices as the invention of modern motherhood256 i.e. the all sacrificing, fully 
devoted and gracious mother, who lives and dies for her children and who makes 
a loving home for them (and by default the father also) because before his 
influence mothers (including privileged ones) behaved somewhat differently.257 
Historians have raised doubts about the ‘truths’ of inherent ‘maternal instinct’ in 
light of historical common behaviour among European women which points to 
women having been far less sentimental or devoted to their children as 
subsequently became the accepted norm.  
 
What we now know is that, for several centuries in Europe, mothers like everybody else 
frequently saw children as, at best, amusing but more likely as enervating and time-
consuming and, at worst, unwanted. What is particularly hard to comprehend is that these 
attitudes, although generally held, were not fostered or forced on women by men. Among 
the very poor and those unwed mothers who left their children to die, perhaps the instinct to 
survive outweighed maternal instincts, but there is no such rationale for the attitudes of 
middle-class and upper-class women.258 
 
It is also interesting to note that the brothers Grimm, who collected and then 
captured traditional folklore in their fairytales over the first half of the nineteenth 
century, originally had both Snow White and the siblings Hansel and Gretel as 
abused and abandoned (respectively) by their biological mothers but later edited 
the stories to turn them into a stepmothers and conciliate their fairytales with the 
changing social values about biological motherhood as well as Christian beliefs at 
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the time.259 Rousseau’s ideas were – albeit in a less romantic form – also 
supported by religion yet without favouring mothers as much for their primary 
virtues vis-à-vis the father but it was apparently Rousseau’s ideas that finally 
romanticised childhood, child-education and, importantly, motherhood, or at least 
escorted in that school of thought among many members of literate society. 
 In England, before the end of the eighteenth century at least two hundred 
treatises on education had been published, all influenced by Émile.260 Rousseau’s 
book had the most immediate and noticeable impact on the practices of breast-
feeding (encouraging it) and swaddling (discouraging it) albeit that these ideas 
were not novel to him.261 He also strongly encouraged domestic life – filled with 
mother love – as salvation, as the means by which morals will be restored, as 
natural, and by which the nation will grow.262 Women responded, (young) 
children’s mortality dropped by nearly a third – most significantly amongst the 
aristocracy – childrearing became a female occupation and fathers took a 
subordinate position.263 Clearly, children also benefited from mothers increased 
nurturing and withdrawal from practices such as wet nursing and swaddling. 
Divorce was however still a remedy for the privileged only, therefore custody 
disputes between parents were minimal whiles the rules regarding children’s 
interests were still rigid. Women knew that the patriarchal norm was near 
impossible to circumvent.  
 Despite these events and changes in society, both the legal and political 
system still resisted acknowledging mothers as having rights264 in spousal 
disputes and ignored these developments in the environment preferring to uphold 
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the father’s superiority. This resonates with Luhmann since it indicates the level 
of unresponsiveness of closed systems and that environmental shifts will only be 
accepted into law’s operations when the law elects to respond to them. The law 
does not necessarily reflect society’s values. 
  Only in 1839 did the political system respond with the Care of Infants Act 
1839 that provided that a mother could seek custody of her children below the age 
of seven and access to older children unless she had committed adultery. But it 
would take about another thirty-five years before the concept of a woman being 
legally allowed to have custody of her children, would be applied within the legal 
system. The apparent complexity of reconciling paternal and maternal rights 
prevented substantial reform for many years and as far as the W&BIC standard 
went, this was only codified into statute in the 1920s.265 The willingness to 
interfere with the father’s rights shown in the eighteenth century was rejected in 
inter-spousal custody cases so as to uphold the established paternal rights at an 
apparent higher level than ever before.266  
Wright argues convincingly that it is because the legal system, controlled 
by men, protected and upheld patriarchy267 and this is most likely true, given the 
very nature and ideology embedded in coverture. Luhmann argued strongly that 
norm setting derives its preconditions from selectively constructed ideas of 
humanity,268 here the inferiority of women and the superiority of men. In deciding 
its operations the law alone chooses and this may amount to rejecting earlier legal 
communications. The court’s jurisdiction to interfere with the paternal right was 
rejected when the dispute was between the two parents as regards a child’s 
custody after divorce. As for the law’s ‘wise parent’ role, in the nineteenth 
century cases it continued to pay lip service to children’s welfare.269  
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4.6 The thirty-five years after De Manneville 
 
The De Manneville’s cases set a trend within the legal system to apply 
different standards in analysing the facts in custody disputes. This depended on 
who sought custody i.e. the mother or a third party.270 The modest approach to the 
welfare of the child in disputes primarily not involving the mother that had 
emerged in the years prior to De Manneville did not apply when the mother was 
the petitioner regardless of whether she could satisfy the welfare of the child 
better. However third parties, such as grandparents or other relatives, were still 
awarded custody if the court considered them to be able to serve the best interests 
of the child – bearing in mind the importance of financial means and commitment 
to the child’s education. The doctrine of coverture would also be applied to 
override private agreements between the spouses that involved custody of the 
children post-separation regardless of how well such arrangements would serve 
the best interests of children.271 
Precedent was set in the 1824 case of Skinner272 to the effect that if a child 
was in a third party’s custody then the court could use its jurisdiction and give the 
child to the mother (should the court find this the right order to make). However if 
the father had already taken the child into his physical care and was not a threat to 
the life and limb of the child then the child would not be removed from the father 
to give to the mother. Once a child was in the physical ‘possession’ of the father – 
irrespective of how he came to have the child in his care– only extreme ill 
treatment would justify removal, not mere unfitness.273 By 1827 the courts clearly 
distinguished between their ability to give the child to its father (when it was 
improperly restrained by someone else including the mother) and their ability to 
take it from the father, regardless of how he obtained possession. In Ball v. Ball274 
the father hid the child, who had primarily been living with the mother, away and 
when the mother brought a case to court she only sought access because she was 
aware of the normative expectation that she, as the mother, had no right to 
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custody. The judge lamented that if only an authority could be found to make it 
possible for him to decide differently he would not deny her custody.275 The judge 
stated that his limited discretion was ‘a case for the authorities’ meaning he – in 
the spirit of stare decisis – was constrained by the law as it had been laid down by 
other judges. Parens patriae could apparently not help nor empower him to decide 
what was in the best interests of the child until the system changed its conditional 
(patriarchal) programmes. 
Custody cases between a mother and a father, (particularly where there 
was no adultery, abuse or financially incapacity) were potentially unsettling for 
the courts, because it challenged the very core of the coverture programme.276 It 
threatened to challenge the long determined legal programme of husband and 
wife’s legal ‘unity’ and the wife’s submission to the husband under coverture. 
Conditionally it provided in this context that: if a woman is married then she loses 
her independent status and stands under her husband’s authority; if a couple with 
children is granted a divorce, then the father has a near unchallenged right to 
custody of his children vis-á-vis the mother. Applying Luhmann’s theory; 
normative expectations (the wife’s inferiority to her husband and the father’s 
superior right to custody) must be capable of being maintained even in cases of 
dispute.277 These norms will stand despite them being disappointed.278 For 
example, despite the disappointments (and reality) that a father may not best serve 
his child’s interests or provide for and respect his wife, as is his depicted role 
under coverture, normative expectations do not ‘learn’ from experience/this 
observation i.e. that all fathers do not necessarily behave that way.279 Once an 
event or situation has been coded as legal, it cannot become illegal despite 
people’s contrary actions.280 From an autopoietic perspective law can merely 
create normative expectations but it is not very effective in producing behavioural 
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changes or regulating conduct that is not open to the determination of 
legal/illegal.281 In constructing and maintaining its self-identity, the law cannot 
use communications other than those derived from its own structures, meaning 
structures (legislation, as interpreted, and conditional 
programmes/rules/precedent) derived from and in support of the coding 
legal/illegal.282 The code of law is what gives the system its identity: “[O]nly the 
legal system can bestow legal normative quality on its elements [i.e. legal 
communications] and thereby constitute them as elements.”283 Therefore, if 
problems arise and the law needs new programmes that can declare actions and 
events as lawful/unlawful it will self-produce such communications as far as can 
be done and as far as constitutions allow it to, to bring matters within law’s code 
but importantly, only if the system decides to do so. Again, to be able to establish 
what exactly goes on inside the legal system is hard for an observer.  
4.7 The Tender Years Doctrine 
 
The idea that mothers may be given access to their children post separation 
if the children were very young was first produced as a legal communication by 
way of legislation. The Custody of Infants Act 1839 declared as lawful that a 
mother may, upon her petition, have custody of her children up the age of seven 
and be given access to older children. Apart from the apparent distress that the 
courts experienced284 politically and socially, the decisions of the courts evoked 
dissatisfaction due to, inter alia, Caroline Norton’s campaigning285 for mothers’ 
rights to have access to their children post separation. Norton relentless wrote and 
published (under pseudonyms – sometimes using male names) to create public 
awareness of court decisions. 286 
                                                
281 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness: on reality in the world of law” above n 19 at 347; 
Niklas Luhmann “Limits of steering” above n 32.  
282Michael King and Anton Schütz “The ambitious modesty of Niklas Luhmann” above n 280 at 
279. 
283 Niklas Luhmann “The unity of the legal system” above n 20 at 20. 
284 Danaya C Wright “Crisis of child custody” above n 211. 
285 Martha J Bailey “England’s first Custody of Infants Act” (1994-1995)” 20 Queen’s L J. 391 at 
402-412. 
286 Caroline Norton did not apply for custody of her children after her husband removed them and 
allowed her limited access. She was aware of how hard it would be for her to get a favourable 
decision from the legal system and rather used her writing skills and political connections to 
agitate for legal change. She had well positioned male friends who assisted her in her mission. See 
Martha J Bailey “England’s first Custody of Infants Act” (1994-1995)” above n 285; Elizabeth 
Ann Sinclair “Timeless considerations; an historical analysis of the development of residence and 
56 
 
 R v Greenhill287 just prior to Norton’s campaign caused much public 
outcry.288 That was a case where the father’s behaviour again was dismissed as 
not relevant if it didn’t directly poison the children’s minds and it confirmed that 
children lawfully belonged in the custody of the father. From Lord Denman’s 
words quoted below it seems that there was, in part, some concern from within the 
legal system that the courts may be flooded by custody cases if the door was 
opened too wide regarding mothers’ position and that the law needed to be 
confirmed in the mind of potential litigants. 
 
But I think that the case ought to be decided on more general grounds; because any doubts 
left on the minds of the public as to the right to claim the custody of children might lead to 
dreadful disputes, and even endanger the lives of persons at the most helpless age. [T]he 
proper custody ... [is] undoubtedly ... the custody of the father.289 
 
Yet, illustrating the autonomy of the legal system as perceived by its 
primary actors, (judges as per Luhmann) confirmed their belief that they merely 
apply the law and are effectively helpless to make decisions contrary to what is 
deemed to be the law as it had developed over time. Lord Denman (then the Chief 
Justice) stated two years after Greenhill that “I believe that there was not one 
judge who had not felt ashamed of the state of the law and that it was such as to 
render it odious in the eyes of the country.”290 This completely denies the fact that 
‘the state of the law’ was wholly created by judges. But it does confirm that 
judges are bound by self-reference or, the closure of the system i.e. that former 
legal decisions must be followed and adhered to.291 The legal rule of stare decisis, 
had also become more elevated at that time,292 But the statement also flies in the 
face of the system’s own declared role of parens patriae because Lord Denman is 
effectively saying that children’s interests, or at least their need to have regular 
contact with or be cared for by their mothers, is subject to former legal decisions 
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and that nothing can be done about that. Alternatively, Lord Denman’s can be 
interpreted as an acknowledgment that custody decisions were about parental 
rights entirely (and divorced mothers did not have any as regards custody) and 
that the children’s interests may not be that important at all.  
Another possibility is that they truly believed that fathers could better 
provide for children given women’s legal and social standing. For example they 
were still barred from the professions, most commonly had limited education and 
were not even trusted yet to have acceptable political opinions, hence could not 
vote. Married women’s property, inheritance and earnings belonged to her 
husband under coverture.293 Judging by the courts’ application of the subsequent 
legislation (see below), the judiciary did not feel that strongly about a mother’s 
right to custody regardless of Lord Denman’s assertion that all the judges were so 
deeply ashamed294. This does not mean that individual judges all felt the same, but 
clearly they felt bound to act in accordance with the rules of the system and it is 
apparent that no judge had the courage to set new precedent which indicates that 
among the judiciary there was either pressure or agreement not to unsettle 
established precedent.  
Nonetheless, the political system responded to this perturbation by passing 
Talfourd’s Act. This provided the legal system with a new and additional 
conditional programme in that if children were below the age of seven then the 
court might consider giving the mother custody. Maternal custody of young 
children became legal in the face of a tyrannical father – the latter then being 
coded illegal i.e. abusive behaviour, or so it may be assumed. Note though that the 
maternal custody would only be legally right if the father was found to be awfully 
abusive or grossly inappropriate – according to the court’s discretion because the 
Act provided no guidance and judicial precedent would then usually apply. As 
already stated, the Act would only apply if the parents had legally separated and 
the mother was not guilty of adultery. Other than that, a father’s right to custody 
was still deemed to be legally right.  
Notably the promoters of the Act did not argue for a change in the law as 
to the father’s ‘natural’ right to custody but merely for relief in cases where the 
father’s right led to ‘grievous wrong’ and that judges should in such cases be 
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granted discretion to infringe on the father’s right.295 Bailey points out that the 
Act was not passed to correct ‘ancient and entrenched’ law but to manage the 
developments in case law discussed above i.e. the case law as it had developed 
since De Manneville. Notwithstanding that the Act provided legal communication 
in the form of recognition of the rights of mothers to apply for custody and access, 
the Act did not have a significant impact on judicial practice of maintaining 
paternal custody rights.296 
 Even though the tender years doctrine in theory presumed that mothers were 
the most suitable caretakers of children in their “tender years” and that it was thus 
in such children’s interests to be in their mothers’ care, this ‘best interests 
standard’ as applied by the courts was extremely limited. In the case of Re Fynn297 
the father retained custody of his sons, despite the court’s comments that he was 
an unsuitable parent but because the judge deemed it beyond his discretion to 
interfere with the father’s power.  
 In Warde v Warde298 the court was reluctant to make a custody order that 
would favour one parent over the other and Cottenham LC stated that “[c]hildren 
are by nature entitled to the care of both their parents” and went on to describe the 
court’s duty as “painful” when one parent’s conduct would not allow for this 
‘natural’ entitlement, and that “all [the court] can do is to adopt that course which 
seems best for the interest of the children.”299 This was in 1849 but resonates well 
with the current approach in custody decisions. It would therefore appear that the 
current approach is not novel at all but that the law could reach backwards to its 
own legal communication300 when it decided to follow the contemporary 
approach. In Warde the mother was awarded custody on the grounds of the 
father’s adultery and recklessness. Then in Re Halliday301 three matters were said 
to be of permanent importance namely the paternal right to custody, the marital 
duty (owed by the husband and wife to each other but also their responsibilities 
towards their children to provide them with care) and the children’s interests. The 
                                                
295Mr Serjeant Talfourd, House of Commons Debate 9 May 1838 at 1054 quoted in Martha J 
Bailey “England’s first Custody of Infants Act” above n 285 at 405-406. 
296 Martha J Bailey “England’s first Custody of Infants Act” above n 285 at 406. 
297(1848) 2 De G. & Sm. 457. Cited in P H Petit “Parental control and guardianship” above n 207 
at 64. 
298(1849) 2 Phillips 786. 
299Warde v Warde above n 298 at 789. 
300 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and Openness: on reality in the world of law” above n 19 at 345. 
301(1853) 17 Jur. 56. Cited in P H Petit “Parental control and guardianship” above n 207 at 59. 
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judge then said that the court should decide, if possible, in favour of the paternal 
right rather than against it. Moving thirty years ahead to 1883 Bowen LJ302 put the 
matter concisely: 
 
It is not the benefit to the infant as conceived by the court, but it must be the benefit to the 
infant having regard to the natural law which points out that the father knows far better as 
a rule what is good for his children that [sic] a court of justice can. 
 
On the one hand it can be argued that this interpretation and application of 
the Custody of Infants Act is not surprising because the wording of the Act 
allowed for a wide scope of discretion303 as the Acts relevant to CCDs across the 
world still do to this day. On the other hand it also illustrates the closure of the 
legal system. While, according to Luhmann, legislation first enters the legal 
system as a communication from the political system,304 the legal system will 
itself decide how to adapt its operations to the received communication and then 
re-produce its own communications or conditional programmes in order to either 
shift or re-affirm normative expectations. Looking at the impact of that Act in 
England from the limited reported case law, there are apparent indications that the 
courts were reluctant to apply it and when they did it was seen as an Act not 
providing for the consideration of the best interests of the child after all, but an 
Act to protect mothers from tyrannical husbands.305 Again, the best interests of 
the child were mere lip-service. 
 The Custody of Infants Act 1873 repealed the 1839 Act and declared as 
legal that any children under sixteen years of age may qualify to have access to 
their mothers or that the mother may have custody over them. New Zealand 
enacted similar provisions in its Law Amendment Act 1882.306Thereafter the 
English and New Zealand legislation “on the subject of the custody of infants was 
                                                
302Agar Ellis v. Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch D 317, 334. 
303 The Act provided that it shall be lawful for the judge “upon hearing the petition of the mother 
of any infant or infants ... if he shall see fit, to make order for the access of the petitioner to such 
infant or infants, at such times and subject to such regulation as he shall deem convenient and just; 
and if such infant or infants shall be within the age of seven years, to make order that such infant 
or infants shall be delivered to and remain in the custody of the petitioner until attaining such age, 
subject to such regulations as he shall deem convenient and just.” Quoted in William Forsyth A 
Treatise on the Law Relating to Custody of Infants in Cases of Difference between Guardians 
above n 241 at 139. (Own emphases).  
304Michael King and Chris Thornhill Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law above n 16  at 
44. 
305 In Warde v Warde above n 298 at 1148 the court stated that “[t]he object of the Act, and the 
promoters of it, ... was to protect mothers from the tyranny of those husbands who ill-used them.” 
306Re JH and LJ Thomson (Infants) (1910) 30 NZLR 168 (SC) at 170 as per Williams J. 
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the same.”307According to at least one New Zealand reported judgement, “[w]hen 
New Zealand became a [British] colony Talfourd’s Act came into force [in New 
Zealand].”308 Reported cases on custody decisions post New Zealand’s 
colonisation309until the early 20th century are practically non-existent. Given that 
New Zealand was still a very young colony, it is reasonable to accept that it 
lacked the resources and structures for proper case reporting and it is worth noting 
that procedural case reporting was not common practice in England until 1865 
either.310Given how closely the English legislation was followed in New 
Zealand’s legislation at that time311 one may be forgiven for accepting that 
English common law was followed as well – at least where possible and that 
Talfourd’s Act was hardly ever applied.  
 However despite the 1873 Act, in England judges were still not 
considering mothers for custody. Parliament then passed the Custody of Infants 
Act 1886. Eventually New Zealand enacted the Infants Act 1908 which still 
followed the English legislation practically word for word.312 Interestingly, the 
relevant section of the Infants Act313 provided as follows: 
 
The Court may, on the application of the mother of any infant ... make such an order as it 
thinks fit regarding the custody of such infant and the right of access thereto of either 
parent, having regard to the welfare of the infant and to the conduct of the parents, and to 
the wishes as well of the mother as of the father; and may alter, vary, or discharge such 
order on the application of either parent, ... as it thinks just. (Own emphases). 
 
Nowhere does the section – exactly the same as the relevant section in the English 
Act314 – expressly state that the mother’s application is first priority, but rather 
that both parents’ views and wishes should be considered in relation to a decision 
that must regard the welfare of the child. Yet, for example in In re A and B 
(Infants)315 the English Court of Appeal read a prioritisation of the mother into 
that section of the English Act. Lindley LJ said “[n]obody can read the various 
                                                
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid. 
309 In the interest of anchoring the time line I deem this to be 1840 when the Treaty of Waitangi 
between indigenous Maori and the English crown was signed. 
310 J H Baker An Introduction to English Legal History above n 292 at  208-11.  
311 See notes 146 and 147 above. 
312 Re RJ and LJ Thomson (Infants) above n 361 at 171. 
 313Infants Act 1908, s 6. 
314 Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, s 5. 
315 [1897] 1 Ch. 786. 
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sections in the Act without seeing that it is essentially a mother’s Act.”316 While 
Rigby LJ acknowledged the equality of the mother and father under the Act he 
found the words ‘the wishes as well of the mother as of the father’ “very 
remarkable”317 and as the ultimate signification of the intention of the legislature 
to interfere with the rights of the father. He was quite fascinated by the fact that 
‘mother’ preceded ‘father’ in the wording of the section which to him indicated 
that the mother must be more important. He went on to say that “as a general rule 
you are to consult the wishes of one as well the other” but then expressed his 
belief that the Act cannot be properly construed if “you are to read into that 
section ‘without prejudice to the rights of the father at common law, and as they 
stand by the decisions down to this time.’”318 
 Despite the quite similar provision in the 1839319 and 1873320 legislation 
that also provided that the court – in exercising its discretion – may consider a 
mother to be the custodial parent of children, it was the 1886 Act that apparently 
bolstered this idea in the legal system, or as Luhmann would view it, because the 
legal system had finally decided to apply the idea of mother-custody from time to 
time. Not even the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 that allowed the courts to make 
custody orders ‘as it may deem just with respect to the custody of children’321 had 
a greater impact on the court.322 Notably however, married women had, five years 
earlier, been granted property rights with the passing of the Married Women’s 
Property Act 1880 and perhaps this was the reason for the courts’ readiness to 
follow the legislation. Lindley LJ actually spelled out that the legislature felt it 
necessary to enact the 1886 Act because what it wanted to accomplish was to 
increase the mother’s rights “because Talfourd’s Act and the Act of 1873 as 
construed by the Courts had not gone far enough in favour of the 
mother.”323Where it was once in the best interests of children to be in the custody 
of their father, mothers would now be considered to be the parent that would serve 
the best interests of young children better. Yet, the actual wording of the section 
                                                
316 In re A and B (Infants) above n 240 at 790. 
317 In re A and B (Infants) above n 240 at 795. 
318 Ibid. 
319Custody of Infants 1839. 
320Custody of Infants Act 1873. The Act removed the bar to any adulterous mothers to petition for 
custody of their children. 
321Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, s 35. 
322 Stephen Cretney Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A history (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford (UK), 2003) at 576. 
323  In re A and B (Infants) above n 240 at 795 (Own emphasis). 
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in the Act does not provide for such a preference, only that the wishes of both 
parents should be considered alongside the welfare of the child.  
 The reasons for the judiciary’s responses to maternal custody is open to 
speculation but what this discussion attempts to show is that the political system 
and the legal system do operate as two separate systems that act in accordance 
with their own operations and perceived environmental irritations that it deems 
necessary to respond to.  
As said, parliament responded, albeit at first reluctantly, to agitation in its 
environment led by Caroline Norton.324 However, three decades later, the 
outcome of custody decisions had not changed significantly and in the meantime 
influential leaders and thinkers such as political and social theorist, John Stuart 
Mill, written about the incapacity of women.325By the mid-nineteenth century, 
feminism and an organised feminist movement emerged with the objective of 
achieving equality for women via legal rights to education, entry to the 
professions, equality in marriage, divorce and child custody and the right to vote 
and some men gave their support. Indeed, Caroline Norton was greatly aided by 
men in her campaign for some maternal custody rights – if only in relation to 
men’s tyranny or cruelty in marriage – and that men of influence were becoming 
willing to support women’s views. In addition there was still the influence of 
Rousseau’s ideas of the importance of the mother in children’s lives and how that 
linked to morality as re-interpreted by the political system. These ideas could have 
and probably would have been exploited by the opposition of the day had the 
government not decided to act upon them.326  
                                                
324 Note that Norton did not agree with feminists on women’s equality to men. In fact she argued 
that it was because of women’s weakness that they needed the protection of the law. See Martha J 
Bailey “England’s first Custody of Infants Act” above n 284 at 405-406. Bailey argues that it was 
precisely because the campaign had not been seen as a threat to patriarchy by the male political 
system that it was passed and that Norton knew that if she wanted the Act to succeed in parliament 
she had to distance herself from any feminist views. She therefore used men’s view of women to 
further her cause.  
325 John Mills wrote On The Subjection of Women in 1861, which was published in 1869. Another 
19th century example is the writing of Samuel Smiles, see Alex Tyrrell “Samuel Smiles and the 
women question in early Victorian Britain “ (2000) 39 (2) The Journal of British Studies 185. 
Feminist writers of that time period include Harriet Martineau and from late in the 18th century 
Mary Wollstonecraft who’s Vindication of the Rights of Women was published in 1792. Jeremy 
Bentham, more than a decade before Wollstonecraft, had pointed out the virtual slavery of women 
and argued for women’s political freedom – to be able to vote and participate in parliament – as 
well as personal freedom for women in allowing them to obtain a divorce. See Miriam Williford 
“Bentham and the rights of women” (1975) 36 (1) Journal of the History of Ideas 167. 
326 Governments react to events that are perceived as threats to holding power in accordance with 
the code of the political system (government/opposition as per Luhmann). 
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That most male politicians were still deeply patriarchal and paternalistic in 
their views of women should not however be doubted. Perhaps the political 
system also felt assured by the developments in the environment (irritation) that 
women had devoted their energy to the institution of domesticity. Reliance on this 
discourse could protect the family as an institution with subsequent benefits for 
the State. The family was a place where financial, educational and moral 
responsibility for raising the State’s citizens could be ensured (or this was the 
ideology) and the hope was that this ‘cult of domesticity’/’cult of true 
womanhood’327 that had emerged would ward off the perceived threats of divorce. 
Mothers were responsible for upholding moral values and raising their children as 
loyal citizens.328 Rousseau’s ideas were neatly selected to re-enforce the private 
sphere of the home where women were supposed to find a haven, protection from 
the ‘harshness’ of men’s world: business, politics and law. Domesticity came into 
vogue over the Victorian period – and not only because the notion re-enforced the 
nuclear family. Indeed, most women claimed and reinforced the ideas of 
domesticity and ‘guidance manuals’ now focused on women, purporting to teach 
them how to do the very important job of running the household (without 
expecting remuneration, of course, but because this was her ‘god given’ place in 
the world) and care for and raise their children so that they would become 
upstanding citizens for the State. But let us not forget that middle and upper class 
families employed servants to get the job done.  
Nonetheless, gradually working class women were striving to achieve the 
same and live up to these expectations of motherhood. Alternatives to married life 
were extremely limited for women since they were less educated (if at all) and 
legally and economically hampered. These developments/irritations in the 
political system’s environment (the cult of domesticity/true womanhood) suited 
the political agenda perfectly and so ignoring feminist agitations was preferred. 
Keeping women in the home was a much-preferred option and therefore legal 
restrictions were supported by the political system by not interfering with the 
legal system i.e. not enforcing more legislation that may emancipate women. 
                                                
327Barbara Welter “The cult of true womanhood, 1820-1860” (1966) 18 (2) American Quarterly 
151. For a New Zealand account see Bev James and Kay Saville-Smith Gender, Culture & Power 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland (NZ), 1994) at 32-47. 
328 Mary Lyndon Shanley Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England 1895  
(Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1989) at 5-6. 
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Politically the message was that the husband’s authority and the wife’s gracious 
influence constituted the two domestic pillars of civil society.329 
Once the legal system had to interpret and apply the first custody Acts, 
that system referred only to its own previous rules and decisions as regards legally 
wrong and legally right. The principal legal norm was that a father is the 
custodian of his children. Eventually the system accepted that a mother could 
have custody of her young children (if she was not guilty of adultery).330 The legal 
system’s developed concern for children’s education was possibly perceived to be 
addressed by the passing of the Elementary Education Act in 1880331 that 
extended compulsory schooling to children aged five to ten. Perhaps, if there were 
doubts about the mothers’ ability not to ‘spoil’ the child then this new politically 
introduced programme would alleviate the ‘damage’. This is suggested as another 
event in the legal system’s environment that could shed some light on why the 
system considered the 1886 custody Act to be ‘the one’ that would ‘allow’ it to 
give custody to mothers on a more regular basis while the wording of the Act 
cannot be said to be all that ‘remarkable’ at all.332 A final suggestion is that the 
move towards a maternal preference in child custody that evolved from here on in, 
was because the law operated by simplifying complexity, as Luhmann suggests. It 
was perhaps considered an easier solution to switch from a paternal preference to 
a maternal preference because dealing with the complexities of human 
relationships and attempting to allocate ‘legally right’ and ‘legally wrong’ values 
to people’s behaviour in individual cases renders the law too unpredictable and 
inconsistent.   
                                                
329 As per Lord Shaftesbury cited in Anthony S Wohl “Introduction” in Anthony S Wohl (ed) The 
Victorian Family: Structures and stresses (Croom Helm, London, 1978) 1 at 9-10. 
330 Commentators have pointed out that when the legal system finally responded by legalising 
women’s care for young children (the tender years doctrine) it practically guaranteed lower 
economic status and financial dependence for women and children in the future and it also 
legalised the ‘cult of domesticity’ i.e. the notion that a woman’s place is in the home caring for 
young children. See e.g. Laura Sack “Women and children first: a feminist analysis of the primary 
caretaker standard in child custody cases” (1992) 4 Yale J. L. & Feminism 291at 296. 
331 Note that the political system, for a long time, ignored/resisted the irritation/development of 
childhood education as a possibility for extending its power but, in order to preserve its position, 
i.e. acting in accordance with its code (government/opposition), the government of the day decided 
to react to the middle classes who had developed a concern for poor children and child labour, the 
latter having become increasingly visible due to the Industrial Revolution albeit that poor children 
had always worked to help sustain the family. See e.g. Sara Horrell and Jane Humphries “Child 
labour and British industrialisation” in Michael Lavalette (ed) A Thing of the Past? Child labour in 
Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries above n 254 at 44 Hugh Cunningham Children & 
Childhood in Western Society since 1500 above n 107 at 79-89 (discussing children’s work and the 
effect of compulsory schooling e.g. extending childhood).   
332 See the discussion at 3.3.5 
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But the legal system’s response – the Tender Years Doctrine (TYD) to the 
Act was also an ‘irritation’ that the political system could choose to reconcile 
itself with. The virtues of motherhood would still benefit future citizens because a 
mother would play the designated role of raising the young and extremely 
dependent children, while fathers were thus free to contribute to the economy and 
to ‘earn the bread’ which would further institute the patriarchy of the nuclear 
family.333The message of the TYD was perceived to be that a mother’s place is at 
home with her children. In turn, the legal system could satisfy itself that it was 
still acting in accordance with its programmes. A father’s legal rights to determine 
a child’s education, religion and medical treatment but, importantly, also his duty 
to maintain his children were still upheld, i.e. the primary functions of patriarchy 
as regards children. 
                                                
333 See e.g. Wally Seccombe “Patriarchy stabilized: the construction of the male breadwinner wage 
norm in nineteenth-century Britain” (1986) 11 (1) Social History 53; Edward Shorter “Women’s 
work: what difference did capitalism make?” (1976) 3 (4) Theory and Society 513. For a thorough 
account of the same developments (State institution of the male breadwinner for families) 
repeating themselves in New Zealand, see Melanie Nolan Breadwinning: New Zealand women 
and the state (Canterbury University Press, Christchurch (NZ), 2000).  
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Chapter 5   The rise of shared parenting – irritations and responses 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter surveys two events and their consequences for CCDs. First the 
introduction of child support payment/collection schemes across the common law 
countries. Second, the reaction from fathers and the subsequent responses by the 
political system via legislation and the courts once the legislation came into force 
and were incorporated into its operations. Smart and Neale suggest334 that what 
has occurred constitutes a determined attempt to socially engineer the family, to 
change the nature of the post-divorce family.335 But this re-visioning of post-
separation family life also rests upon a political consideration of fathers’ financial 
responsibilities.336The prevalence of children living in low income households is 
of concern in common law countries.337 This means that support for single 
mothers forms a significant portion of social support budgets and the State would 
stand to gain if such households’ incomes could be supplemented by other means.  
 
5.2 A problem with child support 
 
 The apparent fiscal emergency in many countries of the 1980s raised 
political concern regarding the public costs of supporting the economically 
weaker members of separated families, and sought to transfer the burden of 
support back to the family itself. The political system introduced child support 
schemes, which either eliminated or severely curtailed judicial discretion in child 
support matters.338 Current child support policy in common law countries was 
                                                
334Carol Smart and BrenNeale “Good enough morality? Divorce and postmodernity” (1997) 1 
Critical Soc. Pol’y 17. 
335Carol Smart “Wishful thinking and harmful tinkering? Sociological reflections on family 
policy” (1997) 1  J. Soc.Pol’y 26. 
336 Richard S Collier “The fathers’ rights movement, law reform and the new politics of 
fatherhood: some reflections in the UK experience” (2009) 20 Fla. J.L. Pub. Pol’y 65 at 75. 
337 See e.g. Charles Waldegrave, Robert Stephens and others “Assessing the progress on poverty 
reduction (2003) 20 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 197 at 200; Roderic Beaujot and Jianye 
Liu “Children, social assistance and outcomes: cross-national comparisons” PSC Discussion  
Papers Series (2002) 15 (18) article 1.  
338John Dewar “Family law and its discontents” (2000) 14 (1) Int J Law Policy Family59 at 67. 
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thus a political initiative to curb state expenditure in support of single parents.339 
The environmental irritation of the massive increase in single parents since the 
1970s led to a dramatic increase in States’ expenditure to support single parents. 
The child support orders made by the courts were proving hard to enforce and 
mothers found the operations of the system so unhelpful and complicated that 
they rather opted to struggle on their own.340 This left many single parent 
households (predominantly mother-headed) in financial difficulty.  
 As a consequence of the subsequent agitation by fathers for legal 
presumptions of shared parenting post separation (that escalated after the 
introductions of child support schemes) it was hoped that by allowing for more 
equal and inclusive language in the legislation that acknowledged the merit of 
both parents, fathers (the predominant non-resident parents) would feel recognised 
and spend more time with their children, but most importantly, comply with their 
child support payments. Some studies were published (irritation) that showed that 
fathers pay their child support more and show more interest in their children when 
they are awarded joint legal (not necessarily physical) custody.341 While none of 
the legislatures in this discussion enacted a regime that provided for 50/50 shared 
parenting time or even specified any amount of time, it has been the courts that 
have interpreted the legislations as the need to order substantial contact and shared 
care arrangements.  
 In Australia the legislature enacted a presumption of equal, shared parenting 
                                                
339 See Richard Collier and Sally Sheldon (eds) Fathers’ Rights Activism and Law Reform in 
Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Portland (OR), 2006) generally. While the various 
contributors discuss multiple factors in the different jurisdictions that relate to the topic, they all 
mention or discuss the effect of child support on fathers’ rights groups; Maureen Baker and David 
John Tippen Poverty, Social Assistance, and the Employability of Mothers: Restructuring welfare 
states (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1999) at 157-190. 
340Maureen Baker “Lingering concerns about child custody and support” (2008) 4 (1) Policy 
Quarterly 10 at 12. 
341 See e.g. Judith A Seltzer Father by Law: Effects of joint legal custody on nonresident fathers’ 
involvement with children Working Paper No. 75 (Center for Demography and Ecology, NSFH, 
U.S. 1997) Finding that joint legal custody increased adherence to child support payments and 
contact with children, and concluding that “[a]t least on the dimension of increased contact 
between nonresident fathers and children, joint legal custody may, as advocates claim, make the 
lives of children after divorce more similar to their lives before divorce or to the lives of their 
peers in two-parent households”); Judith A  Seltzer, Nora Schaeffer and others “Family ties after 
divorce: the relationship between visiting and paying child support” (1989) 51 (4) J. Marriage & 
Fam. 1013; Stephen J Bahr, Jerry D Howe and others “Trends in child custody awards: has the 
removal of maternal preference made a difference?” (1994) 28 Fam. L. Q 247. 
68 
 
responsibility in CCDs but not a presumption of shared equal time.342 Studies that 
disproved the benefits of such arrangements were ignored.343 Findings of a 
subsequent 2010 research report demonstrate however that even shared care 
arrangements made by mutual agreement between the two parents often revert to a 
pattern of one parent providing primary care (the mother) within a few years of 
the initiation of shared care.344 Thus it would seem that the purpose-specific 
programme of achieving greater shared care generally for children is not as 
‘successful’ as the legislature had hoped. This should make political systems in 
other jurisdictions cautious since it does not reflect very positively on a 
government that enacts new legislation which programmes are not being 
achieved. This applies especially when the experiment involves children’s well-
being and it must at the very least be a disruptive experience for children if the 
parenting arrangements turn out not to be sustainable but much worse if they are 
destructive. As one commentator notes “despite the fact that real world practices 
have yet to catch up to the new cultural ideal of fatherhood, fathers’ rights groups 
have seized upon this compelling imagery in making their political claims.”First I 
will look at what prompted the fathers’ rights movement (FRM) to drastically 
elevate their agitation for equal shared parenting. 
 
5.3 Maternal preference meets child support 
 
One justification from a political perspective has made legislative 
promotion of shared parenting (but not presumption of) effectively inevitable and 
that is the financial desirability of limiting and reducing public support of children 
via social support programmes given the growth in the number of one-parent 
                                                
342 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 61 DA, 65DAA (2006) (presumption of “equal shared parental 
responsibility” except where there is violence or abuse; if the court orders equal shared parental 
responsibility, then shared time must be considered). 
343 Conversely, but controlling for observed characteristics and heterogeneity, Veum found no 
causal link between paying child support and contact see Jonathan R Veum “The relationship 
between child support and visitation: evidence from longitudinal data” (1993) 22 Soc. Science 
Research 229 at 242-243. 
344 Cashmore, Judy, Stephen Parkinson and others Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 
2006 Family Law Reforms: Report to the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department 
(Social Policy Research Centre Sydney, University of New South Wales 2010) 
http://www.adfvc.unsw.edu.au/specialcollectionfamilylaw.htmAccessed 22 February 2012. 
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families.345 By the 1970s single parent (mother headed) households, whether due 
to divorce, de facto partnerships breaking up, or women left/choosing to be on 
their own and coping with unplanned pregnancies ahd risen dramatically.346 It is a 
questionable supposition that generally held societal values are preserved in legal 
enactments. Even before the introduction of no-fault divorce, the English Law 
Commission assessed that, per annum, about 20 000 children were born to parents 
who had separated from former spouses, not bothering to legalise the separation 
due to the complicated process of obtaining a divorce, and simply co-habited.347 
When such parents separated they could not involve the law in CCDs because 
they were still legally married to another, and ‘arrangements’ were necessarily 
made between the parents – which most often left the mother caring for the 
children on her own and without commitment of financial support by the father.  
The most important question for the political system was how to support 
such children financially and physically.348 It was evident that the infatuation with 
the nuclear, father-breadwinner family that should provide the resources for 
raising children, was failing on some levels and that this irritation could not be 
ignored much longer. It was also evident the court orders for maintenance and 
child support were not being adhered to. Long before no-fault divorce was 
instituted in New Zealand349 the political system – due to social pressure – 
introduced the Domestic Purposes Benefit in 1973 to support sole parents 
(primarily mothers) but sentiments included that this encouraged women to leave 
their husbands rather than that it supported women who had to raise children on 
their own with no support from the father.   
 
[Support for the one-parent family] challenged two fundamental beliefs about the 
[European] New Zealand family: the ideal of the nuclear family as the only type of 
acceptable family unit and the ideal of the married woman at home caring for children.350 
                                                
345 Patrick Parkinson “Family law and the indissolubility of parenthood” (2006) Sydney Law 
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Downloaded 14 January 2012. 
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Before the Children Act 1989 in the U.K. research showed that it was 
primarily mothers who claimed and obtained custody of children in divorce and 
that it was evident that in the vast majority of cases, the courts were not actually 
determining which parent was the more suitable but basically making orders that 
confirmed the existing trend.351 In New Zealand (as in other common law 
countries) the legal system predominantly upheld the ‘mother principle’352 
(programme) in CCDs and even when couples came to their own agreements, the 
socially accepted values were that women continue to raise the children and that 
men went their own way. Undoubtedly there were fathers who ‘accepted’ this 
type of arrangement also ‘in the shadow of the law’, and not because they only 
had their own comfort in mind. However the law always had the legally 
established programme of the ‘individual approach’ to apply when a judge saw 
the need to veer off from the predominant programme, for reasons of evidence or 
perhaps his own values or subjective perception of a particular parent. But these 
cases do not create any other normative expectation than that a person may just 
stand a chance of ‘winning’ in court. If all cases were decided the same then the 
legal system would not only be unjust but it will also have no business and 
work.353 It is however debatable how concerned the legal system was with 
‘justness’ while it upheld the ‘father principle’ for hundreds of years but at the 
same time it also avoided litigation over child custody. How well this turned out 
for children we will never really know. The point for my purposes is that the legal 
system operates best (for its own purposes) when there are clear self-determined 
programmes to follow. The approach to CCDs swung – over time – from a once 
unbendable rule that fathers owned their children, to the ‘rule’ that of a maternal 
                                                
351 J Eekalaar, E Clive and S Raikes Custody after Divorce (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 
Wolfson College, Oxford (UK), 1977 cited in Richard Collier Masculinity, Law and the Family 
(Routledge, London, 1994) at 178. 
352Re J H and L J Thomson (Infants) above n 361; In re Winter [1930] GLR 637; Norton v Norton 
[1951] NZLR 678; G v G [1978] 2 NZLR 444 (CA); Georgie Hall Family Court Custody and 
Access: The welfare of the child – a literature review above n 352 at 15 citing L S Sealy “Parental 
custody under the law of New Zealand” in Joseph Unger (ed) Parental Custody and Matrimonial 
Maintenance – a Symposium (The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 
1960) at 49. 
353 It is interesting to note that in the same year (1981) that no-fault divorce was introduced in New 
Zealand (meaning many couples no longer needed a lawyer to obtain/defend a divorce), the 
amendment to the Guardianship Act (s23A) was made which provided that a parent’s sex must no 
longer be considered in CCDs. Thus, at least in terms of the legislation, there was now hope for 
those parents who wanted to contest custody in the face of the ‘mother principle’. Perhaps when 
one door closes (for lawyers) another opens.  
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preference. as evidenced in outcomes. As Henaghan says,354 it is what is 
ultimately decided by the courts, the outcomes of contested cases, rather than the 
obiter dictum of judges about values and justice, that determines legal normative 
expectations.  
 The legal system was basically confirming to men (and society) that they 
do not have the skill or dedication to be involved or to be sole parents post-
separation. This was the new legally produced normative expectation that 
followed after the rule of the father and even though change was slow, which is 
typical of the operations of the legal system, eventually the system succeeded in 
stabilising a new legal norm. It was accepted because of the realities of child 
rearing and nurturing i.e. that it was women’s work and specialty and in addition a 
lot of resources and dedication went into driving this practice home to women 
especially around the end of the nineteenth century and over the first few decades 
of the twentieth.355 As said, in accordance with autopoiesis, the legal system is 
cognitively open to its environment and it decides what to react to and when and 
if the environment is offering overwhelming evidence of a ‘truth’ then it is 
relatively simple to confirm such behaviour as legally correct. Over this time 
period medical practitioners provided ‘scientific proof’ to justify the dogma of the 
polarised roles for men and women and for the policy that saw women and girls 
being socially and emotionally programmed via training and education to have 
and to raise (healthy) children and manage households.356 This was possibly a 
                                                
354 Mark Henaghan “Above and beyond the best interests of the child” in Stuart Birks and Paul 
Callister (eds) Perspectives on Fathering Issue Paper No 4 (Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, 
Massey University (NZ), Palmerston North, 1999) 110 at 118. 
355 See Anna Davin “Imperialism and motherhood” (1978) 5 (9) History Workshop Journal 9 for 
her fascinating contention that the rise of imperialism, the arms race between empires (Japan, 
Germany, Britain and America), and the competition relating to industrialisation, turned 
motherhood – particularly the health of mothers - into a focal point in order to produce healthy 
boys that could serve as soldiers and workers and healthy girls that could produce more healthy 
babies. Indeed the colonies – including New Zealand despite its remote location – enthusiastically 
offered (and lost) many its male citizens to Britain in both world wars in the twentieth century. 
Motherhood (and the rise of eugenics) came under the scrutiny of the medical sciences and the 
political system supported and responded to that system’s recommendations. In New Zealand, this 
task was primarily undertaken by Truby King and his wife: see Sue Kedgeley Mum’s the Word: 
The untold story of motherhood in New Zealand (Random House, Auckland (NZ), 1996) at 43-58; 
Erik Olssen “Truby King and the Plunket Society: an analysis of a prescriptive ideology” (1981) 
15 (1) New Zealand Journal of History3; Erik Olssen and Andree Levesque “Towards a history of 
the European family in New Zealand” in Peggy G Koopman-Boyden (ed) Families in New 
Zealand Society (Methuen Ltd, Wellington, 1978) 1 at 8-9. 
356 Carol Dyhouse “Social Darwinistic ideas and the development of women’s education in 
England 1880-1920” (1976) 5 (1) History of Education 41; “Good wives and little mothers: social 
anxieties and schoolgirls’ curriculum 1890-1920” (1977) 3 (1) Oxford Review of Education 21. In 
New Zealand George Hogben (a prominent educationalist) for example introduced cooking, 
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perturbation that the legal system could use to justify its solidified maternal 
preference in the face of more CCDs entering the legal system.357 In addition, the 
State provision of social benefits to single parents was possibly another ‘irritation’ 
that strengthened the legal system in its maternal preference.  
Conversely, women felt compelled to ‘fight’ for custody where a father 
decided to challenge the norm because not only had motherhood – due to over a 
hundred-and-fifty years of social engineering – become an inherent part of most 
mothers’ identity and sense of self-worth, but society also generally expected 
women to have custody of their children and it was heavily frowned upon and 
harshly judged if a mother did not automatically want (or lost) custody of her 
children.358 Social attitudes towards noncustodial mothers are much more 
negative than attitudes toward noncustodial fathers359 since the stabilisation of the 
TYD. And yet, over the past few decades, in the context of marriage breakdown 
and sole parenthood, there is far more public concern for ‘fatherless’ families than 
for families without mothers regardless of the strong traditional approaches to 
women as nurturers.360 
 The ‘mother principle’ dominated within the New Zealand legal system in 
CCDs throughout the 1980s361 and by 1988 for example, despite the legislative 
amendment in 1981 to the relevant legislation that stipulated that a parent’s sex 
                                                                                                                                 
sewing and household management into schools as instructions for girls: Herbert Otto Roth 
George Hogben: a biography (New Zealand Council for Educational Research, Wellington (NZ), 
1952) at 92-93. This then spilled over into tertiary education so that by 1912 a degree was offered, 
let alone just subjects: J C Beaglehole The University of New Zealand: An historical study (New 
Zealand Council for Educational Research, Wellington (NZ), 1937) at 260. 
357 Legal aid for family matters has been available since 1969 in New Zealand. See Ian Shirley and 
Susan St John “Family policy and the decline of the welfare state in New Zealand” (1997) 10 
British Review of New Zealand Studies 39 at 42.   
358 See e.g. Ann Dally Inventing Motherhood: The consequences of an ideal (Burnett Books, 
London, 1982); Aminatta Forna Mother of all Myths: How society moulds and constraints mothers 
above n 256. 
359 See e.g. Joyce A Arditti and Debra A Madden-Derdich “Noncustodial mothers – developing 
strategies of support” (1993) 42 (3) Family Relations 305; Phyllis Chesler Mothers on Trial: The 
battle for children and custody (Revised and updated 2nd ed, Lawrence Hill Books, 2011); Catalina 
Herrerias “Noncustodial mothers following divorce” (1994) 20 (1-2) Marriage & Family Review 
233 (finding inter alia that an overall theme from the literature was a general societal disapproval 
regarding maternal custody relinquishment). 
360 Judith A Davey “Children living in sole father homes in New Zealand” in Stuart Birks and Paul 
Callister (eds) Perspectives on Fatherhood II Issue Paper No 6 (Massey University, Centre for 
Public Policy Evaluation, Palmerston North, 1999) 105 at 106. http://cppe.massey.ac.nz/  
Downloaded on 29 August 2011. 
361 See e.g. Mark Henaghan “Shared parenting: where from? Where to?” in Stuart Birks (ed) 
Children’s Rights and Families: Proceedings of social policy forum 2000 Issue Paper No. 10  
(Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University (NZ), 2001) 50 at 50. 
http://cppe.massey.ac.nz/  Downloaded 30 August 2011. 
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should not be a consideration in CCDs362 only 5% of fully defended CCDs were 
for joint custody.363 It is not evident that this is what the political system intended 
because certainly the relevant legislation instructed gender-neutrality. However, 
there were no further changes (relevant to CCDs) made to the legislation until the 
enactment of the Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA). And certainly no concerted 
effort over this period can be identified to indicate the same level of investment in 
fatherhood as a ‘science’ or to ‘educate’ them in social expectations regarding 
household management matters. When sociologists first started to study New 
Zealand families in the late 1960s they found that mothers were more actively 
involved in more activities within the household management than was the case in 
America.364 New Zealand wives were, for example, more involved in managing 
the family’s finances which was traditionally the husband’s domain, yet husbands 
hardly participated in the traditional wife’s ‘domain’ at all, a father’s role was 
seen as doing his job outside the family. There is a great benefit in entrusting 
women with raising children. As Fuchs pointed out: 
 
Suppose women were better than men at producing and caring for children but had no 
particular desire to do so, while it was men who wanted the children and cared more 
about their welfare. We would probably still see the same division of labor, ... but men 
would have to pay dearly for women’s services. The present hierarchy of power would be 
reversed.365 
 
Nonetheless, these questions and concerns were probably not on the mind 
of the politicians but what did prompt the political system to respond to outcomes 
of CCDs were primarily the financial concerns over public support to sole 
mothers and the reality that the courts’ child support determinations and orders 
were not effective, leaving women and children in dire financial positions. These 
irritations were considered urgent for response by the 1980s and the political 
system elected to remove child support decisions from the courts.  
 The increase in sole parenting thus became one targeted public expense in 
common law countries where a strategy of controlling social expenses in liberal 
                                                
362Guardianship Act 1968, s 23A (as amended in 1981). 
363Georgie Hall Family Court Custody and Access Research Report: The Welfare of the Child – a 
Literature Review above n 352 chapter 2. 
364 A C Webster and L Y Williams “Family and community: social welfare cults” in Trlin A D 
(ed) Social Welfare and New Zealand Society (Methuen Publications, Wellington (NZ), 1977) 78 
at 82. 
365 Victor R Fuchs Women’s Quest for Economic Equality (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA), 1988) at 68. 
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welfare states started in the 1980s.366 Diminishing the public cost of income 
support (one selected irritation) generally has been a driving force in western 
countries’ social policy reform since the 1980s.367 Sharpening policy and method 
around collecting child support was seen in the State of Wisconsin (spreading 
subsequently to other states) and Australia in the 1980s that amounted to 
removing child support assessment from the courts. New Zealand followed the 
Australian model in 1991368 when the Child Support Act 1991 was enacted. In 
most countries, the person with primary care of a child who is in receipt of social 
assistance is compelled to pursue child maintenance irrespective of whether it is a 
court or agency based system.369Recouping State expense is therefore a prime 
priority and not the W&BIC of the children involved, at least not when it comes 
to state revenue.370  However, the new structure of child support became one of 
two major reason for the uprising of the father’s rights movement, the other being 
child custody policy – albeit that for the activists of this movement the two are 
interlinked.371 
In the effort to transfer the financial burden of supporting children in 
single-parent families (predominantly headed by mothers) from society to parents 
(fathers), governments have been enacting and strengthening legislation to 
improve States’ ability for identifying, locating, and collecting child support from 
                                                
366 For an American perspective see Michael B Katz The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the 
American welfare state (Metropolitan Books, Philadelphia, 2008) at 26; John Myles and Jill 
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non-resident fathers.372 Whilst divorce was once restricted in an effort to procure 
financial support of children (and women) within the patriarchal family, the 
attention has now shifted towards keeping the separated family connected 
financially through the introduction of ‘family responsibility’.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 The fathers’ rights movement 
 
 
It must first be noted that the FRM (comprising of various groups and the 
ones that usually get the most media coverage) is not representative of all fathers, 
who are calling for change, at all.373 
 
The [FRM] are mainly concerned with the legal rights of divorced upper and middle-
class fathers. They constitute a response to family law and child support policy and 
mostly work in the legislative/judicial arena and offer legal advice and support to 
individual fathers involved in divorce and custody cases. These organizations have a very 
ambiguous relation to [the] Fatherhood Responsibility Movement; there is both (limited) 
cooperation and tension.374 
 
Thus there are initiatives among men that also focus on reconstructing ideas of 
masculinity and what it means to be a good husband and father. However here, 
where I refer to the ‘FRM’ I am referring to those groups that fit the description 
above: the groups that have targeted the law in aggressive and highly vocal ways, 
that first targeted mothers and motherhood and then shifted to ‘responsibility’ to 
and ‘rights’ discourses to match the language that would trigger response from the 
legal system (both the courts and the political system with the latter’s legislative 
                                                
372Lenna Nepomnyaschy “Child support and father-child contact: testing reciprocal pathways” 
(2007) 44 (1) Demography 93 at 93. 
373 See Anna Gavanas “The fatherhood responsibility movement: the centrality of marriage, work, 
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function).375 
 The rhetoric that the FRM across the western world employ, poses 
contradictions and a lack of correspondence with actual realities in the social 
realm such as for example the harm suffered if children don’t have their fathers 
regularly present in their lives.376 Nonetheless, they are generally ‘pro-family’, 
against divorce and in general argue that mothers should continue do most of the 
parenting but that fathers must still have control over how mothers parent.377 They 
blame mothers for blocking access to the children, argue that children face awful 
consequences due to father-absence, state that child support orders are excessive 
or unfair, accuse the legal system of bias against fathers, demand equal treatment, 
and want shared parenting or joint custody orders as a remedy for these perceived 
ills.378 They reason that child support payments would not be necessary at all if 
the child custody system could be reformed in a way that gives fathers equal child 
caring time.379 What fathers’ rights groups seem to feel most threatened by is 
single mothers’ ability to raise children on their own and to be able to demand 
child support because this dilutes the ideals of the nuclear, heterosexual family.380 
In a UK study based on personal narratives shared by disputing parents, it was 
found that a gendered pattern emerged in the use of the W&BIC discourse, with 
mothers at pains to emphasise ‘welfare’ and fathers invoking ‘rights’ talk”.381 It 
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and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective above n 383 at 1. 
376 See e.g. Miranda Kaye and Julia Tolmie “Fathers’ rights groups in Australia and their 
engagement with issues is family law” (1998) 12 (1) Australian Journal of Family Law 19; Susan 
B Boyd “Backlash and the construction of legal knowledge: the case of child custody law” (2001) 
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 141; Carl Bertoia and Janice Drakich “The fathers’ rights 
movement: contradictions in rhetoric and practice” (1993) 14 (4) Journal of Family Issues 592. 
377Miranda Kaye and Julia Tolmie “Fathers’ rights groups in Australia and their engagement with 
issues is family law” above n 376 and Carl Bertoia and Janice Drakich “The fathers’ rights 
movement: contradictions in rhetoric and practice” above n 376. 
378 Susan B Boyd “Robbed of their families? Fathers’ rights discourses in Canadian parenting law 
reform processes” in Richard Collier and Sally Sheldon (eds) Fathers Rights Activism and Law 
Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart, Portland (OR), 2006) 27 at 32-40. 
379 In New Zealand parents have automatic joint legal custody – called guardianship – over their 
child (unless the court decides otherwise and if the father’s name is on the birth certificate: Care of 
Children Act, ss 17-20) which amounts to parents having to consult on important decisions 
involving the child: Guardianship Act 1968, s 6, re-enacted in the Care of Children Act 2004 s 17. 
Thus in that jurisdiction the FRM agitates for joint physical custody. 
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was this demand of a father’s right to share in the custody of the child and that 
this right was ignored by the legal system that drew attention from the legal 
system and the political system. The same factors that affected the Australian and 
U.K. legislators have also stimulated debates in Canada including complaints by 
non-custodial fathers that the legal system inappropriately limits paternal 
participation in children’s lives.382 However, political systems were careful not to 
respond to the FRM directly since there was reluctance to be seen as favouring 
one gender over another and its interests lies predominantly in maintaining votes 
i.e. always operating with the code of the system in mind.  
 
 (a) United Kingdom 
 
 In the U.K. there is one focal point, regardless of the agitation by father’s 
rights groups, which the government has persistently refused to be move on and 
that is the call by such groups for legislative presumption of greater contact and 
shared equal parenting that will give non-resident parents a legal right to see their 
children.383 The Children Act 1989 does state that the welfare of the child is best 
served by sustaining relationships with both parents as far as is possible, but no 
‘right’ to contact/access is provided for. The government selected to respond to 
and act in accordance with a body of research that has directly contradicted the 
key claims of fathers’ rights activists such as that the overwhelming majority of 
men are equal caregivers to their children and the contention that fifty-fifty care 
arrangements are largely viable and practical.384 
 Yet, since the coming into force of the Children Act 1989 in the UK, 
scholars have commented on how the claims of fathers’ rights groups have 
impacted on the operations of the courts (including family welfare professionals) 
                                                
382 Helen Rhoades “The rise and rise of shared parenting laws: a critical reflection” (2002) 19 Can. 
J. Fam. L. 75 at 112; Nicholas Bala “A report from Canada’s ‘gender war zone’: reforming the 
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the politics of family law reform – reflections on the UK experience” above n 383 and sources 
citing.  
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and indeed on parents themselves. In court cases, new terminology (or ‘semantic 
artefacts’ as per Teubner385) had emerged such as ‘implacably hostile parent’ to 
describe what is perceived to be an obstructive, selfish mother, the ‘alienating 
parent’ that damages the child and blocks contact with the non-resident parent, 
and consequently the ‘alienated child’ to refer to the child who resists contact.386 
In this way the legal system reduces a myriad of complexities to ‘identified’ 
problem behaviour that is basically deemed ‘illegal’ or legally wrong. In her 
analysis of emerging case law in England and Wales, Kaganas has argued that in 
pursuit of the notion of ‘parental responsibility’ it is near “impossible to conceive 
of a father who is harmful to children unless he inflicts direct violence on 
them.”387 The courts now start from a presumption that contact with the non-
resident parent is good for children388 and thus legally right. It has thus become a 
programme that can be utilised to simplify CCDs and so a new ‘rule’ has been 
found by which courts can operate. 
  In April 2004, the U.K. government announced its commitment to “new 
laws to end the child custody wars.”389 The Green Paper Parental Separation: 
Children’s Needs and Parents’ Responsibilities (2004) outlined a range of 
proposals aimed at diverting as many divorcing parents as possible from the 
courts and promoting “generous parenting” for both parents.390 However, as for 
the claim by the FRM that the law was biased against fathers the government did 
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not accept this perception and countered that under the law both parents are equal 
and that no change was needed to the core principles set out in the Children Act 
1989.  
 In order to deal with the claim that there are shortcomings as regards 
enforcing contact the government enacted the Children and Adoption Act 2006.391 
This Act introduced, inter alia, punitive measures that can be employed against a 
parent that is found to block contact by the non-resident parent. These measures 
apply to the residential parent (usually the mother) who resists contact as opposed 
to the non-residential parent who refuses to maintain contact (usually the father). 
In this respect, “fathers’ rights campaigns [do] appear to have had the effect of 
galvanising the government and the courts into action against mothers whom they 
see as obstructive”.392 In 2010 MP Brian Binley entered the Shared Parenting 
Orders Bill (Bill 56 2010-2012 ) into parliament. The bill proposed that in CCDs 
the court order must include that “the child must spend a  substantial and 
significant amount of time with both parents”.393 Its first reading was in July 2011 
but it was defeated at the second.394 
 As for the courts, long before the Children Act 1989 came into force in 
October 1991 it was found that the courts were more willing to make joint 
custody orders (not physical joint custody) in contested cases – most likely the 
highest conflict cases – than uncontested cases which, so the researchers 
suggested, may indicate that the courts used such orders as a compromise to a 
complex problem rather than as a creative attempt to involve the both parents in 
the child’s future.395 This indicates a very limited understanding and empathy for 
the complexities and dynamics that may underlie divorce and separation matters 
and rather judges using their power to achieve a solution to clear the desk. 
 (b) Canada 
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In Canada the fathers’ rights discourse and the movement’s political agitation 
increasingly permeated the law reform process (political system) but it did not 
entirely determine its outcome. The Canadian Divorce Act 1985 contains a 
friendly parent and maximum contact principle that applies to CCDs.396 However 
in 1996 the government in Canada responded largely to claims of bias (by the 
FRM) in the legal system and created a Special Joint Committee (SJC) to research 
the allegations. However, the courts there chose to respond to this irritation 
(agitation by the FRM) as evidenced in the continuing rise in joint custody orders 
even before (and after) the SJC delivered its report.397 Neilson’s research 
conducted before the reform process began in Canada found that many Canadian 
judges already took as their starting point that contact is in a child’s best interests, 
including sometimes where abusive behaviour is an issue.398 
While the SJC report399 noted fathers’ issues and referred to research that 
could support their grievances (such as the harm of divorce for children, loss of 
contact with fathers and its negative effects for children, and the benefits for 
children of having both their parents involved in their lives) it also pointed to 
research that refuted the claims that the law is biased against fathers, for example, 
that the despite the legislative provisions (which should motivate fathers to 
negotiate for more shared care) the vast majority of post-separation agreements 
made between the parties themselves amount to the parties agreeing that the 
mother should have primary care.400 
Once the SJC submitted its report, the government repeated the report’s 
recommendation that there should be no presumptions about post-separation 
parenting arrangements or level of contact. This was arguably a careful move not 
to appear to favour either mother-custody or father-custody or even joint custody. 
The government focussed on the need to change the language of the relevant 
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legislation to counter-act the win/lose message – as espoused by the FRMs 
spokesmen – that ‘custody/access’ sent as well as concerns about access to 
children. An Act to Amend the Divorce Act (Bill C-22) was introduced to 
parliament on 10 December 2002 but it has not yet been passed. It proposes 
reduction of conflict, promotion of co-operation between parents, enhancement of 
parental responsibilities and removal of the terms ‘custody’ and ‘access’.401 It 
proposes to introduce parenting orders that would allocate parenting 
responsibilities to each parent (as per their agreement or as decided by the court) 
rather than adopt the terms ‘residence’ and ‘contact’ as in Australia and 
England.402 Notably a right to contact or parenting time was absent from the bill. 
The FRM recommendation for a presumption favouring shared parenting was not 
included.  
Despite this middle-ground-approach by the government many of the same 
challenging results that are seen in Australia (where law reform responded 
directly to the FRM) are seen in Canada also because lawyers, judges and family 
court service providers are choosing to respond to the FRM despite the fact that 
the legislation has not yet changed.403 
 (c) Australia 
 
 In Australia, since the 1995 reforms to the Family Law Act 1975, the lower 
courts were choosing to interpret the legislation as providing for the need to 
maintain contact regardless of the Full Court explaining the reforms and holding 
that the reforms had not created a presumption in favour of contact but that the 
best interests of the child are the ultimate determining factor and that a 
assumptions about contact should not be applied as being in the child’s best 
interests.404 In A v A: Relocation Approach405 the Full Court also explained that 
no single factor will be decisive. The lower courts, with a much higher workload, 
that in practice “appears to be approached with the goal of clearing the desk”406 do 
not have the time or perhaps the skill to unpack the complexities of parental 
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disputes and children’s needs. 
 The Australian political system definitely opted to respond directly to the 
agitation of the FRM,407 and at the time a conservative government was in power. 
However, academic researchers have pointed out that the FRM were not that 
powerful in numbers and often had high member turnovers.408 It is therefore 
hardly evident how strong their voting impact could have been and Rhoades 
points out that “the question of ultimate responsibility for this shift [in focus on 
separated fathers] is a story of complex and shifting influences.”409 Nonetheless, 
the different activist groups promoted shared parenting and demanded a 
legislative presumption for equal time in child care.410 
In June 2003, the then Prime Minister, John Howard established a 
Parliamentary Committee to explore the option of a rebuttable presumption that 
children will spend equal time with each parent. He was particularly concerned 
that too many boys are growing up with their mothers and lack a “proper male 
role model”.411 This assumes that fathers are proper role models. It assumes that 
they can fulfil a role that many fathers may not consider themselves capable of 
fulfilling. Much has been written about women’s experiences within patriarchal 
marriage and the pressure on them to live up to constructed ideals. We should 
perhaps also consider the expectations that the patriarchal, ‘male role model’ 
notion place on men. Great effort went into ‘teaching’ women and girls how to be 
good mothers but men’s parental skills may have been too readily assumed (under 
patriarchy) or dismissed (under the cult of motherhood).  
Ultimately, though paying much attention to fathers’ claims, the 
Committee recommended against a presumption of equal time in its report. 
Instead, it recommended in favour of equal parental responsibility. Similar to the 
Canadian response, the Committee pointed out that there should be no standard 
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arrangement imposed in CCDs. It did however make it clear that the legal system 
should move away from the assumption that the normal ‘80/20’ pattern of CCDs 
(i.e. time spent with the non-resident parent every second weekend and half of the 
school holidays).412 After extensive further consideration of the Committee’s 
report, the Federal Parliament enacted the Family Law Amendment (Shared 
Parental Responsibility) Act 2006. An obligation to consider shared parenting was 
placed on the courts (section 65DAA), legal practitioners, family counsellors, 
mediators and the courts’ own family consultants (section 63DA(2)). Section 
61DA413 provides for a rebuttable presumption of equal shared parental 
responsibility when the court makes parenting orders. The Full Court of 
Australia414 interpreted the change as follows: 
 
There is a legislative intent evinced in favour of substantial involvement of both parents 
in their children’s lives, both as to parental responsibility and as to time spent with the 
children, subject to the need to protect children from harm, from abuse and family 
violence and provided it is in their best interests and reasonably practicable. 
 
Chisholm opines that courts sometimes use ‘legislative intent’ “essentially as a 
label for the interpretation that they have decided to adopt.”415 Even so, when the 
prime minister announced his intention he already used the words “equal time” 
and “presumption” and it is under that prime minister’s leadership that the 2006 
reforms were enacted.416 Where father absence was the original apparent 
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motivation for reforms, the focus now has shifted to time sharing – its 
practicalities, benefits and/or viability, even including cases where conflict 
between the parents is high.417 
 Post reform evaluation and research in 2009418 indicates that there has 
been a considerable increase in shared care in judicially determined cases. In a 
2010 study419 about parentally agreed shared care and its outcomes since the 
reforms, the findings were ambiguous and showed that while more parents 
themselves attempt shared care arrangements these arrangements often did not last 
and reverted back to the ‘80/20’ model or something close to it.   
It is evident that both the political and legal systems in Australia were 
pushing an agenda that is not reflective of reality. Before the 2006 reforms, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics data showed that more than a quarter of children 
with separated parents saw their fathers either once a year or never. That has not 
changed post the reforms and in 2008 stood at 28%.420 Despite the pertinent drive 
to send a legal message that shared care is now the normative expectation and in 
that way looming in the background of negotiations between parents should their 
communication break down completely and they have to ask a court to decide; in 
cases where parents come to their own agreements, the great majority of parents 
do not agree to enter significant shared care. In 2008 research showed that this 
amounted to 9.5%421 of parents and by 2010 research showed that it was just 
below 8%.422 Shared care had by no means yet become a preferred arrangement, 
contrary to popular ideals in society and the FRM.423 There is however an 
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apparent increase.424In 1997 only 3% of Australian children with separated 
parents lived in a shared care arrangement in which each parent cared for the child 
at least 30% of the time.425 The researchers point out that many of the shared 
parenting arrangements in the 2010 research, were among recently separated 
parents and since they also found that these arrangements have a high incidence of 
collapsing after a year or more, the rise can only be seeming and not 
conclusive.426 
As Gilmore points out, research on shared care and its outcomes for 
children must, crucially, distinguish between court-imposed shared care and 
arrangements that parties themselves agreed to before generally positive findings 
are assumed to be the outcome.427Not surprisingly, where parents had negotiated 
their own arrangements for shared care (this does not necessarily mean 50/50 
arrangements but a minimum of 35% of nights with one parent) and, importantly, 
were not particularly resentful, hostile or blaming of each other, arrangements that 
endured, worked relatively well.  
 In the case of court ordered shared arrangements the picture was more 
negative but, precisely as the researchers also point out, those cases that are 
determined by the courts invariably involve highly conflicted parents. And yet, as 
the 2009 evaluation found, in those cases a significant increase in (imposed) 
shared care orders are seen.428 Shared care rose from 4% to 33.9% in the cases 
where contact arrangements were specified by the courts. Prior to the 2006 
reforms, 65.2% of mothers had primary care and after the reforms their care time 
reduced by 26.7%. Fathers in 30.8% of cases had primary care prior to the 
reforms and their care time decreased by a huge 40.6%! This could possibly be a 
consequence of either a still harboured maternal preference, or perhaps of the 
wishes of the child(ren) involved. Nonetheless, the rise in court determined shared 
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care indicates that the courts are not capable of, or are ignoring the risks involved 
for children when their parents are highly conflicted i.e. an ignored perturbation. 
The legislation only obligates the courts to consider equal shared care, not to 
actually order it.429 Despite a presumption of shared care as a starting point, the 
primary obligation remains the W&BIC but it appears that, as has been shown in 
history, W&BIC is – at least in Australia – again on its way to being simplified to 
a general rule/normative expectation. Notably maternal preference in CCDs also 
took time to be established within and by the legal system but that it was 
established is undeniable. And that ‘rule’ developed without any express 
(legislatively) preference except for gender neutrality. While legislation can have 
an impact, the legal system can and does establish its own rules. 
 Also not surprisingly, research and academic literature from Australia and 
elsewhere still advises against presuming that equal shared care after separation is 
best for children because, depending on the circumstances, it can increase the 
mental health risks for children particularly when parents are in conflict or when 
children are very young.430  In the Australian context researchers also found that 
while children benefit from having good and pleasant relationships with both their 
parents, there is no empirical evidence showing a clear linear relationship between 
the amount of parenting time and better outcomes for children.431 
 
 (d) New Zealand  
 
 In New Zealand in 2000 MP Muriel Newman put forward a private 
members’ bill for shared parenting in parliament. It can be assumed that this was, 
at least in part, prompted by FRM agitation. The bill aimed to introduce a 
rebuttable presumption of 50/50 shared custody. The government released a press 
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statement announcing that it would not support the Shared Parenting Bill.432 The 
bill was defeated on its first reading by seventy-one votes to forty-nine. The 
Attorney-General responded on behalf of the government: 
 
[S]eparation should not end the parental responsibility. However, we do not believe that 
that purpose will be achieved by this Bill because it relies on the assumption that 
separating parents will be able to reach agreements, which is clearly not the case in most 
instances that go to Court.433 
 
 The government did undertake that it would be giving detailed consideration 
to a wide range of family matters later that year and this would provide an 
opportunity to take a considered view of all relevant issues, including the option 
of providing for equal shared parenting. Like Canada,434 the message was that the 
government did not believe in a ‘one size fits all’ approach to CCDs as it 
perceived the bill to do. Eventually COCA was the result. The Ministry of Justice 
has stated that “[t]he review of the Guardianship Act originated from proposals 
for shared parenting ...”435 In response the question as to whether the bill favours 
shared parenting the Ministry stated: 
 
The Bill does not, however, create a presumption of shared parenting or a right to contact. 
Instead, the Bill focuses on encouraging co-operative parenting by focusing on the best 
interests and welfare of children and by emphasising the ongoing role both parents have 
in a child’s upbringing.436 
 
Although COCA does not express a presumption of shared care it is hard to see 
how else the Ministry’s aim of emphasising both parents’ involvement and ‘co-
operative parenting’ can be achieved. What else would be the point of the 
aforementioned achievements? COCA does signal a greater trend towards shared 
parental involvement.  Most likely the political system would have looked at the 
research and results of the Canadian process. No doubt, some MPs were also 
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aware of the mixed results437 that the introduction of ‘right to contact’ and ‘equal 
responsibility’ in Australia438 already showed. The courts there interpreted ‘equal 
responsibility’ as translating to ‘equal time’, with the upshot that, in the absence 
of a proper inquisitorial process, greater scope for an abusive, non-custodial 
parent to interfere. This also led to more conflict. Yet, all the other western 
common law countries had already embedded the message of more sharing, co-
parenting and equal responsibility and political systems generally follow each 
other. New Zealand’s family law had been criticised in publications for being 
outdated439 by then because of its continued usage of ‘custody’ and ‘access’ and 
so if nothing else, at least semantic changes were perceived to be important.  
 As in the UK, New Zealand judges had already found ways to use the old 
Act,440 specifically a section that provided for resolution of disputes between 
guardians, to make orders that basically amounted to shared physical care 
orders.441 Decisions made under that section of the Act (s 13) could not be 
appealed. Since these judgments were reported it can be accepted that the legal 
system considered them as acceptable use of the law. The New Zealand Court of 
Appeal also approved this practice in M v Y:442 
 
I recognise that there are many valid arguments in favour of joint custody... And it may 
very well be the proper order in many cases as in Makiri v Roxburgh (1988) 4 NZFLR 
673 (Judge Inglis QC) and Franklin v Franklin (1988) 4 FRNZ 466 (Judge Boshier).  
 
Even before M v Y these cases were included for guidance in leading New 
Zealand family law texts that targeted practitioners and law students.443At a Law 
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Society conference in 2001 family court judge von Dadelszen said444 in his 
address that “[i]t would be fair to say that many Judges, including me, have made 
some attempt to avoid using the custody/access formula and have begun speaking 
in terms of the sharing of day to day care.” In research conducted by the New 
Zealand Department of Justice in 1994, judges indicated that they, from time to 
time, made joint custody orders as a means to settle difficult cases; as a “sop to a 
difficult parent to encourage cooperation”.445 This indicates that, also in New 
Zealand, judges were effectively – and long before the enactment of COCA – 
pointing out that difficult cases frustrated them and that they found ways to use 
(or misuse) the legislation to avoid protracted litigation by ‘forcing’ conflicted 
parents to co-operate.  This also indicates that they saw (forced) joint 
custody/shared care as a solution and presumably as being in the W&BIC by 
default. Therefore the courts did not actually need COCA to move towards shared 
care albeit that COCA strengthens the courts’ already existent ability to order such 
an option. 
The Supreme Court (SC) recently heard an appeal446 in a ‘relocation case’ 
(the parent with custody/primary care wanting to move to another location – 
beyond a specified distance – with the children; the other parent opposing the 
move). Most of the court’s judgments were aimed at providing guidance as to the 
application and interpretation of the various principles provided for under COCA. 
The Court of Appeal447 had effectively stated that principle 5(b)448 (importance of 
continuing relationships with both parents ‘in particular’) was to be accorded 
greater weighting than the other principles (apart from principle (e) – the 
protection from violence principle). The three-to-two majority disagreed however 
with the Court of Appeal’s reading of principle 5(b), saying that there was nothing 
in the language of the subsection or the section as a whole to indicate that this 
principle “or any of the other principles there set out should have any presumptive 
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weighting as against other principles referred to in the section”.449 This is peculiar 
for the reason that parliament had used the words ‘in particular’ as regards the 
child’s continuing relationship with both parents. It is hard to see how ‘in 
particular’ could translate to anything else but ‘especially’. It is not surprising that 
the SC judges were divided on this issue. In particular does not (yet) mean ‘for 
example’.  
However, if the behaviour of the Australian lower courts, as discussed 
above, is anything to go by, it is probable that New Zealand family court judges 
will also give greater weight to the continuing relationship with both parents 
because this is what is happening in other common law countries, i.e. self-
referencing to the international common law legal system. The networks of 
communications created by legal systems in other common law jurisdictions form 
part of any relevant country’s legal system i.e. in its operations of self-reference 
and self-production of legal meaning it will also refer to cases from ‘fellow’ 
jurisdictions, finding its authority there if need be rather than in its direct 
environment.  With the protection of judicial discretion as a legal programme, this 
is always achievable.   
In 2011 the Child Support Amendment Bill was introduced in parliament. 
This was, in part, due to the FRM’s agitation but also, no research had been done, 
since the 1991 Act about the actual cost of raising children in New Zealand.450 
The Minister of Revenue, Peter Dunn who introduced the Bill, explains that the 
Bill will better reflect the legal changes brought about such as a “greater emphasis 
placed on separated parents sharing the care of and financial responsibility for 
their children.”451 This, he says, will increase parents’ motivation to meet their 
child support obligations. Yet the bill proposes to enact automatic and compulsory 
deduction of child support from the responsible parent’s employment income by 
an employer452 which indicates a real doubt that this proposed legislation will be 
such a great motivator for parental involvement. The bill also proposes a new 
formula on which to base child support payments which will give a wider 
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recognition of shared care, based on, for example, there being care of at least 28% 
of nights in a year that the liable parent has the child in his/her care.453 As part of 
yet another Family Court review, the government has, in 2011, invited public 
comment, and on the matter of the proposed changes to child support the 
discussion document states, as one primary objective that must be taken into 
account, that:  
 
The child support system should reflect social and legal changes that have occurred since 
the introduction of the current system in 1992. Social changes in that period mean that there 
is now a greater emphasis on separated parents sharing the care of their children.454 
 
It is hard to understand this statement. The current regime allows for reductions to 
the established amount of child support if a parent has the child in his/her care for 
40% or more of the nights in a given year. The proposed change will allow 
reduction for 28% of nights. Effectively then, the ‘social changes’ that are being 
accommodated is that less actual shared care will also be acknowledged as shared 
care. Moreover, ‘greater emphasis on separated parents sharing the care of their 
children’ does not mean that this translates into actual shared care.  
5.6 The re-attached family 
 
Regardless of the real attitudes of men and women in relation to family 
and childrearing, family legislation has taken very specific steps towards re-
producing the normative expectations of post-divorce parenting.455 The notion of 
courts of conciliation with their affiliate counselling and mediation services was 
born in California456 in the early 1960s.457 The Commission in New Zealand that 
also reported in 1978 on the need for a specialised family court with conciliatory 
services noted that social change created “complex personal and legal 
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456 See e.g. Meyer Elkin “Conciliation courts: the reintegration of disintegrating families” (1973) 
22 (1) The Family Coordinator 63. 
457 New Zealand’s family court with affiliated services of counselling and (now) mediation was 
established in 1981 under Family Court Act 1980. 
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problems”.458 What is never noted by these official enquiries and reports, whether 
called for by the political system or the legal system, is that the law, as an 
autonomous social system, determines which issues and events will be legal 
issues (problems) in the first place i.e. whether it will ‘belong’ to the system. The 
law invented coverture, controlled divorce to preserve the family and forced 
unhappy couples to stay together, disempowered women, declared some children 
to be illegal by their very existence (‘illegitimate’ children), turned children into 
property that belonged to one spouse (the father), and then legalised the maternal 
preference when men lost interest in maintaining relationships with their children 
after separation. The law had historically constructed the relation of fatherhood, 
paternal authority and male economic power in a way that led to the vast majority 
of men not wanting to be the primary caregiver for their children.459 Yet, despite 
these truths, a neat reversal takes place by stating that society, by changing, is 
causing problems for the system and then implies that the system must find new 
ways to solve these problems/come to the rescue – which is another way of 
maintaining and restating the system’s authority and closure. A new (legal) form 
of family now had to be invented to ensure for the (legal) care of children and 
most importantly their financial care.  
The current relevant legislation in common law countries do provide a 
vision of the ideal of reduced ‘conflict’ between separated and separating parents 
and to encourage both parents to remain involved in their children’s lives after 
separation.460 Law has assumed the task of impressing upon parents their 
responsibility to arrange their post-separation family lives in a way that 
corresponds to the image of the ‘good’ post-separation family, one in which 
parents are exclusively concerned with the W&BIC of their children and who co-
operate in sharing time with and responsibility for them. The former ideas of the 
‘clean break’ that accompanied no-fault divorce were/are being legally re-
produced (and substituted) to provide for a new ideal: the post-separation family. 
Rules that encourage private parental agreement assume that giving responsibility 
                                                
458 D S Beattie, I H Kawharu and others Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts 
(Government Printer, 1978) at 146. Practically all parties are now first sent to the family court’s 
counsellors which is a government funded service.  
459 Richard Collier Masculinity, Law and the Family above n 351 at 180-181. 
460 Shelley Day Sclater and Christine Piper “The Family Law Act 1996 in context” in Shelley Day 
Sclater and Christine Piper (eds) Undercurrents of Divorce (Dartmouth Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999) 
3 at 3. 
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to parents support them in making better decisions. This has not been seen.461 This 
however is ignored so long as parents avoid conflict and avoid litigation.   
These ideas of enduring relationships, co-operation and sharing the child, 
have been entered into the public domain as new dominant legal and normative 
expectations462 with the result that other things have been left aside or unsaid, 
such as many people’s lack of ability to simply ‘forgive and forget’ or that high 
conflict is the very reason why many couples separate which, ironically, the law 
legalised and acknowledge by enacting ‘irreconcilable differences’ as a ground for 
divorce. But now, suddenly, these ‘irreconcilable differences’ had to be ignored 
and for this the W&BIC programme could yet again be adapted. The image of the 
post-separation child has become that of being a victim, of suffering harm because 
of divorce and if parents cannot agree, and of a ‘survivor’ of divorce.463 
Legislation moved away from the language of ‘custody’ and ‘access’ 
toward a language of ‘residence’ (now ‘day-to-day’ care in New Zealand) and 
‘contact’ explicitly grounded on the supposition that neither parent should 
consider her/himself to be ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ in separation as regards the care of 
their children, but that parental responsibility is ongoing for both parents. Studies 
in Australia show that a ‘pro-contact culture’464 has taken hold in the courts, and 
the professional advice given to separated parents465 creates new pressures on 
custodial parents to agree to contact regardless of their concerns or doubts about 
the other parent. Not surprisingly, this is similar to findings in the UK under less 
                                                
461 Katharine Bartlett “US custody law and trends in the context of the ALI principles of the law of 
family dissolution’ (2002) (Fall) Va. J. Soc. Pol’y& L. 5 at 48. 
462Ben Neale and Carol Smart “In whose best interests? Theorising family life following parental 
separation or divorce” above n 13 (noting the shift in the 1980s in legal (and political) discourse 
from the single/reconstituted family to the “co-parenting, biological family”); Carol Smart and 
Bren Neale Family Fragments? (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999) 37-39 (discussing the importance 
of the Children Act 1989 in England, as an experiment to promote “a new style of child-centred 
post-divorce parenting”.) 
463Christine Piper “Divorce reform and the image of the child” (1996)23 (3) J Law &Soc’y 364; 
Jan Pryor and Bryan Rodgers Children in Changing Families: Life after parental 
separation(Blackwell, Malden (MA) 2001) generally. 
464 Kathryn Rendell, Zoe Rathus and others An Unacceptable Risk: A Report on Child Contact 
Arrangements Where there is Violence in the Family (Queensland Women's Legal Service Inc. 
2000) at 20; Rae Kaspiew “Empirical insights into parental attitudes and children’s interests in 
family court litigation” (2007) 29 Sydney L Rev 131 at 134. 
465Helen Rhoades, Regina Graycar and Margaret Harrison The Family Law Reform Act 1995: The 
First Three Years above n 437 at 5.109 
http://www.familycourt.gov.au/wps/wcm/resources/file/ebab0a49e079ac3/famlaw.pdf 
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prescriptive legislation.466 Recent research (note that the sample was small) 
indicates that family court practices (including family court counselling and 
mediation) in New Zealand are drifting in a direction of encouraging 50/50 shared 
care.467About 5% of cases that enter the legal system in New Zealand go to a full 
hearing468 meaning that the other processes of the family court were not 
successful in the parties’ coming to an agreement and these are counselling, 
mediation, judicial conference.  
By the 1980s the New Zealand family court with its new affiliate services, 
mediation and counselling469 had, long before the enactment of COCA, taken up 
the agenda of shared parenting.470  “The various arms of the New Zealand Family 
Court are ready to reach out and prop up shared residence arrangements”471 wrote 
one commentator in 1994. All parents, who file an application with the family 
court, will invariably be sent to family court counsellors as a first step in the 
process of trying to reach ‘mutual’ agreement.472 
COCA (as under the former Guardianship Act473) specifies in section 17 
that in most circumstances both parents will automatically have joint legal 
                                                
466 Carol Smart and Bren Neale “Arguments against virtue: must contact be enforced?” above n 
386; Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Jacqueline Barron and others “Settlement culture and the use of the 
‘no order’ principle under the Children Act 1989” (1999) 11 CFLQ 53.  
467 Julia Tolmie, Vivienne Elizabeth and Nicola Gavey “Is 50:50 shared care a desirable norm 
following family separation?” above n 430. 
468 New Zealand Ministry of Justice Reviewing the Family Court: A public consultation paper 
above n 454 at 81. 
469 The Domestic Proceedings Act 1968 already emphasised reconciliation between the parties “to 
help the parties build back their relationship together”: Mark Henaghan “Legally rearranging 
families: parents and children after break-up” in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin Family Law 
Policy in New Zealand (3rded, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) 269 at 276. The primary emphasis 
was on keeping the family together and a duty was placed on lawyers and the court to consider 
reconciliation: Domestic Proceedings Act 1968, s 13. This shifted to conciliation under the Family 
Proceedings Act 1980, ss 8, 12, 14. 
470 See e.g. W R Atkin Living Together Without Marriage: The law in New Zealand (Butterworths, 
Wellington (NZ), 1991) at 44. Spence v Spence (1984) 3 NZFLR 347 (CA); McDougall v Cheyne 
(1990) NZFLR 446 (FC); Mark Henaghan “Legally rearranging families: parents and children 
after breakup” above n 530 at 329;  
471 Caroline Bridge “Shared residence in England and New Zealand – a comparative analysis” 
above n 439 at 12. 
472Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 10. For current practices suggesting coercion see Julia Tolmie, 
Vivienne Elizabeth and Nicola Gavey “Is 50:50 shared care a desirable norm following family 
separation?”  above n 430. This, again, is not limited to New Zealand. The same is happening in, 
for example, England. Wallbank has argued that mothers, who evidently resist arguments for the 
father’s continued involvement and regular contact as not being in line with W&BIC, are criticised 
and discouraged from such resistance. See Julie Wallbank “Castigating mothers: the judicial 
response to ‘wilful’ women in disputes over paternal contact in English law” (1998) 20 J of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 357. 
473Guardianship Act 1968, ss 3 and 6. 
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guardianship of their children474 unless a court deems it inappropriate and thus 
what is decided by the court in CCDs is primarily which parent will have what 
percentage of the child’s physical care. Therefore the concept of ‘parental 
responsibility’ did not have to be introduced in COCA. The last available family 
court statistics475 (2008) do not however show an apparent increase in shared 
‘day-to-day’ care orders which stood at about 11% and with ‘day-to-day’ care 
being awarded to the father in another 11% of cases. The majority of orders are 
given ‘by consent’ of the parties to the proceedings, rather than decided by a 
judge. Mothers were awarded ‘day-to-day’ care in about 65% of cases. Without 
more up-to-date statistics it is not possible to say whether there have been 
significant increases or decreases over the past three years. In the first year after 
COCA came into force, the New Zealand Principal Family Court Judge reported 
that the court made just over 33% of CCDs either for shared care or primary 
father ‘day-to-day’ care.476 The 2008 statistics would thus reflect a decrease in 
shared and ‘father only’ CCD orders. What cannot be gleaned from these statistics 
is how much contact the court grants the non-resident parent or whether this has 
increased since COCA came into force. Also bear in mind that pursuant to Child 
Support Act ‘shared care’ is only recognised from 40% upwards of nights spent 
with a parent over a year. As noted above, if the current Child Support bill is 
enacted, shared care will be ‘official’ from 28% of nights spent with a parent. 
This might significantly impact on the statistics. Based on what is being said by at 
least one government minister, shared care has risen, and therefore child support 
formulas will be adapted to reflect this. The proposed changes to the current child 
support scheme and assessment formula will 
 
better reflect many of the social and legal changes that have occurred since the 
introduction of the current [child support] scheme, such as the greater emphasis placed 
on separated parents sharing the care of, and financial responsibility for, their 
                                                
474 In the case of never married parents, the father has guardianship if he lived with the mother at 
the time of the child’s birth. 
475Ministry of Justice Family Court Statistics – An overview of family court statistics in New 
Zealand 2004 to 2008 (May 2010) Statistical Bulletin at 4. The overview states that “[m]ost of the 
time, day-to-day care is given to a single party ... Relatively few orders are shared between two or 
more parties” at 3. 
476 14.9% were for shared care and 18.4% for father primary care. Peter Boshier “The family court 
– 25 years on” Speech given to the New Zealand Law Society, Christchurch, 13 October 
2006.http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/family-court/publications/speeches-and-papers/the-family-
court-25-years-on Accessed 2 November 2011. 
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children. This in turn will increase incentives for parents to meet their child support 
obligations.477 
 
 The public discussion on the bill invited, inter alia, contribution on the topic 
‘greater emphasis on contact and care’ and pointed out that family law now places 
greater emphasis on shared care and parenting and going on to say that COCA 
emphasises “that parents’ responsibilities are ongoing, and that both parents 
should have a significant role in their children’s upbringing.”478 Evidence is found 
of a “substantial ... regular sharing of care” in a Family Commission’s survey in 
which 36% of respondents (child support paying parents) said that they “look 
after” their children “at least a few days a fortnight”.479 
 It is unsure how the following comment relates to a parent paying his/her 
child’s support (especially as this can be done via the Inland Revenue Department 
if one so wishes thus requiring no contact with the other parent whatsoever) but it 
can be assumed that its inclusion in the public discussion and information 
document was directed at custodial parents (primarily mothers) entirely. 
 
Even when high levels of care did not occur, comments from parents suggested they would 
be willing to increase their levels of care if other hurdles, such as conflict between the 
parents, could be overcome or reduced.480 
 
This is definitely in line with one objective that the FRM wants to achieve. In 
other words, by arguing that they will pay more towards their children’s support if 
they are recognised as joint custodians and preferably with as much shared 
parenting time as possible, they caused the ‘right’ perturbation for political 
response.  
 However whether the mention of shared care in the cited government 
documents is largely used in the hope of encouraging child support payment 
                                                
477 Peter Dunn “Child Support Amendment Bill, Government Bill 337-1” at 2. (Own 
emphases).http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2011/0337/latest/DLM4071711.html 
Accessed 8 November 2011. 
478 Peter Dunn “Supporting Children, a government discussion document on updating the child 
support scheme” at 27.http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/2010-dd-supporting-
children/overview Accessed 3 January 2012. 
479Peter Dunn “Supporting Children, a government discussion document on updating the child 
support scheme” above n 478_ at 27 para 4.3. The relevant key finding of the survey was, to be 
precise, as follows: “48.3 percent of parents who pay child support (... through voluntary 
arrangements as well as through the child support scheme) say their child stays overnight at their 
house at least a few days per fortnight, compared with 32.0 percent of receiving parents who say 
their child stays overnight at the paying parent’s home at least a few days a fortnight (an average 
of 36.4 percent).” See Appendix 4 at 81. 
480Peter Dunn “Supporting Children, a government discussion document on updating the child 
support scheme” above n 478 at 28.Own emphasis. 
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cannot be ruled out. A bigger irritation, rather than the FRM, that the government 
was likely responding to could be the massive debt owed by (predominantly) 
fathers and that this could no longer be ignored, as clearly had been done for 
many years.481The 1994 Trapski report482 was the first significant analysis of the 
Child Support Act 1991 (CSA) but many of its recommendations had been 
ignored by the political system. One of these was that that ‘paramount’ legal 
programme namely the ‘welfare of the child’ should be included in the child 
support legislation. It was not, nor is it currently anywhere included in the bill 
before parliament that will, if passed, amend the Act.  
One of the great irregularities of the scheme under the CSA, and an 
indication of its distance from the ‘welfare of the child’, is the discrepancy 
between actual cost of raising children in New Zealand and the amounts payable 
under the CSA, something that the Trapski Report pointed out seventeen years 
ago. Even subsequent to that report, the actual cost of raising children had not 
been researched by the government until 2009/2010 when research was published 
and presented483 and this information will apparently be incorporated under the 
new scheme proposed in the current bill before parliament.484 
 
5.7 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child – an irritant? 
 
International human rights law – being a legal communication in the 
Luhmannian sense – belongs, to the legal system and it is thus subject to the 
operations of national legal systems that involve the systems’ principles, rules, 
standards, as produced by those legal systems. The articles of the UNCRC 
relevant to this thesis – articles 3, 12 and 18 – did not introduce legal concepts or 
rules that were not already part of the western common law legal system e.g. the 
U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and America, albeit that the latter has 
                                                
481 Imogen Neal “Parents $2.3b in debt for support” (Fairfax NZ News) Last updated 23/10/2011 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/5835623/Parents-2-3b-in-debt-for-support Accessed 3 January 
2012. 
482P Trapski D Halsted and others Child Support Review 1994 Report of the Working Party 
(Wellington (NZ), 1994). 
483 Iris Claus, Paul Kilford and others “Costs of raising children” Presentation (March 2010) 
Official Statistics Forum 2010. 
484Peter Dunn “Child Support Amendment Bill, Commentary on the Bill” (Policy Advice Division 
of Inland Revenue, Wellington (NZ), October 2011) at 5, 9, 10.http://www.legislation.govt.nz/ 
Downloaded on 1 December 2011. 
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signed the Convention but is yet to ratify it while having been heavily involved in 
its drafting.  
Looking at legislation, article 3 of the UNCRC states that the best interests 
of the child must be primary in actions that involve the child. This is recognised in 
the relevant legislation of most countries’ of the world. Paragraph 1 of article 12 
assures, to every child who is “capable of forming his/her own views [i.e. not all 
children and depending on the courts’ discretion as to the child’s capacity] the 
right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of 
the child being given due weight in accordance with age and maturity.” Paragraph 
2 states, in particular, that the child shall be afforded the right to be heard in any 
judicial or administrative proceedings affecting him or her. New Zealand’s 
Guardianship Act s 23(2) for example provided in 1968 already:  
 
In any proceedings [involving the welfare of the child] the Court shall ascertain the 
wishes of the child, if the child is able to express them, and shall, ... take account of them 
to such extent as the Court thinks fit, having regard to the age and maturity of the child.” 
(Own emphases). 
 
“Shall” was apparently not instructive enough – and courts certainly did not 
always obtain the views of children in CCDs485 – and so the importance of article 
12 was explained as having been “of considerable influence” in enacting 
COCA.486 Section 6 of COCA now says the court “must” give a child a 
“reasonable opportunity to express views” in CCDs and any views expressed must 
“be taken into account”. Note, that neither the UNCRC nor COCA instructs that 
the child’s views must be superior. Despite the change in COCA to elevate this 
                                                
485Pauline Tapp and Nicola Taylor “Agents or dependants - children and the family law system” 
(2001) 3 BFLJ 245; Anne B Smith and Megan M Gallop “What children think about access with 
their non-resident parent” in Anne B Smith, Megan M Gallop and others (eds) Children Whose 
Parents live Apart: Family & legal concepts (Children’s Issues Centre, Dunedin (NZ), April 2001) 
1; Pauline Tapp “Parenting, a private responsibility or a collaborative partnership? A perspective 
based on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child” in Vivienne Adair and Robyn 
Dixon (eds) The Family in Aotearoa New Zealand (Addison Wesley Longman, Auckland (NZ), 
1998) 1. 
486 Robert Ludbrook and Lex de Jong Care of Children in New Zealand: Analysis and expert 
commentary (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 2004) at 8; See also Pauline Tapp “Judges are 
human too: conversations between the judge anda child as a means of giving effect to section 6 of 
the Care of Children Act 2004” (2006) NZ Law Rev. 35; Peter Boshier “The new era – 
professionalism in the family court” New Zealand Law Society Family Law Section, Family Law, 
(October 10, 2005) http://www.justice.govt.nz/family/publications/ Accessed 12 December 2011.  
speeches-papers/archive.asp?inline=nzls-family-law-section-10-10-2005.asp 
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rule, recent research found that, as happened under the previous legislation, the 
court still does not consistently hear the child’s views.487 
Ironically, while article 12 implies that the child is an autonomous social 
actor, article 3 speaks of the child as vulnerable and incompetent; in need of a 
more powerful or knowledgeable forum, body or actor to decide what will be in 
her/his best interests.488 No instruction or clarification is given by the UNCRC as 
to the meaning of ‘best interests’ in article 3, except that it must be ‘primary’ and 
therefore the articles’ meaning and/or application will, again, be determined on a 
national level by the courts or, more recently, by legislation.489 There is thus a 
structural coupling between international human rights law and national law, at 
least of western jurisdictions, while national legislatures will react in ways that 
they deem applicable and practical within the jurisdiction but also bearing in mind 
that States parties are actually themselves involved in drafting conventions at the 
United Nations.490 Who is instructing whom? Or, as Luhmann explains, there is 
circularity in the operations of law. Importantly, as has been pointed out by 
Freeman, the construction of individual rights in response to perceived social 
problems allows governments to construct these problems as conflicts that need 
resolving between the individuals involved and thereby avoids scrutinising their 
social and economic causes.491 By having reflected on and researched the history 
of CCDs and the legal system’s operations and constructed normative 
expectations as the system applied its version of W&BIC, I would add legal 
causes also.  
Kaganas and Diduck point out that two images of children in law and 
socio-legal communication can be identified.492 These are first the image of the 
                                                
487 Antoinette Robinson “Children heard but not listened to? An analysis of children’s views under 
s 6 of the Care of Children Act 2004” (2011) 7 NZFLJ 39 (concluding that the article’s analyses of 
recent court decisions involving the child’s views has shown that “a change in law will not deliver 
a true change, if the change is not the result of a change in attitude” – quoting Dala Huang 
Accession Magazine (New Zealand, August 2010) at 1. 
488 Scholars have pointed out this contradiction before. See e.g Carol Smart “Children and the 
transformation of family law” in John Dewar and Stephen Parker (eds) Family Law: Processes, 
practice, pressures at 231; Rebecca M Stahl “'Don’t forget about me': implementing article 12 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (2007) 24 (3) Arizona J of Int. & 
Comparative Law 803. 
489 For example the Care of Children Act 2004, s 5 
490 Michael King “Children’s rights as communication: reflections on autopoietic theory and the 
United Nations Convention” (1994) 57 (3) MLR 385 at 392-401. 
491 Michael Freeman The State, the Law and the Family: Critical perspectives (Tavistock, London, 
1984) at 55. 
492 Felicity Kaganas and Alison Diduck “Incomplete citizens: changing images of post-separation 
children” (2004) 67 (6) Mod L. Rev. 959 at 961ff. 
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child as developing towards agency albeit still dependent – i.e. of yet to become a 
fully rational subject – and the other the ideas of the romantic realm – i.e. of the 
child as innocent, developing through socialisation and therefore with a limited 
competency. They contend that the former view currently dominates particularly 
when social scientists become involved in law’s operations and is also reflected 
by UNCRC – specifically article 12.  
That being said, the notions of children’s rights, as espoused by UNCRC, 
are idealistic communications rather than instruments of power and obligation. 
National legal systems become important in transforming those concepts of rights 
from the venerable yet Eurocentric statements493 of the Convention into rules 
designed to regulate relationships between children and adults. These demands for 
legal remedies to better children’s lives elicits little more than formalistic 
responses from governments494 and selective responses within the operations of 
the legal system. To add to the fluidity of interpretation of the UNCRC the articles 
of the Convention constantly shifts between discussions of children’s particular 
need for protection,495 their developing need for independence,496 and the 
protection and enforcement of parents’ rights and duties, respectively.497 Its 
construction appears to want to cover so many possibilities and ideals that in the 
end, it can contradict itself.  
Parents (as adults – and not including under aged parents) vote, or at least 
are eligible to vote, while children do not. Pleasing parents can therefore be far 
more important for political purposes and staying in or gaining power than 
pleasing children. But also, making parents the primary source of support for their 
children’s financial well-being means making rules that can continue to elevate 
parents’ position above that of their child(ren) while then demanding 
‘responsible’ parenting in the form of, inter alia, paying child support and 
relieving government’s from significant expense. For example, Helen Rhoades, 
suggests that the political system (in Australia) chose to respond to the ‘gender 
                                                
493 See e.g. Allison James “From the child’s point of view: issues in the social construction of 
childhood” in Catherine Panter-Brick (ed) Biosocial Perspectives on Children (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1998) 45 at 52-53. 
494 Michael King “Children’s rights as communication: reflections on autopoietic theory and the 
United Nations Convention” above n 490 at 386. 
495Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Art.3, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 
1989) art 5 (protection from abuse) 
496 Ibid, art 12 (right to express views in judicial proceedings concerning them); art. 13 (freedom 
of expression). 
497 Ibid, art 5 (protection of parental rights and duties); art. 18 (responsibilities of parents). 
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wars’ discourse surrounding post-separation child-rearing and caring by way of 
instituting ‘equality’ and thus being seen as responding ‘fairly’.498 In other words 
the focus on the child has been displaced by the political system’s internally 
produced solution to ‘solve’ the ‘gender war’ surrounding post-separation 
parenting but with the aim to increase the level of responsibility taken for 
children, or simply put, to force fathers to be (financially) involved in their 
children’s lives post separation.  
 
5.8 The new normative expectation? 
 
In both law and politics, there has materialised an equality agenda and  
promotion of gender neutrality while, in reality, child rearing is still 
overwhelmingly a maternal practice, despite the extremely exaggerated claims by 
the FRM.499 In Australia, after the first round of reforms in 1995 that encouraged 
greater shared parenting and even after the 2006 reforms, when parents come to 
their own agreements, the mother predominantly remains the primary caregiver. If 
most separated fathers were truly as determined to have equal time with their 
children one could imagine that the new ‘shadow’ that the law casts would have 
them push for greater shared care in their negotiations. Because of the social 
systems’ closure there is every possibility that Australia’s initiative will be 
followed.500 Political systems of particular realms, such as western common law 
countries, invariably also follow each other, particularly in family law it seems. 
 Why are legal and political systems reacting (albeit differently except in 
Australia) to the FRM? They are not that great in numbers and often do 
themselves no favours by the way they stage public protest. Their websites and 
user forums often make for misogynistic and very conservative reading and there 
is a great hatred of child support enforcement. These are relatively easily 
                                                
498 Helen Rhoades “Children's needs and ‘gender wars’: the paradox of parenting law reform” 
(2010) 24 AJFL 1. 
499 In America, which I have not discussed above, but where the move away from sole parent 
custody/care has been underway longer than in the countries discussed above; approximately 84% 
of children are in their mothers’ custody/primary care see e.g. Jocelyn Elise Crowley “Taking 
custody of motherhood: fathers’ rights activists and the politics of parenting” above n 371 at 224. 
500 See Owen Bowcott “Government backs shared parenting legislation after separation” (6 
February 2012) The Guardian online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/feb/06/government-backs-shared-parenting-
legislation Accessed 28 February 2012: “Fathers and mothers should be entitled to a legally 
binding ‘presumption of shared parenting’ after separation, the [U.K.] government has announced, 
rejecting advice by an independent review on family justice.” 
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accessible on the World Wide Web and academic commentators have studied 
their content.501 The FRM’s public protests often seem immature and 
unimpressive.   
 
When a protester dressed as Spiderman climbed a crane on Tower Bridge, London, in 
November 2004, city Mayor Ken Livingstone said the stunt demonstrated why “some men 
should not have access to their children”.502 
  
Luhmann maintains that all choices and decisions made within autopoietic 
systems are contingent at any given point in time, meaning that there were, and 
always will be other options available and that choices are made by the systems 
about what to respond to or not depending on what the receiving system wants to 
achieve. Some events will be selected for response and others will be ignored. 
While political systems need to seem more transparent in their motivations, it is 
much harder to determine what the legal systems will react to and how. Courts are 
not compelled to make public statements or to explain themselves. In addition, the 
legal system reacts slowly and little by little as it did for example to stabilise the 
TYD. Therefore, if shared care is indeed the system’s preferred legal expectation 
that it wants to stabilise, we are not yet seeing a dramatic escalation in court 
ordered shared parenting, with Australia being an exception.  
 Coltrane and Hickman have concluded503 that legislative child custody 
reforms in America were readily adopted in the 1980s because certain 
developments coincided. For the political system, the rhetoric and goals of joint 
custody as espoused by the FRM, the agitation by women and mothers for child 
support enforcement reforms and greater financial support from fathers, and the 
prevailing political climate coincided. The political climate in the 1980s was 
conservative, particularly as far as social support and welfare budgets were 
concerned. The objective for the political system was primarily to save State 
expenditure by shifting financial support of single-parent-children onto fathers. 
To compromise, the State had to be seen to ‘accommodate’ fathers and legislative 
changes were made that suggested greater equality with seemingly ‘share-
friendly’ provisions. However the courts, even before the reformed legislation 
                                                
501 See e.g. Susan S Boyd “Robbed of their families? Fathers’ rights discourses in Canadian 
parenting law reform processes” above n 378. 
502 BBC NEWS “Profile: Fathers 4 Justice” http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/uk_news/3653112.stm Last updated 22 April 2008 15:10 UK. 
503 Scott Coltrane and Neil Hickman “The rhetoric of rights and needs: moral discourse in the 
reform of child custody and child support laws” (1992) 39 (4) Social Problems 400 at 413. 
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entered it, started to move toward shared parenting. Possibly because the FRM 
specifically lashed out at the courts, accusing its practices of gender bias, 
constantly using legal language such as the ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ thus ‘irritating’ 
the system to respond (over time) to the agitation by the FRM by enhancing joint 
physical custody/care. Crowley highlights how the FRM uses the arguments 
employed by women and minority groups in the past to agitate for ‘equality’ in 
CCDs.504 
As for children, the latest research after the 2006 reforms in Australia, 
confirmed what researchers had found already before the reforms505 namely that 
regardless of the type of care arrangement that children find themselves in, what 
matters to them the most is the quality of the relationship that they have with their 
parents and not the amount of time they spend with them per se. Thus, if a parent 
lacks relational and/or parenting skills, no amount of time spent with her/his child 
will magically turn the relationship into a constructive, pleasant and reliable 
relationship. “[T]he better (richer, deeper, and more secure) the parent-child 
relationships, the better the children’s adjustment, whether or not the parents live 
together.”506 This however appears to be ignored by both legislatures and the legal 
system.  
Shared parenting by mutual agreement is on the (slow) rise and sometimes 
it works well and children benefit and other times the experiment ends (for 
whatever reason.507 It is unfortunate when parents enter agreements only because 
they feel pressurised by legal and popular (unrealistic) rhetoric especially when it 
is too difficult to sustain. The biggest losers in the process are invariably the 
children because of the discontinuity in arrangements and the disruptions that this 
may cause and also because of the conflict when parents are simply not suited for 
shared arrangements. Of greatest concern however is that the courts (and their 
                                                
504 Jocelyn Elise Crowley “Adopting ‘equality tools’ from the toolboxes of their predecessors: the 
fathers’ rights movement in the United States” above n 348. 
505 Paul Amato and Joan G Gilbreth “Nonresident fathers and children’s well-being: a meta-
analysis” (1999) 61 Journal of Marriage and the Family 557; Carol Smart, Bren Neale and 
Amanda Wade The Changing Experience of Childhood: Families and divorce (Polity Press, 
Cambridge (UK) 2001) chapter 3. 
506 Michael E Lamb “Improving the quality of parent-child contact in separating families” in 
Mavis Maclean (ed) Parenting after Partnering: Containing conflict after separation (Oñati ISLS, 
Hart Publishing, Portland (OR), 2007) 11 at 17. 
507 This may also include a parent having to move away for job purposes or that the arrangement 
proves too costly for example by having to maintain two materially equal households.  
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affiliated services such as family court counselling and mediation that also 
ostensible push the legal agenda) are attempting to create a new normative 
expectation by imposing shared arrangements on parents that are not able to cope 
with the demands of such an agreement and worse, that are not able to manage 
their differences and dislike of each other.   
 There will be exceptions of course because the legal programmes of judicial 
discretion and the ‘individualistic approach’ is part and parcel of CCDs in 
particular. These programmes however only come into play when judges decide 
CCDs. For the great majority of cases, the legal system’s subsidiary services will 
basically be responsible for helping the parties decide how care will be divided. 
These lower order services will, quite likely, increasingly follow the first rule of 
the system by which they operate: help parties to reach a settlement that includes 
sharing the care of children.   
Given the history of CCDs in the legal system and its application of the 
W&BIC programme to stabilise the legal preference of CCD outcomes over time, 
there is a great possibility that the legal system will, and already is, pushing this 
new ideal of shared parenting towards the next stabilised (at least for the system) 
legal expectation. Law’s function is not to establish the ‘truth’ of W&BIC, but 
rather to stabilise the (changing) normative expectations about W&BIC, which is 
achieved by way of law’s own operations i.e. by establishing the legality (or not) 
of circumstances.508  Shared parenting post separation is now legally correct. If 
there is ‘evidence’ in its environment that at a given time coincides with the legal 
system’s programmes then such evidence will be utilised by the system in its 
establishment of normative expectations. The next chapter will briefly look at 
how the law, in this process, coupled with social science. 
                                                
508 Michael King “The future uncertainty as a challenge to law’s programmes: the dilemma of 
parental disputes” (2000) 63 (4) MLR 523 at 539. 
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Chapter 6   The structural coupling between law and social science 
 
6.1       Introduction 
 
The social sciences509 produced vast amounts of new and, given human 
nature and emotion, ambiguous communications510 about the impact and effect of 
divorce on children and advice on curtailing its negative consequences. However 
this eventually provided the legal system with opportunities to select from and use 
those communications that can justify, stabilise and support its own norms. As 
King and Trowell explain:  
 
One of the services that the law performs is to transform complex, messy situations 
involving intricate human relationships and a multiplicity of possible causes and effects 
into a simple story which makes sense and holds a moral for everyone.511 
 
Put differently, the inherent indeterminable and subjective interpretation512 of the 
W&BIC doctrine urged the legal system to “enslave”513 some social science 
discourses in accordance with law’s own norm-establishing purposes. By 
                                                
509 While social sciences are more dependent on interpretative concepts, interpretative elements 
per se are part and parcel of natural sciences also, and therefore social science does belong to the 
scientific realm. See e.g. Mary B Hesse Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of 
Science (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1980); Gary King, Robert O’ Keohane and 
Sidney Verba in Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1994) chapter 1: “The science in social science”; Michael King 
“Child welfare within law: the emergence of a hybrid discourse” (1991) 18 (3) J Law & Soc’y 303 
at 309-311. On the diversity of approaches within social science research, see e.g. Tim May Social 
Research: Issues, methods and process (3rded, Open University Press, Buckingham, 2001) at 7-27. 
510 Notwithstanding a large collection of existing published research on issues such as divorce, 
child welfare, and fathers’ involvement in their children’s lives, overviews of these works can only 
reach agreement on the unfeasibility of drawing any clear conclusions. See e.g. Stephen Gilmore 
“Contact/shared residence and child well-being: research evidence and its implications for legal-
decision-making” (2006) 20(3) IJLPF 344 at 346; Graeme B Wilson “The non-resident parental 
role for separated fathers: a review” (2006) 20(3) IJLPF 286 at 290. 
511 Michael King and Judith Trowell Children’s Welfare and the Law: The limits of legal 
intervention (Sage, London, 1992) at 1.  
512 Robert Mnookin “Child-custody adjudication: judicial functions in the face of indeterminacy” 
(1975) 39 L. & Contemp. Prob. 226 – 293; Jon Elster Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the 
Limitations of Rationality (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1989); Andrea Charlow 
“Awarding custody: the best interests of the child and other fictions” (1986-1987) 5 Yale L. 
&Pol’y Rev. 267; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse “Towards a revitalization of family law” (1990) 69 
Tex. L. Rev. 245 at 289; Lynn M Akre, “Struggling with indeterminacy: a call for interdisciplinary 
collaboration in redefining the ‘Best Interest of the Child’ standard’” (1992) 75 Marq.L.Rev. 628; 
Martin Guggenheim What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA), 2005) Chapter 5 - arguing that espousing W&BIC is a disguise to obscure that custody 
decisions are really about the involved adults’ interests. 
513 Gunther Teubner “How the law thinks: toward a constructivist epistemology of law” above n 
17 at 745.  
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“enslave” Teubner means that the law responds to scientific information that is 
outside its boundaries by determining the relevance of such information in 
accordance with the legal system’s operations. In the process much information 
that an expert in social/behavioural sciences may consider relevant or contingent 
(the latter being worse for the legal system that seeks certainty) will be discarded 
or reconstructed by the legal system in accordance with its own pre-determined 
value allocations. Thus, the legal system absorbs ideas only if these ideas can fit 
into the system’s operations.  
There exists, especially since the 1970s, a wealth of scientific knowledge 
about a wide range of factors that might harmfully or beneficially affect children’s 
development post parental separation, yet only a small section of this knowledge 
enters the legal system.514 Luhmann explains that synthesising outside 
information within a social system (such as law) so as to produce a 
communication “is always a selective occurrence”515 where the process of self-
production of the system’s network of communications “grasps something out of 
the actual referential horizon ... and leaves other things aside”.516 A social system 
views its environment – comprised of other social systems – as a “horizon”.517 In 
this chapter I will highlight and discuss the impact of some of the social science 
research as it emerged since the first half of the twentieth century in law’s 
environment (or ‘horizon’) that the legal system reacted to in its unavoidable 
structural coupling with social sciences as this discipline increasingly focussed on 
divorce and child rearing practices after the legal event that divorce is.  
The focus will primarily be on New Zealand developments however at 
times developments in other jurisdictions will be relevant. Given the diversity and 
volume of social science research and outcomes I do not propose to cover the 
information from that system exhaustively but will focus on what the legal system 
seemed to have responded to. Thus, I will not offer an array of all the social 
science propositions or ‘general’ findings that the legal system ignored or could 
have selected for response due to the sheer volume of contributions.  
 
                                                
514 Michael King A Better World for Children? Explorations in morality and authority (Routledge, 
London, 1997) at 19. 
515 Niklas Luhmann Social Systems above n 8 at 140. 
516 Ibid. (Emphases in original.) 
517 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness: on reality in the world of law” above n 19 at 337.  
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6.2 Social science research within the legal system 
 
The legal system had, in CCDs, started to react to social science in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. The maternal preference encapsulated in the 
TYD was “given a boost” by the development and popularisation of 
psychoanalysis, and Sigmund Freud’s theory of child development in the latter 
half of his career (the first four decades of the twentieth century) placed heavy 
weight upon the mother’s role as primary caretaker in a child’s life.518 
Subsequently theories of attachment between mother and child such as John 
Bowlby’s519 added apparent scientific support to the weight placed on infant-
mother attachment and implied that infant-father attachment was less important to 
the child’s development.520 Thus, scientific theories of psychoanalysis and 
attachment appeared to lend further credibility to the maternal preference. Perhaps 
for these reasons (or at least in part) the legal system deemed the TYD programme 
to be justified as being in the W&BIC of children.  
By the 1960s fathers had started to agitate for legal recognition of their 
parental role in divorce proceedings and the political system reacted to this 
perturbation by starting to consider that a more gender-neutral standard might be 
legally (legislatively) appropriate but still leaving the discretion of the courts 
intact. Yet it is hard to see where the legislation, since the introduction of equal 
consideration of both parents in CCDs, was not gender neutral. It was the 
outcomes and preferences of the courts that had then tilted heavily in favour of 
maternal custody that evoked environmental irritation. This was also the time of 
heightened agitation by the ‘second wave’ feminist movement that questioned the 
social division of labour in the family and the pressure on women to accept most 
of the child rearing responsibilities521 while the reality was that women had 
increasingly started to join the work force, including middle class women. 
Working class women largely had no choice but to work in order to survive 
                                                
518 Jonathan W Gould and David A Martindale The Art and Science of Child Custody Evaluations 
(Guilford Press, New York (NY), 2007) at 35. 
519 John Bowlby Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment (Hogarth, London, 1969). 
520 Jonathan W Gould and David A Martindale The Art and Science of Child Custody Evaluations 
above n 518 at 35. Attachment theory has not (yet) been rejected by social sciences, see Inge 
Bretherton “The origins of attachment theory: John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth” (1992) 28 Dev. 
Psychol. 759 at 770-771. 
521 Sarah Gamble The Routledge Companion to Feminism and Postfeminism (Routledge, London, 
2001) 25. 
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financially. Therefore the ideal of a mother staying at home and largely devoting 
her time to homemaking and childrearing had become questionable given the 
realities in the environment. The ideal of the breadwinner husband and father was 
also not realistic for many working class families, but then normative expectations 
can often not claim workability in practice, an outcome that is often ignored by 
both the political and the legal systems for as long as possible.   
In 1973, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit522 introduced their version of 
W&BIC that claimed that a child is best off with its ‘psychological parent’.523 
This book was selected for response by the legal system.524 
 
Today, more than a decade after the appearance of the first book, it is evident that the 
authors have had an impact on the law governing child welfare decisions that would 
exceed any academician’s wildest expectations. As one commentator observed, every 
subsequent proposal for reform of the child welfare system has drawn its vocabulary and 
central ideas from Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s conceptual framework.525 
 
Why these authors’ work had such an impact on the legal system is not entirely 
clear but notably the first author was a law professor, who teamed up with two 
social scientists, one being Sigmund Freud’s daughter and her father’s ideas had 
already been ‘approved’, in part, by the legal system. Also, the authors directly 
address the issue of a child’s W&BIC in child placement and CCDs, and the book 
is directed at the legal system. With W&BIC having been legally constructed in 
CCDs as being the central legal issue,526 it is perhaps not surprising that the legal 
system chose to respond to its recommendations, at least in part.527 
In CCDs the authors recommended that once a custodian had been 
selected by the legal system, continuity and stability could only be achieved by 
confining any change in custody and by giving the custodian full decision-making 
authority over the child, including whether the child would visit the non-custodial 
                                                
522 Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (Free Press, New York, (NY), 1973). 
523 A psychological parent had been defined as one who, “on a continuing day to day basis through 
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child’s psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child’s 
physical needs.” See Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit  Before the Best Interests 
of the Child above n 43 at 98. 
524 Nadine Taub “Assessing the impact of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit’s proposals: an introductory 
overview” (1983-84) xii Review of Law and Social Change 485 and cases cited.  
525Ibid. 
526 Daniel A Krauss and Bruce D Sales “The problem of helpfulness in applying Daubert to expert 
testimony: child custody determination in family law as an exemplar” (1999) 5 (1) Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 78. 
527 Lynn D Wardle and Laurence C Nolan Fundamental Principles of Family Law (William S 
Hein & Co. Inc., Buffalo (NY), 2002) at 863. 
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parent.528 A “conversation of sorts” began in response to the authors’ proposals 
that sought to give further definition to W&BIC.529 Because some of their 
recommendations, particularly concerning the power of the custodial parent (by 
and large the mother), were considered too controversial, the legal system largely 
did not respond to that but it took on board the idea of there being one 
psychological parent and decided CCDs based on legal assessments of which 
parent the child was more ‘bonded’ with.530 Thus the notion of the ‘psychological 
parent’ was accepted by the legal system as matters of evidence and was used as 
such by lawyers for children and guardians ad litem.531 Goldstein et al. also 
recommended that parents should come to their own agreements and that the legal 
system should, ideally, stay out of such arrangements. This suggestion most likely 
contributed to what is now being called the ‘settlement culture’532 by some 
scholars in the U.K. context where the same development emerged. The New 
Zealand legal system had also started to pursue ‘alternative’ ways to settle custody 
disputes since the implementation of its conciliation services in CCDs such as 
counselling under the Guardianship Amendment Act 1980. 
Some of these authors’ ideas had therefore been selected by the common 
law legal system generally, including in New Zealand.533 Perhaps its attraction for 
the legal system lay in its seemingly gender neutrality. It may even be plausible to 
                                                
528 Goldstein et al. above n 43 at 23-25. 
529 Jane Spinak “When did lawyers for children stop reading Goldstein, Freud and Solnit? Lessons 
from the twentieth century on best interests and the role of the child advocate” (2007) 41 FLQ 393 
at 398. 
530 Mark Henaghan “Legally rearranging families: the family court process, custody, access, 
adoption, name change, separation and dissolution” in Family Law Policy in New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1992) 83 at 107. 
531 Jane Spinak “When did lawyers for children stop reading Goldstein, Freud and Solnit?” above 
n 529. 
532 Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Jacqueline Barron, and Julia Pearce “Settlement culture and the use of 
the ‘no order’ principle under the under the Children Act 1989” above n 466. 
533 See e.g. A v A [1978] 1 NZLR 278 (HC); B v B [1978] 1 NZLR 285 (HC). For New Zealand 
discussions of that theory in the legal context see e.g. Graeme Austin Children: Stories the Law 
Tells (Victoria University Press, Wellington (NZ), 1994) at 27 and for a discussion of related case 
law see chapter 4; Mark Henaghan, Bill Atkin, Dale Clarkson and others Butterworths Family Law 
in New Zealand (15th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington (NZ), 2011) under “The needs and development 
of children” at 6.113 citing as regards the “disruption of bonds by separation of a child from his 
[sic] psychological parent(s)” inter alia Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert J Solnit Beyond 
the Best Interests of the Child (1973) for those authors’ contention of the dangers of disrupting 
children’s bonds with the psychological parent. The “psychological parent” is now mostly referred 
to in adoption or child placement cases in New Zealand but see e.g. L v L FAMC Taupo FAM-
2003-069-262, 26 May 2006 Judge Hikaka; E v E HC Dunedin CIV-2004-412-923, 20 July 2005 
Hansen J; B v W FAMC Taupo FAM-2003-069-101, 2 December 2004 Judge Twaddle; R v R 
(1990) 6 FRNZ 232 where judges still refer to or accept evidence that supports the ‘psychological 
parent’ notion.  http://bookersonline.co.nz 
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suggest that these authors’ work was interpreted as providing scientific evidence 
(again) of why the maternal preference should be maintained since mothers were 
overwhelmingly given physical custody because they were indeed primarily 
responsible for child rearing and nurturing. Therefore the legal system used this 
‘irritant’ (Goldstein et al.) so as to continue justification for its TYD in the face of 
(liberal) feminist criticism and paternal agitation for parental recognition in 
CCDs. The maintenance of stabilised norms is usually important for the legal 
system so as to protect its unity, stability, and authority. For example, the U.S. 
state of Florida’s legislature amended that state’s child custody law in 1971 in an 
effort to remove the TYD and providing for the father to be given equal 
consideration vis-à-vis the mother when custody is determined. However, the 
Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the TYD four years later, concluding that the 
statute did not change the doctrine.534 Whatever the motivation for the legal 
system’s reaction to Goldstein et al., that there was no empirical support for the 
‘psychological parent’ and that it was based on untested assumptions535 was, 
perhaps conveniently or deliberately, ignored by the legal system that is 
ostensibly and particularly expected to scrutinise evidence.536It is must also be 
noted that the psychological parent postulation also challenged the ‘blood ties’ or 
biological connection that the courts used to justify the need for contact between 
the child and the father.  
The next social science contribution that had a notable impact537 was that 
of Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly in 1980.538 According to these researchers, 
the 131 ‘children of divorce’ (this became a social construction in itself) in their 
research preferred living in a household where the parents were unhappy in the 
                                                
534 Cynthia A McNeely “Lagging behind the times: parenthood, custody and gender bias in the 
family court” (1998) 25 Florida State University Law Review 892 at 919. 
535 Jonathan W Gould and David A Martindale The Art and Science of Child Custody Evaluations 
above n 518 at 35-36. 
536 Judge Davis discusses her experience, observations and analyses as regards judicial acceptance 
of extra legal material, including the work by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, as legislative facts: 
Peggy C Davis   “‘There is a book out’ ...: an analysis of judicial absorption of legislative facts” 
above n 44. 
537 See e.g. Carol Smart “Negotiating parenthood: bargaining in the shadow of the law” in 
Christine R Barker, Elizabeth A Krik and Monica Sah (eds) Gender Perceptions and the Law 
(Ashgate Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997) 1 at 3-4.  
538 Judith S Wallerstein and Joan B Kelly Surviving the Breakup: How children actually cope with 
divorce (Basic Books, New York (NY), 1980). See Mark Henaghan “Legally rearranging families: 
the family court process, custody, access, adoption, name change, separation and dissolution” in 
Mark Heneghan and Bill Atkin Family Law Policy in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland (NZ) 1992) 83 at 107.  
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marriage rather than having their parents’ divorce and that both parents are 
essential for the child’s psychological health.539 They therefore recommended that 
shared parenting should be encouraged and parents be helped to engage in post-
separation arrangements that would allow and enhance continuity in the 
relationships between children and both their parents.540 However, their research 
was criticised for reasons: the participants were not randomly selected nor did 
they have a control group; the participants were from affluent neighbourhoods 
(thus limited to a specific socio-economic stratum); the participants were all 
referred for therapy by local agencies (mostly schools) or practitioners.541 
Nonetheless and regardless of the identified problems with generalising the 
findings of this research, this work became very influential in the U.K. and the 
U.S. and the focus was shifted towards a new perceived problem for ‘children of 
divorce’ namely the loss of the biological father; whether they had ‘bonded’ with 
him or even whether they still needed to bond with him i.e. the father was now 
being seen as more than just an economic provider.542 In the U.K. for example, 
this research played a part in the enactment of the Children Act 1989 which its 
primary drafter, Brenda Hoggett, explained as being an ‘experiment in joint 
custody’.543 
What appears to have been ignored was that Wallerstein and Kelly also 
found that the fathers in their sample group who fought for custody were not men 
who had been nurturing parents. Those men who were nurturing parents during 
the marriage did either, surprisingly, not want custody or, as perhaps could be 
expected, obtained it by way of agreement with the mother. The fathers who 
                                                
539 Mark Henaghan “Legally rearranging families: the family court process, custody, access, 
adoption, name change, separation and dissolution” above n 530 at 107 quoting Wallerstein and 
Kelly.  
540 Bearing in mind that children’s needs are also socially constructed within the construction of 
childhood over time. See e.g. Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott “Risk anxiety and the social 
construction of childhood” in Deborah Lupton (ed) Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New directions 
and perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1999) at 86ff. 
541 Carol Bruch “Parenting at and after divorce: a search for new models: Surviving the Breakup: 
How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce by Judith S. Wallerstein; Joan Berlin Kelly” 
(Michigan Law Rev. (1981) 79 (4) 708 at 708-709. For other critiques see e.g. Eleanor Maccoby, 
Charlene E Depner and Robert Mnookin “Co-parenting in the second year after divorce” (1990) 52 
(1) Journal of Marriage and the Family 141. For reference to Wallerstein and Kelly in New 
Zealand legal texts see Mark Henaghan, Bill Atkin, Dale Clarkson and others Butterworths Family 
Law in New Zealand above n 530  at 6.114 and accompanying notes.  
542 Carol Smart “Negotiating parenthood: bargaining in the shadow of a new law” above n 538 at 
4.  
543 Brenda Hoggett “Joint parenting systems: the English experiment” (1994) 6 (1) Tolley’s 
Journal of Child Law 8. 
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fought for custody were angry and bitter and tried to find ways to prolong the 
spousal conflict; the authors considered such men, unlikely to co-operate in cases 
of joint custody orders. These findings actually confirmed research results that 
were published the previous year by Weitzman and Dixon.544 Wallerstein and 
Kelly in fact found that for only 25% of the parents in their study would joint 
custody be a good option. They also found that the mothers in their study, who 
had primarily been the custodial parents, were battling under the strain of paid 
work, household work and child care functions but that most fathers refused to 
help lighten the load by, for example, spending additional time with their children, 
even where they were able to without dropping other commitments. They 
perceived such possible involvement not as an opportunity to maintain or increase 
contact with their children, but rather as acting as a childminder for the mother’s 
convenience.545 Thus, the message that seems to have been taken from this 
research – that joint custody should be a preferred option – sweeps aside some 
important nuances of the study’s findings. 
The point here is not to diminish the importance for any children of having 
regular and reliable contact with their fathers. It is rather to point out that these 
matters are complex and conveys more than what is selected for response. 
Simplified conclusions should be avoided since they lead to distortions. 
Unfortunately, social science research appears often to be subjected to such 
simplified practices when it enters the legal system, possibly due to the legal 
system’s need to determine ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ in situations where these are not 
always determinable and often cannot be known at the time when a decision is 
made. Indeed, correlation in social science studies does not imply causation and 
this is self-evident in and for social science methodology.  
Moving forward to the current state of affairs, the social science literature 
and research as it emerged over the past two to three decades generally but never 
conclusively supports the idea that children do best when they can maintain good 
relationships with both parents. This is relied upon to support the current thinking 
towards an ideal of regular contact and shared care as well as to persuade parents 
                                                
544 Lenore Weitzman and Ruth B Dixon “Child custody awards: legal standards and empirical 
patterns for child custody, support and visitation after divorce” (1979) 12 U.C.D L. Rev. 471.  
545 Carol Bruch “Parenting at and after divorce: a search for new models: Surviving the Breakup: 
How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce above n 541. 
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that conflict between them puts their children at risk of harm.546 Therefore parents 
should maintain an active role in their children’s lives and parents should not 
engage in conflict over their care, an ideal that is clearly unattainable for a 
substantial minority of parents. It is even questionable that all the parents who do 
reach private agreements do so because they truly believe in the good of the 
agreement, or whether they are aware of the law’s stance and are apprehensive of 
what a judge might order, a reality that has been identified in numerous 
publications.547 
These general and contingent propositions from the child mental health 
literature have steadily come to represent the ‘truth’ despite its acknowledged 
inconclusiveness. As mentioned above the law operates by way of rules and this 
involves simplifying and reducing complexity to an applicable programme.  
 
Interference of law and other social discourses does not mean that they merge into a 
multidimensional super-discourse, nor does it imply that information is “exchanged” 
among them. Rather, information is constituted anew in each discourse and interference 
adds nothing but the simultaneity of two communicative events.548 
 
While child mental health research involves far more than ‘if-then’ propositions, 
it includes findings that contact and shared care is good for some children albeit in 
certain circumstances, but law appears to have re-produced this ‘finding’ to a 
legal norm of continuing relationships under the W&BIC in cases where no 
violence or abuse is found. Again, while the sentiment is not necessarily a harmful 
one, there is the risk and possibility that the courts, working under time 
constraints and with loaded court dockets, are unable to identify such 
complexities. They may dismiss important evidence so as to uphold the possibility 
of continued relationships with both parents. While the legislation allows for 
social science experts to be called upon in CCDs, this practice is not a rule in New 
Zealand, and as will be discussed below, these experts are specifically not meant 
                                                
546 Felicity Kaganas “Contact, conflict and risk” in Shelley Day Sclater and Christine Piper (eds) 
Undercurrents of Divorce (Dartmouth Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999) 99 at 99. 
547 See e.g. Richard Neely “The primary caretaker parent rule: child custody andthe dynamics of 
greed” (1984) 3 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 168 at  177-78 (explaining that men often use threats of 
seeking custody as a bargaining chip to reduce financial settlement and child support); Martha 
Fineman “Dominant discourse, professional language and legal change in child custody 
decisionmaking” (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727; Nancy D Polikoff “Why are mothers losing: a 
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Rep. 235.  
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to answer issues that the court deems to be related to the welfare and best interests 
of the child. 
As regards shared parenting, legal texts and judges in New Zealand seem 
to select some social science research that is not only vague, but if reduced to a 
simplified conclusion, supports the ideal of shared/joint parenting. Wallerstein 
and colleagues’ research, as interpreted by the legal system, was influential in 
New Zealand also, and currently some publications by Joan Kelly and colleagues 
are favoured i.e. cited in legal texts and even quoted in judgments.549 In 
accordance with autopoiesis, such extra-legal messages are thereby brought into 
the operations of the legal system, that is, are reproduced as legally approved 
communications, once this happens.   
In M v M550 the New Zealand Court of Appeal reaffirmed that a parent 
should only be deprived of access in exceptional circumstances. The Family Court 
necessarily (in line with law’s operations) followed the authority of the Court of 
Appeal in for example M v H551 and added that there is a “presumption” that both 
parents are entitled to contact. Subsequently the High Court in L v A552stated that 
it is harmful to children’s interests to elevate to a legal rule – the idea that only if 
parents get along well can there be shared parenting. Therefore if parents are 
continuously conflicted, then this will not preclude shared parenting. This 
disregards the child mental health research on the negative impact of parental 
conflict553 and effectively denies that ongoing conflict is harmful to the W&BIC 
of children in favour of minority outcomes in social science research that find that 
if parents can or do co-operate, shared care contributes to the W&BIC of 
                                                
549 Pauline Tapp and Nicola Taylor “Relocation: are we trying to do too much, too late, with too 
few appropriate resources? (2008) NSFLJ 6(4) December 94. These two New Zealand academics 
concur that the New Zealand courts currently favour social science research/publications of Joan 
Kelly that promotes the frequent and regular contact between children and both their parents. 
550 (1981-82) NZFLR131 (CA). 
551 [1999] NZFLR 439 (FC). 
552 [2004] NZFLR 298 (HC). 
553 See e.g. Paul R Amato “Parental divorce and adult well-being: a meta-analysis” (1991a) 53 
Journal of Marriage and the Family 43; Paul R Amato and Bruce Keith “Parental divorce and the 
well-being of children: a meta-analysis” (1991b) 110(1) Psychological Bulletin 26; Robert E 
Emery “Parental alienation syndrome: proponents bear the burden of proof” (2005) 43(1) Fam. Ct. 
Rev. 8; John H Grych “Interparental conflict as a risk factor for child maladjustment: implications 
for the development of prevention programs” (2005) 43(1) Fam. Ct. Rev. 97; E Mavis 
Hetherington and John Kelly For Better or for Worse: Divorce reconsidered (W W Norton & Co, 
New York (NY), 2002) at 137; Joan B Kelly “Children’s adjustment in conflicted marriage and 
divorce: a decade review of research” (2000) 39 J. of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 963; Frank 
F Furstenberg Jr. and Andrew Cherlin Divided Families: What happens to children when parents 
part? (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 1994) at 107-108. 
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children.554 Thus, despite the supposed individualistic approach and abandonment 
of precedent and rules in CCDs, the courts still favoured law’s self-referencing 
operation which led to a stream of judgments where the words (or words akin to) 
‘shared care’ were used.555 
For example in K v K556 the Family Court judge said that the perception 
that joint day-to-day care can only operate in situations where there is a high level 
of co-operation between parents is not supported by social science opinions. His 
Honour then went on to selectively quote from an analysis and review557 of social 
science research studies published by Joan Kelly and Robert Emery that is very 
far from conclusive, as indeed few social scientists would honestly claim their 
research to be. Terminology such as ‘most’, ‘generally’, ‘potential benefit’ and 
‘many’ is often found. Also, in social science different and concurrent theoretical 
interpretations of behaviour may be constructed that emphasise different aspects 
of a particular child’s well being for the purpose of therapy and diagnoses but 
these cannot transfer as guides to make decisions about children’s welfare.558 The 
point is however that by citing such research, the judge legally endorsed those 
findings and the message taken from them is that: 
 
more than half of parents engage in ... parenting in which low conflict, low 
communication, and emotional disengagement are typical features. [C]hildren thrive as 
well in [such] parenting relationships when parents are providing nurturing care and 
appropriate discipline in each of their households.559 
 
Note the qualifiers included: low conflict and both parents providing care and 
appropriate discipline. What is also not made clear is whether these parents 
reached such parenting arrangements of their own accord or whether a court 
ordered the parenting plans. It seems plausible that if parents are not highly 
conflicted, albeit that they understandably don’t feel particularly warm but rather 
                                                
554 See e.g. Jan Pryor and Bryan Rodgers Children in Changing Families: Life after parental 
separation  above n 463.  
555 Dick Webb, Mark Henaghan, Bill Atkin and others Butterworths Family Law in New Zealand 
(14thed, LexisNexis, Wellington (NZ), 2009) at 228. 
556 Family Court, Whakatane, FAM-2002-087-200, FAM-2002-087-186, 15 April 2004, Judge 
Geoghegan.Cited in Dick Webb, Mark Henaghan, Bill Atkin and others Butterworths Family Law 
in New Zealand above n 569 at 201. 
557 Joan B Kelly and Robert E Emery “Children’s adjustment following divorce: risk and resilience 
perspectives” risk and resilience perspectives” (2003) 52 (4) Family Relations 1.  
558 Michael King and Judith Trowell Children’s Welfare and the Law: the limits of legal 
intervention above n 511 at 21.  
559 Joan B Kelly and Robert E Emery “Children’s adjustment following divorce: risk and resilience 
perspectives” above n 557 at 357 as cited and quoted in K v K (FAMC, Whakatane, FAM-2002-
087-200, FAM-2002-087-186, 15 April 2004). 
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aloof towards each other, that they will have reached such styles of post-
separation parenting without having to ask a court to decide the matter for them. 
Whether this is acceptable for the children (their parents’ attitudes) is another 
matter. Serious doubts should remain as to whether this can transfer to highly 
conflicted parents who strongly disagree on multiple issues and disrespect each 
other. 
Yet in, for example, Greer v Greer560where “there was animosity between 
the parents to the point of ‘hatred’ of the father being felt by the mother”561 but 
the judge decided that it is most important to emphasise the significance of putting 
in place a clear and basically permanent routine whereby the parents shared the 
care of the children or else there would be, “very serious concerns about the 
ongoing emotional well-being of these children if they are left in a situation where 
through the effluxion (sic) of time their mother can pervert their views about their 
father”.562 This is an unreported case and we are told little else about the details in 
the legal text in which it is cited and the judge is quoted, except that the children 
were four, two and one years old. One cannot help but wonder what the support 
for this young family looked like after the judge made such a controversial and 
decision. We also do not know how these orders turned out for them which is true 
for all the cases that the court decides and that we get a glimpse of or are able to 
read reported judgments of.   
In A v G563 (heard after COCA came into force) the High Court accepted 
the legal relevance of the contribution by Kelly and Emery564 as the court was 
clearly referred to the judge’s assertion in K v K.565 Thus the door for (legal) 
reliance on that social science assertion(s) that reviewed and simplified findings 
from other research findings, was left open by the High Court and that particular 
research article by Kelly and Emery is now regularly cited by judges in reported 
cases566 as regards ‘proof’ that ongoing conflict is not necessarily detrimental to 
                                                
560 Family Court, Auckland FP 1402/99, 28 June 2000. Cited in Dick Webb, Mark Henaghan, Bill 
Atkin and others Butterworths Family Law in New Zealand above n 569 at 199. 
561 Dick Webb, Mark Henaghan, Bill Atkin and others Butterworths Family Law in New Zealand 
above n 569 at 199. 
562 Greer v Greer above n 560 at para [11] quoted in Dick Webb, Mark Henaghan, Bill Atkin and 
others Butterworths Family Law in New Zealand above n 561. 
563 HC Invercargill CIV-2006-425-489, 21 December 2006 http://brookersonline.co.nz 
564 Ibid at [70]. 
565 Above n 559 . 
566 See e.g. P v M FAMC Auckland FAM-2002-004-2110, 5 May 2009; T v E FAMC Auckland 
FAM-2007-004-2481, 14 October 2008; CR v JS FAMC Auckland FAM-2008-004-673, 11 April 
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making shared care orders. Bruch,567 in reference to social science research, 
asserts: 
 
[T]he interest of a noncustodial parent in maintaining frequent, regular visits does not 
necessarily guarantee a good outcome for the child. Things work out well if he and the 
custodial parent are among the 20% to 25% of divorced couples who are able to talk over 
the children’s problems, coordinate household rules and child-rearing practices, and adapt 
their schedules to fit their children’s needs.  
Less auspicious are the 50% of cases in which parents go forward while ignoring each 
other, neither coordinating their parenting nor interfering with each other. It is the final 
25% of divorcing couples who pose the greatest danger to their children, and a 
noncustodial parent’s ... interest in maintaining frequent, regular visits in this setting is 
apt to harm rather than help them. Hetherington explains, ‘[T]he only childhood stress 
greater than having two married parents who fight all the time is having two divorced 
parents who fight all the time’.568 
 
Although the greater part of the cases decided under this shift toward greater 
shared parenting since the early 1980s in New Zealand did not involve actual 
equal time in the care of each parent,569 these decisions signified that both parents 
ought to share more in the care of the child post-separation, and thus the move 
towards a new legal norm had been strengthened.  
Priestly J in the High Court has described the principles in section 5 of 
COCA in Brown v Argyll570 as desirable social norms but in accordance with 
autopoiesis they are, in effect, legal and now also political norms of what ought to 
be best for children. They are both political and legal because they are 
communicated in legislation but are first approved by parliament. As Luhmann 
says, the operations of the legal system are circular but the courts remain central 
to the operations of the system and legislation remains at the periphery. The 
political system can of course, in theory, alter the normative expectations that the 
courts have stabilised, or are seeking to stabilise, by changing legislation but it is 
very careful in that regard and very seldom (but not never) imposes principles via 
legislation on the legal system that had not already been established, or partially 
established, within the legal system. As discussed in chapter 3, under the first 
custody legislation in the common law system, the courts ignored the introduction 
                                                                                                                                 
2011; MCP v RC (Family Court, Levin FAMC 2006-031-000024, 1 December 2006). These 
judgments reported online  at http://www.brookersonline.co.nz 
567 Carol Bruch “Sound research or wishful thinking in child custody cases?” (2006) 40 Fam. L. Q. 
281. 
568 Ibid quoting E Mavis Hetherington in E Mavis Hetherington and John Kelly For Better or for 
Worse above n 553 at 136-137. 
569Dick Webb, Mark Henaghan, Bill Atkin and others Butterworths Family Law in New Zealand 
(14th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington (NZ), 2009) at 228. 
570[2006] NZFLR 705 (HC). 
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of the equal consideration of mothers in CCDs for nearly fifty years and simply 
upheld the law of the father. The courts, for whatever reason, did not consider 
maternal custody a viable option yet. Therefore, while we are led to believe that 
legislation is the primary source of law, the unfolding of the courts’ determination 
of CCDs under the legislation tells a different story and judges are ‘protected’ by 
the programme of judicial discretion, which is always part of CCD legislation. In 
turn, the legal system can agitate for legislative changes when it finds a change in 
legislation will ease decision making but the political system can and does reject 
requests and recommendations often when what is proposed will be, for example, 
too costly – in revenue terms. However, as discussed in chapter 4, judges in New 
Zealand had found ways, and were free to use the Guardianship Act in a way that 
allowed shared parenting orders without parliament’s endorsement in anyway. 
The “in particular” principle of continued relationships with both parents is now 
provided for in subsection 5(b) of COCA571 and is a continuation of the 
programme that was started under the former Act.  
Child mental health science will most often be re-constructed within the 
legal system to meet the demands of legal discourse.572 Because of the inevitable 
structural coupling between law and social science, selected principles of child 
well-being and development can and will also be used within the legal system 
similar to how precedents are used and in accordance with how the system 
decides to use them.573 In a recent literature review of contact issues574 it was 
established that much of the literature exploring methods for dealing with the 
matter of child contact in CCDs also actually questions this ideal of increased 
contact and shared custody and the circumstances under which this will be good 
for children. Yet in New Zealand for example the Principal Family Court Judge 
has recently reiterated that “[t]he importance for children of having both parents, 
... actively involved in their lives is central to the understanding of how the 
                                                
571 Section 5  Principles relevant to child’s welfare and best interests 
(b) there should be continuity in arrangements for the child’s care, development, and 
upbringing, and the child’s relationships with his or her family, family group, whanau, hapu, or 
iwi, should be stable and ongoing (in particular, the child should have continuing 
relationshipswith both of his or her parents): (Own emphases). 
572 Michael King and Christine Piper How the Law Thinks About Children above n 21 at 52. 
573 Michael King and Christine Piper How the Law Thinks About Children above n 21 at 52. 
574 Fran WasoffDealing with Child Contact Issues: a literature review of mechanisms in different 
jurisdictions (Centre for Research on Families and Relationships, University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh, 2007). http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/10/ Downloaded 5 September 
2011. 
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Family Court approaches care of children cases.”575 
It appears that the normative expectation of regular contact with both 
parents weighs so heavily within the courts that in PN v BN576 the judge went so 
far as to order a father, who did not want to spend more time with his children due 
to his work commitments and other priorities, to increase his contact time with 
them.577 This jurisdiction of the Family Court to enforce contact on a ‘reluctant’ 
parent under COCA, which was held not to exist under the Guardianship Act 
1968,578 was confirmed by the High Court in B v H.579This was apparently due to 
the wider scope of considerations that the court may consider in matters relating 
to the best interests of children and “the Act in its totality.”580 There is however 
no express provision in COCA that a ‘reluctant parent’ can be forced to have more 
or specified contact with her or his child(ren). Importantly though, the High Court 
was not asked to (and did not) decide whether a contact order could be enforced 
against a reluctant (contact) parent. In other words, whether the law has the power 
to force a parent to have contact, thus the decision in PN v BN still stands. 
However COCA makes it a criminal offence for a person, without reasonable 
excuse and with intent, to disobey or prevent compliance with a parenting order. 
Even if the court has the power to make an order against an unwilling parent there 
are likely to be difficulties in enforcing the order. The power to issue a warrant 
under COCA s 73 applies only where a person entitled to contact has applied for a 
warrant to have the child uplifted and delivered to them. Conversely, there is no 
power for the primary care-giving parent or the child to apply for a warrant to 
enforce a contact order. Breaching of a parenting order occurs when the parent 
responsible for providing contact fails to satisfy or breaches his or her obligation 
according to the order.  Thus, it is when the primary care-giving parent prevents 
contact because it is that parent’s responsibility to present the child to the contact 
parent. Apparently then the contact parent does not have a responsibility but a 
right to contact. 
                                                
575 Peter Boshier “What’s gender got to do with it in New Zealand family law” (2011) 7 NZFLJ 
61.  
576 [2007] NZFLR 320; (2006) 25 FRNZ 536 (FC). 
577 It must be noted that the children wanted to have more contact with their father and the mother 
accordingly applied to have more contact time enforced on the father than what the father 
proposed he has.  
578 B v VE (1988) 5 NZFLR 65 (HC); Cunliffe v Cunliffe (1992) 9 FRNZ 537 (FC); Collins v 
Sawtell [1995] NZFLR 880 (FC). 
579 [2008] NZFLR 200 (HC). 
580 PN v BN above n 576 at para [43]. 
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There are commentators who point out that the positive benefits for 
children of father-involvement essentially exist where both parents are welcoming 
thereof, but when men are forced into higher levels of involvement, the effects on 
children tend towards the negative.581 “A father’s motivation in caring for 
children may be, ... more important than the amount of time he spends with 
them.”582 Is the ideal of wanting parents/fathers to continue to make meaningful 
contributions to their children’s lives greater than what will, in the children’s 
experience, be uncomfortable or unwanted? Perhaps. Only time and the children 
involved can tell whether their interests were actually served by decisions that 
strive to encourage fathers to remain or become involved in their children’s lives. 
In Australia with its legal presumption of equal shard parenting research indicates 
that more children in shared care arrangements want to change the arrangements 
than children in primary parent arrangements and a primary reason for them 
wanting change was their parents’ conflict.583 
This expansion of the New Zealand court’s jurisdiction to order more 
contact time where this is against the wishes of the resident parent offers one of 
many examples for why Luhmann sees the courts as being central to the legal 
system.584 As stated, this is not provided for in COCA but then, judicial discretion 
is. Also, courts – not legislatures – alone are expected to make legal decisions, 
even when there are no profound reasons for doing so because of the norm 
relating to the prohibition of the denial of justice.585  The courts have to interpret 
legislation and decide what will be legally right or legally wrong which runs into 
the problem of law’s paradox i.e. that in the end something will be legally correct 
because the legal system says it is and not because some universal ‘über-truth’ 
provides us with this knowledge. The reality of having to decide what is un-
decidable leads to situations that “if [the courts] cannot decide, they must force 
themselves to be able to decide. If the law cannot be found, it must simply be 
                                                
581 See e.g. Jan Pryor and Bryan Rodgers Children in Changing Families above n 463 at 202; Paul 
Amato and Joan G Gilbreth “Nonresident fathers and children’s well-being: a meta-analysis” 
above n 505; E Mavis Hetherington and John Kelly For Better or for Worse: Divorce 
reconsidered above n 553 at 134. 
582Jan Pryor and Bryan Rodgers Children in Changing Families above n 463 at 202. 
583 Judith McIntosh “Legislating for shared parenting: exploring some underlying assumptions” 
(2009) 47 (3) Fam. Crt. Rev. 389 at 396. 
584 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 Chapter 7. 
585 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 279. 
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invented”.586 Lest we forget how much ideas about children’s W&BIC have also 
changed within the legal system587 (while all the while children were and are on 
the receiving end of these selected norms and programmes in the interests of 
predictability of the law) despite changes in its environment and even legislative 
changes as seen by the courts’ response to the first Act that provided for 
consideration of the mother in CCDs discussed in chapter 3. The nature of the 
courts’ law-producing activities and the legal rules which constrain them 
(operations of the legal system) have profound implications for the possible 
influence of social science as well.588 
Judges face the pressure of having to decide individual cases and to decide 
them justly, meaning that they should treat similar cases equally and apply the 
same rules in accordance with the courts’ ‘just’ interpretation of legislation.589 I 
suggest, that the legal system is uncomfortable with firstly being ‘accused’ of 
being biased and therefore ‘unjust’ (as by fathers’ rights groups) and secondly 
with constantly being exposed to the irritation that there is no consistency in its 
CCDs. The legal system is now moving towards recovering an image of 
consistency and it has decided on stabilising the norm of shared care as the means 
to achieve this agenda. To escape some of the paradox (that the law cannot know 
what is in the W&BIC of any given children) and to support the normative 
expectation it selects from the social sciences those suggestions that will aide in 
determining this new normative legal expectation in order for the system to be 
able to justify its decisions by presenting them as being based on sound research.  
 
[T]he scientific discourse of child welfare in all its richness and complexity is 
reconstructed as concepts which ‘make sense’ within law – that is, concepts which further 
the immediate demands of the law to determine guilt and responsibility, resolve disputes 
and do justice between litigants and at the same time promote the function of law in 
modern society – distinguishing the lawful from the unlawful.590 
 
The diversity of outcomes in child mental health research on the impact of divorce 
on children is profound.591 It is evident that this branch of science cannot in truth 
                                                
586 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 289.  
587 See e.g. Carol Smart and Bren Neale “Arguments against virtue – must contact be enforced?” 
above n  386; Mary Ann Mason From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights above n 49. 
588 Richard Lempert “'Between cup and lip': social science influences on law and policy” (1988) 
10 Law & Pol’y 167 at 195. 
589 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 279. 
590 Michael King and Christine Piper How the Law Thinks About Children above n 21 at 50. 
591 For an example listing of research in this regard see e.g. Mark Henaghan “Legally rearranging 
families: parents and children after break-up” above n 469  at 272 n 14.  
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be said to provide one answer (and it would/should not claim to be able to do so).  
That the New Zealand political system did not legislate for equal shared 
parenting should probably not be seen as inspiring to those who disfavour such an 
arrangement for children (and/or the custodial parent). The U.K. for example had 
legislated in the same way but as Harris-Short reports in 2010: 
 
Despite the Labour government’s refusal to enshrine a presumption in favour of 50/50 
shared residence in the Children Act 1989, there is a very real danger that we are edging 
closer and closer towards a position in which this will indeed become entrenched as the 
normative model for organizing post-separation family life.592 
 
Whether this is more ‘dangerous’ than the previous presumptions of the courts 
(first that fathers were the automatic custodial parent that ‘knew best’ and then 
that mothers are the natural nurturers and therefore better care givers of (young) 
children remains to be seen. I suggest that any ‘rule of thumb’ can and probably 
was and will be detrimental to some children. However, the courts have not 
proven to be very successful at applying and maintaining genuine individuality in 
their decision-making. The overwhelming trends thus far have been too striking 
and it would therefore not be surprising if the shared parenting norm will 
eventually come to dominate CCDs. Nearly two years after Harris-Short’s 
statement above, in February 2012, the British government expressed its intended 
support593 for a legally binding presumption of shared parenting, thereby rejecting 
the advice from the independent review594 led by David Norgrove and presented 
in 2011. That Report referred to its Interim Report that had been submitted and 
stated: 
 
The thorough and detailed evidence from Australia showed the damaging consequences 
for many children. So we recommended that: no legislation should be introduced that 
creates or risks creating the perception that there is a parental right to substantially shared 
or equal time for both parents.595 
 
From an autopoietic perspective the reaction from the current British government 
should not be surprising. Australia had already entered this communication (of 
                                                
592 Sonia Harris-Short “Building a house upon sand: post-separation parenting, shared residence 
and equality – lessons from Sweden (2011) 23 (3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 344. 
593 Owen Bowcott “Government backs shared parenting legislation after separation” (The 
Guardian, 6 February 2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/feb/06/government-
backs-shared-parenting-legislation 
594 Family Justice Review, Final Report (Crown, November 2011) at 4.23:  
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/policy/moj/2011/family-justice-review-final Accessed 9 
January 2012. 
595 Ibid at 4.23. 
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rebuttable presumption for equal shared care) into the greater political social 
system of common law countries hence there is a strong possibility that it will be 
followed. America eventually seems to be settling on an ‘approximation standard’ 
in CCDs that allocates shared care in accordance with the time spent by each 
parent prior the separation in caring for the child. True to law’s need for stability 
in producing its norms the primary reason given for this is the need for 
predictability.596 
McKay reports597 in 2012 that where children saw their non-resident 
parent most often their parents were financially comfortable while those who 
never saw their non-resident parent were poorest. This again confirms that the 
realisation of shared parenting or ‘regular contact parenting’ involves far more 
than just the law declaring it to be legally correct and by ordering plenty contact. 
It also signifies little hope for poor children in terms of improving their financial 
position598 and of having more positive input from their non-resident parent.  
 I am not arguing that fathers do not have an important role to play in their 
children’s lives and certainly some research outcomes and surveys about 
children’s experiences of shared parenting when committed fathers have the 
opportunity to be more involved and take-up the opportunity, have some inspiring 
messages. What I am questioning though is whether these outcomes are  
‘transplanted’ onto CCDs in the hope that parents will overcome their conflict 
and/or become more involved and pay their child support contribution.  
I am also not searching for, or suggesting, the better or worse ‘rule’ by 
which to determine a child’s living arrangements after parental separation. The 
point I am making is that the law seeks stability, a legally produced rule, a 
stabilised norm (as Luhmann calls it) as regards behavioural expectation, that 
reflects its ability to ‘know’ what a good outcome ought to be. Indeed, other 
social systems and individuals in society also consider, and rely on, the legal 
system as the one system to provide at least a certain degree of sureness as regards 
                                                
596 Robert F Kelly and Shawn L Ward “Allocating custodial responsibilities at divorce: social 
science research and the American Law Institute’s approximation rule” (2002) 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 
350 at 350. 
597 Stephen McKay “Shared parenting: longitudinal and comparative perspectives” Presentation at 
the 4th meeting of the AHRC Research Network, University of Birmingham, UK, 5 January 2012. 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-mds/haps/projects/MESH/AHRC-
Meetings/Meeting3/StephenMcKay.pdf 
598 See Tanya Evans “Is it futile to try to get non-resident fathers to maintain their children?” 
(2006) October, History & Policy http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/themes.html#families 
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legal rights and wrongs. Invariably, over the history of legal decisions the law 
managed to create rules by the outcomes of custody and contact decisions 
regardless of the ‘indeterminability’ of (or perhaps because of)  the W&BIC 
‘standard’. This is precisely why I suggest that the legal system has been, or is, so 
uncomfortable with the claimed, albeit necessary in reality, ‘individualist’ 
approach. This is possibly also why judges repeatedly referred/refer to the 
decision being ‘painful’ or ‘the hardest’ to make. 
As has been suggested before, the parents who feel it necessary to have a 
judge decide their child care arrangements are likely to be the parents that struggle 
the most with co-operation, communication and child rearing practices. How 
precisely does/can a judge know, often without hearing expert evidence, that a 
particular pair of parents have the skill and determination to overcome their 
differences or manage them in a way that will not expose the children to conflict? 
How precisely do children’s welfare and best interest feature in a decision that is 
focussed on ‘distributing’ the child between two parents who have no respect for, 
and practically despise each other? The issues that underlie such parents’ 
perceived problems are often very complex and hardly be ‘solved’ by way of a 
forced co-parenting order. I propose that these parents need another forum 
through which they can be helped to overcome their difficulties, difficulties that 
can contain subtleties that the legal system is neither capable of identifying, nor 
equipped to remedy by way of making parenting orders. There are still judges 
who do not agree shared parenting,599 but given the history of the legal system in 
relation to CCDs there is a very good chance that shared parenting will eventually 
be stabilised from within the legal system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
599 E.g. B v VE (1988) 5 NZFLR 65 (HC); Mills v Mills (Family Court, Taupo FP 069/115/99, 13 
April 2000) cited in Butterworths Family Law in New Zealand above n 569 at 6.104; AJD v KGD 
(Family Court, Hamilton FAM 2004-019-1896, 6 October 2005); AL v TLL (Family Court, 
Auckland FAM-2008-004-2588, 6 August 2009). 
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6.3 The ‘psy’600 experts  
 
By the 1970s no-fault divorce had been legally and normatively 
established and as regards custody decisions, parents’ behaviour would no longer 
be taken into account if the court deemed it not to affect the welfare of the child. 
Therefore a conditional programme of law that relied on a parent’s (formerly) 
‘illegal’ behaviour (adultery most often and with a harsher attitude towards 
mothers601) to determine which parent would have the children in her/his custody 
became superfluous, no longer considered legally relevant. Arguably it had 
therefore become challenging to find ways602 
 to ultimately apply ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ values in the process of deciding 
custody while the latter remains a legal issue which means that they would be 
decided by the legal system. No-fault divorce and the subsequent rise of parental 
separation created research demands and opportunities for the social sciences as 
regards children’s needs and behaviour during and after parental separation. 
Social and behavioural science rely, however, largely upon “unfalsifiable” 
statements i.e. statements that are reducible to ‘true’ or ‘false’ values – in part due 
to the relativity, context, dynamics of human life/experience and the variant 
theories offered within this branch of science – and this presents “a direct 
challenge to law’s normatively-directed version of reality” because law seeks to 
offer congruence and predictability.603 Yet, as discussed above, the law chooses to 
accept some social science research as ‘more true’ and representative than other.  
New Zealand judges have, in the past, shown an unwelcoming attitude 
                                                
600 No fault-divorce was introduced in New Zealand by the Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
601 See e.g. Palmer v Palmer [1961] NZLR 702 (CA); Re L (Infants) [1962] 1 WLR 886 (C.A.); M 
v M & L unreported 7 April 1964, discussed by Rutherford Ward “Parental misconduct and the 
custody of children” in B D Inglis and A G Mercer (eds) Family Law Centenary Essays (Sweet & 
Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, Wellington, 1967) 57 at 58-59; Otter v Otter [1951] NZLR 739; Cubitt v 
Cubitt [1930] NZLR 227; Van der Veen v Van der Veen [1923] NZLR 794. 
602 Referring to psychologists, psychiatrists and the practice of psychoanalysis. See e.g. Carol 
Smart “Power and the politics of child custody” in Carol Smart and Selma Sevenhuijsen (eds) 
Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (Routledge, London, 1989)  at 5-6; Michael King and 
Christine Piper How the Law Thinks about Children above n 21 at 85; Nikolas Rose Inventing Our 
Selves: Psychology, power and personhood (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1996) 
at 10. 
603 Michael King and Christine Piper How the Law Thinks About Children above n 21 at 44-45. 
See also Alan Goodwin and Llewelyn Richards-Ward, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
Working With Psychologists (CLE New Zealand Law Society, July 2002) at 29 (describing 
psychology as a “nervous science when placed in a courtroom which often seems to demand the 
definite from the nervous about the uncertain.”) 
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towards welfare officers (before the introduction of the ‘psy’ experts in CCDs604) 
when the judges perceived them to be stepping outside the role that the courts 
considered they should fulfil. For example in B v B and S605Hardie Boys J 
admonished the fact that a welfare officer’s statement, that he himself would be 
reluctant to upset the prevailing residence arrangements of the child, was made in 
the lower court. The statement, said Hardie Boys J, should never have been 
expressed because it is unacceptable to restrict the view of the court and to assume 
the latter’s function. Again, this approach was not confined to New Zealand but 
was in line with judicial expressions in the other common law jurisdictions. For 
example in the U.K. in In re C (L)606the undisputed evidence from a psychiatrist 
that a change in custody will be damaging to the child was accepted by Pearson 
LJ but he then called attention to the danger of the legal system allowing its 
function to be trammelled. In the House of Lords case of J v C607 Lord Upjohn 
made it clear that a science opinion can only be a support element to the judge’s 
general knowledge and experience and also stated that a judge must not hesitate to 
risk going against scientific evidence if he considers that the W&BIC would be 
better achieved in the way the judge deems to be proper. 
It is evident that at least until the early 1970s judges felt (and expressed) 
that the courts know best when it comes to W&BIC.608 It cannot be said with 
certainty that the attitude from within the New Zealand legal system, has changed 
significantly. The current Principal Family Court Judge in New Zealand appears 
to be, or at least to have been, apprehensive about psychological opinion in the 
legal operations of family law stating that while psychologists’ reports can be 
useful for the court’s purposes, “perhaps we overuse psychologists. We may have 
unwittingly developed a culture wherein we dare not move without asking for a 
psychological opinion. This is hardly good litigation practice.”609Conversely, 
judges and lawyers in America currently appear to want specific 
                                                
604 Guardianship Act 1968, s 29A as amended in 1980. 
605 [1970] NZLJ 367 (HC). 
606 [1965] 2 Q.B. 449. 
607 [1970] A.C. 668 (HL). 
608 Catherine Mallon “A critical examination of judicial interpretation of a child’s best interests in 
inter-parental custody disputes in New Zealand” (1973-1976) 3 Otago L. Rev 191. 
609 Peter Boshier “Speech of Principal Family Court Judge Peter Boshier to the Auckland Family 
Courts Association” (Auckland (NZ), 21 April 2004) available at  
http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/family-court/publications/speeches-and-papers/archived-
speeches/speech-of-principal-family-court-judge-peter-boshier-to-the-auckland-family-courts-
association Last accessed 4 March December 2011. 
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recommendations and accept that this is what child custody evaluators (social 
scientists) provide. One recent study showed that an overwhelming majority of 
judges (84%) and lawyers (86%) believe that child custody evaluators should 
directly address the ultimate issues in custody disputes with specific 
recommendation.610 Another study showed that evaluators offer specific 
recommendations in almost every case (94%).611 
In New Zealand a 1980 amendment to the Guardianship Act 1968612 
provided for the introduction of expert evidence from social scientists to assist the 
court in reaching child related decisions. Under COCA these professionals (who 
are psychologists for the purposes of CCDs) are now called ‘specialist report 
writers’ in New Zealand613they were allowed into the operations of the legal 
system but, importantly, in accordance with the law’s operations. As a closed, 
self-reproducing system, the legal system only draws those outside of the system 
who are concerned about children’s issues into an understanding that allows and 
facilitates considerations about the future best interests of children but on the 
principle that this well-being depends substantially upon adopting the appropriate 
legal solution.614 The law was increasingly confronted with the incompatible clash 
between maintaining its autonomy over deciding CCDs in accordance with the 
W&BIC and its dependence for its authenticity upon an outsider body of 
knowledge.615 
However to ensure the legal system’s authority and control, the judge has 
the final discretion as to whether expert evidence will be required616 and a 
specialist report asked for, that is, the judge must first be satisfied that a report is 
necessary “for the proper disposition of the application”617 and then the judge will 
call for such a report. In that regard an expert opinion and report remains 
conditional, in line with the nature of law’s conditional programmes: if the judge 
                                                
610 James N Bow and Francella A Quinnell “Critique of child custody evaluations by the legal 
profession” (2004) 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 115. 
611 James N Bow &Francella A Quinnell “A critical review of child custody evaluation reports” 
(2001) 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 164. Ibid. 
612 Guardianship Act 1968, s 29A. 
613 Care of Children Act 2004, s 133. 
614 Michael King “Future uncertainty as a challenge to law’s programmes: the dilemma of parental 
disputes” above n 508 at 525. 
615 Gunther Teubner “How the law thinks: toward a constructivist epistemology of law” above n 
17 at 742.  
616P and P v P (1991) 8 FRNZ 232 at 235; Burger-Ringer v Burger-Ringer [1995] 3 NZLR 310 
(HC) also reported as E v C [1995] NZFLR 895. Codified by Care of Children Act 2004 s 133(2). 
617Care of Children Act 2004 s 133(2). 
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considers a psychologist’s report to be necessary in the particular case, then the 
court will request such a report. Specialist report writers are also selected and 
approved by the legal system.618 The purpose of such a report is to provide the 
court with an assessment of the present relationships, risks existent within the 
relevant family plus the impacts thereof on the children, and a determination 
regarding the potential consequences of these risks and relationships on the 
children’s future care as proposed by the parties.619 The judge (in consultation 
with the lawyers involved) however will provide the report writer with a brief as 
to what he/she must determine and report on.620 For observers outside the legal 
system such matters may fairly consistently be classed as belonging to the realm 
of child mental health science yet psychologists called into the legal system are 
“adjunctory experts” while the legal system “seeks to address [the] core 
psychological process of child development and attachment disruptions 
occasioned by parental separation.”621 
Experts must adhere strictly to the legal system’s requirements of what 
may or may not be included in their reports and the legal system is very 
prescriptive622 as to what a report must, and must not, contain as well as the 
position that the report writer must be seen to take in recognition of her/his ability 
to provide the court with the assistance it seeks. The report writer must for 
example refrain from reporting on the child’s views as this is considered to be a 
task that the lawyer for the child must do or that a judge will determine by 
interviewing the child.623 The court effectively said that a judge or a lawyer624 is 
deemed to be more able to determine the child’s views. In depth and large-scale 
research on children’s experiences of their court appointed counsel may shed 
                                                
618 Care of Children Act 2004, s 133(2)(b). 
619Alan Goodwin and Llewelyn Richards-Ward, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Working 
With Psychologists above n 603 at 1. 
620 Practice Note Specialist Report Writers (24 March 2011). Available at 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/family-court/practice-and-procedure/practice-notes/practice-
note-specialist-report-writers-
1/?searchterm=%22specialist%20report%20writers%22%20and%20%22practice%20note%22  
Last accessed 02 August 2011. 
621Alan Goodwin and Llewelyn Richards-Ward, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Working 
With Psychologists above n 603 at 29. 
622 See Practice Note Specialist Report Writers (24 March 2011) above n 620 ; Judith Medlicott 
“Psychiatry and psychology in the family court” (2005) 11(1) Otago L.Rev. 79 at 79-96. 
623 K v K [2005] NZFLR 28 (HC) at paras 89-91. 
624 Care of Children Act 2004, s 7 requires that a lawyer for the child be appointed if proceedings 
go to trial. Subsection 7(2)(b) provides that the court can decline to appoint a lawyer for the child 
if considers that this will serve no useful purpose. Therefore, there is a general presumption that 
the appointment of a child’s lawyer in CCD proceedings will benefit a child. 
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more light on children’s experiences in this regard. From the small New Zealand 
studies that have been done, the results are not very inspiring.625 
The idea of separate legal representation for children in CCDs in New 
Zealand was, again, not novel to New Zealand but was taken from the greater 
common law legal system. This proposition developed without political 
involvement at first but was campaigned for by judges, long before the invention 
of the UNCRC626 with its communication of the ‘child’s rights to express her/his 
views’627 in judicial proceedings. Perhaps the legal system is relying on children’s 
innate sense of fairness and sharing, that they learn through socialisation and/or 
are taught from a young age, to help to justify the system’s drive towards easier 
solutions in CCDs that will also reflect ‘fairness’ and ‘balance’. Any irritations 
can be selected by autonomous social systems for response but without having 
actual insight into the day-to-day discussions among the legal system’s decision-
makers (judges, senior lawyers and selected senior legal academics) and 
throughout the hierarchy of the system (first instance courts up to Supreme Court 
level) we are reduced to looking at the outcomes over time to determine the likely 
choices that the system makes/made in terms of creating stabilised norms. 
Nonetheless, of relevance here is that the notion of a lawyer representing a child 
in CCDs was presented as an integration of social science skills and legal 
skills.628 
When the New Zealand High Court in K v K629 placed this role limitation 
on psychologists it relied on a Court of Appeal judgment.630 The Court of Appeal 
case is cited for two reasons. First, it outlines the proper role of counsel for the 
                                                
625 Nicola Taylor, Megan Gollop and Anne Smith “The role of counsel for the child - perspectives 
of children, young people, and their lawyers” (2000) 3 BFLJ 146 – finding that out of 20 children 
only 5 children stated clearly that they even liked their lawyer; Nicola Taylor, Megan Gollop and 
Mark Henaghan Relocation Following Parental Separation: The Welfare and Best Interests of 
Children (June 2010) (Centre for Research on Children and Families, Faculty of Law University 
of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand) at 130-34. 
626 Robert F Drinan “The rights of children in modern American family law” (1962) 2 J. Fam. Law 
101; Henry H Foster and Doris Jonas Freed “A bill of rights for children” (1972) 6 Fam. L. Q. 
343; Judge Hansen of the Family Court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, turned the issue into a 
campaign in the 1960s:  Robert W Hansen “The role and rights of children in divorce actions” 
(1966) 6 J. Fam. Law1. 
627 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art 12. 
628 See e.g. Olive M Stone The Child’s Voice in the Court of Law: An account of the 
representation of minors in civil proceedings in Canada and some other (mostly common law) 
jurisdictions (Butterworths, Toronto, 1982). 
629 Above n 623. 
630 M v Y [1994] 1 NZLR 527 (CA). 
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child631 which is to interview the parents, to ascertain and investigate all relevant 
facts, to ascertain the wishes of the child in the most appropriate way and to 
provide the court with this information, to negotiate or mediate in the most 
appropriate way the welfare of the child at the earliest possible opportunity. “In 
most cases the negotiation of a workable compromise or settlement, which 
minimises the destructive effect of litigation, dispute or uncertainty, will achieve 
this result”.632 Finally, to protect the child from unnecessary or undesirable 
examinations, tests and evaluations. The second reason for referring to the Court 
of Appeal judgment is for authority that a judge is entitled to reach a view that is 
inconsistent with expert evidence.633 The High Court states in its judgement that 
to use specialist reports for the sole purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the 
child, should cease immediately.634 What is ignored is that in the Court of Appeal 
judgment, none other than Hardie Boys J stated: 
 
Whether or not the Judge sees the child, the child’s wishes must be ascertained. That may 
in a proper case be done through the specialist appointed to report, or through counsel 
for the child, or by a combination of one or both of these with an interview by the Judge 
himself.635 
 
 
Principal Family Court Judge Peter Boshier also feels strongly that the court is 
ultimately and primarily responsible for children’s futures when it decides CCDs 
and asserts: 
 
We are the Court that deals with raw emotion, with conflict and with the lives of children.  
If we get it wrong or even if we don’t get it right enough, it will in probability be the 
Youth and District Courts that pick up the pieces and in very costly fashion deal with 
juvenile and adult crime.636 
 
In dealing with all this emotion and bearing in mind this monumental 
responsibility of the court as Judge Boshier sees it, how far does the system go to 
ensure that all available help is utilised? 
                                                
631 K v K above n 623 at 47. 
632 Rule 5.3(d) (iii) of the Family Court Practice Note, January 1982, published in Butterworths 
Family Law Service as quoted in the judgment and without further explanation or comment on 
their meaning or application: M v Y above n 630 at 538. 
633 K v K above n 623 at para [85]. 
634 K v K above n 623 at para [90]. 
635 M v Y above n 630 at  537. (Own emphasis). 
636 Peter Boshier “Getting it right in the Family Court” Speech given to Christchurch Family 
Courts Association, Family Court, Christchurch, 18 November 2010 at 7. Downloaded from 
http://www.courts.govt.nz/courts/family-court Last accessed 17 February 2011. 
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An authoritative and much used legal database in New Zealand states in its 
introductory discussion of COCA that in “most disputed proceedings” under the 
Act, “the court will have obtained a psychological report” under s 133(2) and the 
report writer will be a registered psychologist with the required experience and 
expertise.637According to recent New Zealand research however, in a sample of 
120 cases involving children, in those decisions that determined CCD matters, 
fewer than 50% had the input of a specialist report writer.638 It would therefore 
appear that judges regularly find it unnecessary to ask for input from such a 
specialist. The current Principal Family Court Judge is however also of the 
opinion that “[j]udges become very discerning in knowing before too long, where 
the welfare interests of children really lie.”639 This perhaps illustrates the 
prevailing self-identity within the legal system i.e. that the system’s decision 
makers are best equipped to know what even those with substantial experience 
and education in child mental health sciences will not readily claim to know for a 
fact.  
If a specialist report is asked for, then according to a leading legal text 
“[c]ases in which the Court goes against the recommendation of a specialist 
reporter are relatively rare.”640 Without having access to all the CCD judgments 
that are made on a daily basis this cannot be accepted as a certainty. However if it 
is the reality then it can be justified by considering that if the court called for such 
a report because the court considered it as ‘necessary’, and so then the time and 
money spent may urge a judge to trust the psychologist’s input, particularly as the 
legal system itself selects those experts that will be preferred for providing the 
court with reports.641 
 
The Registrar or Family Court Co-ordinator will convene a panel to consider 
applications for inclusion in the list of report writers available to undertake Family 
Court appointments.  The panel will consist of a Caseflow Manager or Family 
Court Co-ordinator as chair, two experienced report writers appointed by the 
                                                
637 Brookersonline “Introduction to the Care of Children Act 2004” at para 13A. Available at  
http://www.brookersonline.co.nz. Last accessed 15 March 2011. 
638 Antoinette Robinson “Children: heard but not listened to? An analysis of children’s views 
under s 6 of the Care of Children Act 2004” above n 487. 
639 Peter Boshier “Getting it right in the Family Court” above n636. 
640 Dick Webb, Mark Henaghan, Bill Atkin and others Butterworths Butterworths Family Law in 
New Zealand above n 569 at 381 n 1. 
641 See “Process for selection” in Practice Note: Specialist Report Writers (24 March 2011). 
Available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/family-court/practice-and-procedure/practice-
notes/practice-note-specialist-report-writers-1 Accessed 15 February 2012. 
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Court, and a Family Court Judge nominated by the Principal Family Court 
Judge.642 
 
In one ‘relatively rare’ case in 2007, two brothers aged thirteen and nine years old 
successfully appealed a Family Court decision that held that it was in their best 
interests to have contact with their father and that any risks to them in having 
contact with him were manageable. The judge decided on ordering contact despite 
expert evidence that the boys had been psychologically injured by previous 
contact with their father.643 
Thus we see that the legal system does not simply freely and collegially 
allow those expert professionals from outside the system to enter its operations, 
and it does at times not follow or act upon the evidence provided by the specialist 
report writer, even though they are selected and ‘evaluated’ for their acceptability 
by the legal system first. Psychologists themselves have reported to the New 
Zealand Law Commission during its enquiry into the procedures and practices in 
the Family Court of New Zealand that they find the adversarial and hostile 
approach by lawyers and litigants highly unpleasant and removed from the notion 
of a ‘team approach’. Concluding on these difficulties the Law Commission’s 
report states:644 
 
The Family Court risks losing the expertise of these people. At the same time, newly 
qualified clinical psychologists are being advised not to enter the field. It is crucial to 
remedy these problems and support report writers. It is also important to re-state and 
reinforce the teamwork approach. There are many ways to operate as a team without 
compromising a properly conducted adversarial hearing. 
 
In a fairly recent custody case the parties jointly applied for an adjournment based 
on, inter alia, the need for a specialist report from a psychologist and Judge 
Adams (the Administrative Judge for the Family Court for the Northern Region in 
New Zealand) explained the situation as regards psychologists in CCDs in his 
judgment as follows: 
 
                                                
642 Ibid. (Own emphasis). The appointed report writers can be assumed to have extensive 
experience of providing this service in accordance with the court’s specifications, preference and 
style which, limits the content to what the legal system deems necessary.  
643 Fairfax NZ News “Boys spurn contact with father” Last updated 21/10/2007  
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/38466/Boys-spurn-contact-with-father Accessed 3 March 2012. 
644 New Zealand Law Commission Te Aka Matua O Te Ture Report 82 Dispute Resolution in the 
Family Court (NZLC, Wellington (NZ), March 2003) at p 148 para 710. 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/family-court-dispute-resolution-0?quicktabs_23=report#node-
521 Downloaded 15 March 2011. 
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[40] The reasons advanced is [sic] broadly that this is a complex situation because there 
are blended families.  C has half siblings with different fathers.  There is the question of 
her attachments and how it will be for her if she were removed from her mother’s care 
and placed with her father.    
[41] In my view these are ordinary bread and butter matters for the Family Court. I 
do not see anything particularly unusual in this case.  If that were the threshold, then 
we would be obtaining psychological reports in at least two thirds of the cases we 
hear that cannot possibly have been filed its intention [sic].  I am well aware of the fact 
that there are simply not enough specialist report writers to achieve that kind of 
result.645 
 
Fortunately though, there appears to be enough lawyers for the child to do the job. 
Lawyers for the child are governed by the legal professions’ code of 
conduct that limits their discretion from the outset.646There was a question in New 
Zealand as to whether or not the training received by family lawyers is 
appropriate or adequate for the multi-disciplinary role that such lawyers for the 
child are expected to carry out.647 A lawyer for the child is appointed by and is 
firstly accountable to the court.648 As with psychologists, the court keeps a list of 
approved lawyers that it has selected and can select from. If such a lawyer does 
acknowledge her/his lack of skill in a particular case the court will then condone 
reliance on a specialist report writer to aid with ascertaining the child’s views.649 
But the legal system finds it essential to produce a rule that the lawyer for the 
child is the preferred actor to establish the child’s views.650 The Principal Family 
Court Judge explained in a speech he gave a week after COCA came into force 
                                                
645 R v B-L FAMC Papakura FAM-2004-039-16628 March 2006 http://www.brookersonline.co.nz 
(Own emphases). 
646 Katherine Hunt Federle “Children’s rights and the need for protection” (2000) 34 Fam. L. Q, 
421 at 424. 
647 Simon Jefferson “Lawyers representing children” in Stuart Birks (ed) The Child and the Family 
Court:  seeking the best interests of the child Proceedings of Social Policy Forum 2002 Issue 
Paper No 13 (Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University, Palmerston North (NZ) 
2003) at 33 at 35. http://cppe.massey.ac.nz/ Downloaded 30 August 2011. Accessed 30 January 
2012. 
648 Care of Children Act 2004, s 7. 
649 See e.g. R v B-L (High Court, Auckland CIV 2006-404-001666, 12 May 2006) at para [85]. 
http://www.brookersonline.co.nz 
650 In the U.K. Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) officers are 
primarily responsible for informing the court of the child’s wishes and feelings: Directgov “Child 
welfare during court proceedings (Cafcass officers)” 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Parents/Lookingafterchildrenifyoudivorceorseparate/Childrendivorce
separationandcourts/DG_4002959; Canada is proposing to follow the same route as New Zealand 
(lawyer for the child in CCDs): Department of Justice “The voice of the child in divorce, custody 
and access proceedings, 4.0 conclusion and recommendations”http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fcy-
fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2002/2002_1/p4.html (Recommending inter alia that: “Lawyers must acquire 
the requisite skills to represent children in custody, access and divorce cases.  These include 
appropriate interview skills, the ability to communicate information in simple and comprehensible 
language, an understanding of child psychology, and knowledge of community resources for 
children.”) 
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(2005) that “all those involved in the process must commit themselves to 
understanding how best to go about this challenging task” of having significant 
interviews with children.651Only since March 2011 does a revised Practice Note 
now require, in addition to five years of legal practice experience that must 
include defended cases in court, “an understanding of, and an ability to relate to 
and listen to, children of all ages” and “relevant qualifications, training and 
attendance at relevant courses”.652 It is not sure how these skills and practical 
knowledge are assessed since experienced lawyers usually work independently 
and are unlikely to provide references that can attest to their actual performance in 
working with children. Possibly the children themselves would be the best point 
of reference but it is unlikely that ‘hearing the voice of the child’ will ever stretch 
that far. 
A reality, I suggest, is that the courts prefer to work with lawyers rather 
than psychologists because these lawyers understand the rules and operations of 
the legal system and, arguably, approach matters from a legal perspective rather 
than from a child’s perspective, or a mental health perspective, when they talk to 
children. They are, after all, committed to law’s code and programmes and they 
act within law’s boundaries, meaning that they are likely to focus on that which 
the legal system has identified as relevant and ignore what is considered 
irrelevant. However, appointing a lawyer who will represent the child shows 
compliance with the UNCRC and seems to be a primary motivating factor for 
such appointments.653 Research shows that a lawyer for the child is always 
appointed in matters concerning children in the family court.654 I fully agree with 
Tapp who states that “[t]he complexities of family law make it a discipline that 
                                                
651 Peter Boshier Principal New Zealand Family Court Judge “The Care of Children Act 2004 – 
does it enhance children’s participation and protection rights?” Children’s Issues Centre, 6th Child 
and Family Policy Conference, Dunedin (NZ) (7 July, 2005) 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/family-court/publications/speeches-and-papers/archived-
speeches/the-care-of-children-act-2004-does-it-enhance-childrens-participation-and-protection-
rights Accessed 4 November 2011. Cf. an article by a family court judge published towards the 
end of the year after COCA came into force discussing the difficulties and challenges for counsel 
for the child and judges to interview children and to ascertain their views: Jan Doogue “A seismic 
shift or a minor realignment? A view from the bench ascertaning children’s views” (2006) 5 
NZFLJ 198. 
652 Practice Note: Lawyer for the Child: Selection, appointment and other matters (24 March 
2011) Issued by the Principal Family Court Judge, at 9.5 (f) and (i). http://www.justice.govt.nz/ 
Accessed 1 March 2012. 
653 Practice Note, Lawyer for the Child: Code of Conduct (24 March 2011) at 1.4. Issued by the 
Principal Family Court Judge.http://www.justice.govt.nz/. Accessed 1 March 2012. 
654 Antoinette Robinson “Children: heard but not listened to? An analysis of children’s views 
under s 6 of the Care of Children Act 2004” above n 487. 
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cannot be covered by the general legal profession.”655 Lawyers for children must 
be assessed and approved for their specialist skills and not for their years of legal 
experience. As commented before, these lawyers’ ‘clients’ (children) do not give 
very positive feedback about their experiences.  
The tentativeness and inconclusiveness of statements produced by those 
who work within the child psychology realm/discourse, indeed inherent to the 
subject field and the very nature of ‘childhood’ as it has been constructed (i.e. a 
developmental, progressive, evolving life phase) make content of reports and the 
‘expert report writer’ rather defenceless to ‘enslavement’ within the legal system 
and it is not surprising that the cross examination process leaves social scientists 
feeling degraded and devalued. The law’s demand for resolve and conclusiveness, 
for right and wrongs to be identified in order to further its normative objectives, 
tends to impose legal conclusions upon child mental health professionals.656 
 
6.4 The inevitable results? 
 
The legal system takes advantage of conflicting perspectives (of which 
there are many in social science) so as to form and reproduce generalised 
behavioural expectations.657 If Luhmann is right in saying that the law can merely 
create normative expectations for society, then it is quite likely that the law will 
not successfully alter parental behaviour such as, for example, withdrawal from a 
child’s life post-separation. What seem to be the current legal norms that law is 
seeking to stabilise in CCDs – co-parenting and joint financial responsibility – 
will likely only be successful in cases where parents agree and co-operate and in 
such instances parents are unlikely to ask the legal system to decide the parenting 
arrangements for them in the first place. To oblige conflicted parents (those who 
feel compelled to ask the law to decide for them and which is not necessarily a 
reflection of obstinacy but most often involves real complexities and concerns) 
into shared parenting in the hope that they will eventually sort out their 
differences, ignores the child’s well-being and is not conducive to stable 
environments for children. Also, in accordance with autopoiesis and norm 
                                                
655 Pauline Tapp “Judges are human too: conversation between the judge and a child as a means of 
giving effect to Section 6 of the Care of Children Act 2004”  above n 486 at 36. 
656 Michael King “Child welfare within law: the emergence of a hybrid discourse” above n 509 at 
312. 
657 Niklas Luhmann “The coding of the legal system” above n 27 at 147. (Emphasis added).  
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creation, the legal system is not very effective at producing behavioural changes 
or regulating conduct that are, in particular, not easily or logically subjectable to 
the values of legal/illegal.658 Therefore, to hope that conflicted parents will change 
their behaviour and act in accordance with how the legal system wants them to 
behave (i.e. settle their differences and take responsibility for children’s 
upbringing) is unrealistic and often illogical.  
Stabilised norms pre-impose a bias. What follows is that freedom of 
conduct thus becomes restricted in advance at least on the level of expectations 
(i.e. what to expect from the legal system). People who want to act in a way that is 
perceived to violate the established expectations are at a disadvantage right from 
the start. A truly individualist approach is perhaps beyond the scope and ability of 
the legal system. It seems that, looking at the history of CCDs, as long as we 
expect the legal system to decide CCDs we must expect to see the system reduce 
complexity in its norm stabilising function and thus to disregard information that 
interferes too much with this task while selecting other information that can 
complement the norms selected for stabilisation. Of course, there will always be 
odd exceptional cases to keep some debate afoot. The legal system after all needs 
cases to survive. 
 
                                                
658 Niklas Luhmann “Closure and openness: on reality in the world of law” above n 19 at 347; 
Niklas Luhmann “Limits of steering” above n 32.  
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Chapter 7   Concluding discussion 
 
For an observer from outside of the legal system there may be insight that 
law, as produced by the legal system, is not synonymous with justice or fairness. 
Indeed, it may not even be reflective of general social practice but it merely 
informs of how the law will most likely view a parent’s life, expected gendered 
role (as constructed by law), and responsibilities in terms of raising the State’s 
future citizens. And it presents these legal norms to society as the welfare and best 
interests of the child. What happens beyond the boundaries of the legal system 
remains a plane of events that the legal system, as one of society’s functional, 
closed systems, can select from and respond to as the system sees fit.  
But the legal system cannot afford to see or consider itself in the face of 
such possibilities because that will threaten its identity and autonomy. It therefore 
has to maintain its self-image and believe that legal justice is the same as 
universal rightfulness. If need be, the legal system will engage and utilise 
knowledge from outside itself to substantiate its universality but because of its 
closure, such knowledge will be extracted, reshaped and simplified to match the 
law’s operations.  
 Under the ‘welfare and best interests of the child’ standard a judge can 
usually provide a plausible excuse for giving one parent or both physical custody 
of their child(ren), whatever the judge’s reasons might be. The law’s programme 
of judicial discretion protects its decision makers to be able to do this and to 
present such personal views and values as being based on the welfare and best 
interests of the child. Because a judge says it, it is legally acceptable. However, 
the legal system favours consistency and random outcomes threaten law’s 
function of providing norms as regards behaviour. It also threatens law’s unity, 
that is, the law’s need to be able to refer to its own communications (precedents, 
legislative interpretation and application, etc.).659 Once an event has been declared 
                                                
659 It also heightens the potential for litigation, which, for lawyers, may be a good thing since it 
provides a greater source of income. However, lawyers who are trained to ‘identify the relevant 
law’ in relation to a client’s legal problem, need to be able to inform their client of, inter alia, what 
the law ‘says’ and therefore, randomness and inability to ‘find the law’ threatens their professional 
image also. Like, for example, medical doctors who act in the closed social system of science, 
continuous answers to clients that state “I don’t know” will quickly undermine the function and 
unity of the system and of course the reputation of the relevant professional.  
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to be a legal issue, or legally determinable – as the custody of children post 
parental separation and the law’s ability to know what is best for children had 
been declared – the law must bear the burden of seeming to know what is right 
and what is wrong and deny the paradox that this represents.  The fundamental 
and major assumption the law should remain the system to decide over children’s 
care, reinforces the illusion that courts are able to reach ‘the right decision’ for the 
child’s future well-being.  
 I suggest, based on Luhmann’s theory, that the legal system is profoundly 
uncomfortable with the ‘no rules’ method that an individual approach in CCDs 
effectively demands and for this reason it has chosen shared parenting, which 
seemingly matches other legal notions such as ‘equality’ and ‘non-
discrimination’, as a norm to stabilise from here on in.   
To be able to seem informed about children’s needs and development in a 
society that becomes increasingly diverse despite law’s norms, the legal system 
must find ways to uphold its identity and will couple with other social systems, 
here the sub to ‘learn’ from their communications. However, ultimately, the law 
will select and extract some communications from the system it couples with and 
discard others in order to reduce and simplify complexity into legal norms i.e. 
those norms that make sense for the system. While it is true that society becomes 
ever more complex, I suggest that ‘complexity’ itself must also be analysed in 
relation to legal norms. If same sex couples insist to be acknowledged at the same 
legal level as heterosexual couples and to have children, or nearly half of all 
marriages end in divorce, or women choose to keep their babies born outside of 
law’s norms (which is what ‘illegitimate’ children basically once meant), are these 
signs of ‘complexity’? I suggest that for family law, ‘complexity’ means nothing 
more than people acting in accordance with their own meaning and perceived 
reality rather than in the manner proscribed by law. Perhaps the ‘complexity’ is 
rather caused by law that assumes that it knows.  
Despite the law’s best efforts, for many people, the sanctity of, and 
imposed ideology of sacred, life-long marriage and parental roles based on the 
patriarchal model, did, and does, not reflect their experienced reality. This 
includes many men and women. Law’s norms, based on assumptions often cause 
the very ‘problems’ that it then subsequently attempts to ‘solve’. That being said, 
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Luhmann does not propose that the legal system solves problems; it only produces 
normative expectations and stabilises them over time. The law cannot be used to 
investigate über-truths, or to discover innovative solutions.660 By applying its 
norms, law however can harm and oppress but it is not liable for those 
consequences.  
The political system in turn supports more involved co-parenting and 
shared parenting at least for the reason of attempting to reduce State aid for single 
parents and perhaps in the hope that this will reduce social problems that is so 
often blamed on single parents, while a multitude of potential reasons for social 
problems is often ignored. As Professor Thane for example points out,661 single 
parenthood has been a reality for a long time and is not a recent phenomenon 
while the notion of legally endorsing on-going relationships with both parents 
after separation has only recently become an issue. As suggested, if the legal 
system, the courts specifically, had not already started to move towards more 
liberal contact and shared parenting orders, it is quite possible that the courts 
would have found ways to avoid making such orders if history is anything to go 
by. As discussed in chapter 3, because the legal system had not before considered 
and made orders that mothers have custody of children, when the political system 
felt it necessary to respond to women’s demands and included mothers for 
consideration via legislation, the courts continued to apply the norm of paternal 
custody for nearly fifty years.  
Joint custody or shared parenting has been an option available to the 
courts for a long time and was never prohibited by statute. It was the courts that 
produced the rule of the father (in the absence of custody legislation) and then 
eventually produced the maternal preference that evolved from the ‘tender years 
doctrine’. Nonetheless, when political systems contemplate making a collectively 
binding decision (legislation) the lawfulness of the decision can and is tested in 
advance via its coupling with the legal system.662 For this reason, it is suggested 
that via the close coupling between the political system and the legal system, 
enhanced co-parenting after separation was produced in law and its relation to 
                                                660 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 366. 
661 Pat Thane “'Happy families?' History and policy” (2010) History and Policy 
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/ Accessed 21 November 2011. 
662 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 368. 
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children’s welfare is bolstered by selected (yet still inconclusive) social science 
research.  
Ever since the legal system started to advocate the law’s ability and 
responsibility to make decisions in custody cases based on and in accordance with 
the best interests/welfare of the child, the notion has been criticised. These 
perturbations (criticisms) in law’s environment, apart from stimulating 
intellectual, political and academic debate have, to date, made no difference to 
law’s proclaimed ability per se. The welfare and best interests of children remain 
‘the legal standard’. The overriding assumption663 of these observers and 
commentators lies in their belief that there are indeed right answers, or 
better/worse answers to issues relating to children’s welfare in parental separation 
disputes. Therefore the reasoning is that the court simply lacks all the right 
information and that this is the reason for its wrong decisions and so if the courts 
were better informed they would not make such poor decisions.664 Autopoiesis 
suggests however that the problem arises due to how the law operates and not 
because it lacks information. The legal system is largely concerned with its 
decisions being legally correct not whether it is metaphysically, morally or 
philosophically correct. This does not mean that individuals who act within the 
legal system do not ponder these matters.  
Regardless of these criticisms, a judge’s decision does not depend for its 
legality on the actual correctness of their predictions or her/his personal beliefs, 
but only on how the law operates. Only a higher court’s decision can change the 
outcome but not the consequence of the decision being intolerable for the parties 
involved. Thus the legal system itself still decides the correctness of the decision 
and in order for it to do so and to believe in its own ability it/we must accept the 
paradox of law’s code: the code cannot be applied to itself with the result that we 
can never know if law itself is ultimately correct/legitimate665 for those who are 
affected by it. For Luhmann, legitimacy precedes the law, and law does not 
represent legitimacy. When we consider how law tends to ignore realities or real 
experience or customary practice, particularly in family law and the conjugal 
family as discussed in this thesis, Luhmann’s point becomes more evident. The 
                                                
663 Michael King “Future uncertainty as a challenge to law’s programmes: the dilemma of parental 
disputes” above n 508 at 525. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Niklas Luhmann “The third question: the creative use of paradox in law and legal history” 
(1988) 15 J Law & Soc’y 153 at 153-154. 
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law however defers to no higher truth. As long as these decisions are made by the 
legal system, they will be deemed to be legally correct and that is all that the legal 
system can achieve.  
Legal decisions are only subject to the norms that the legal system seeks to 
stabilise and this is achieved in a closed manner. Only the system decides what it 
responds to and how it responds.  
 
Law is not something that is simply maintained with the help of powerful support and 
then, more or less, enforced. Law is only law if there is reason [for society and its various 
social systems] to expect that normative expectations can be expected normatively.666 
 
 
In other words, for as long as society and/or the political system believes that 
there will be a way to ‘convince’ the legal system of the actual ‘truth’ or the 
whole truth of children’s welfare and best interests, then we effectively believe 
that the law is capable of providing us with, and can discover the ‘right’ norms 
that will support that ‘truth’. Despite the law being incapable of defining 
children’s welfare in a pre-emptive way it operates circularly by self-reference 
thus determining welfare based on whatever the law has recognised as favourable 
for children. And this may include some findings from the social sciences that 
will be reproduced as legally approved messages.667 Luhmann suggests that when 
judges try to act as therapists they are no longer operating in the legal system 
because they are attempting to apply a different code to legal operations.668 
Ultimately judges must therefore behave like judges and act in accordance with 
the legal system’s identity, meaning they must act as deciders of what will be 
legally right and legally wrong in terms of the child’s future best interests. A 
problem that is evident here is how to subject extra-legal communications and 
human behaviour to law’s code. Consequently the law treats social science as 
knowledge that can legitimise law’s accounts of and decisions about reality and 
the subsequent decisions of the legal system.669 
If the legal system did not continue to claim its jurisdiction over and its 
ability to ‘know’ what is best for children’s living arrangements and, in addition, 
if the political system did not choose to sit back and support the legal system’s 
                                                
666 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 158. 
667 Michael King “An autopoietic approach to ‘parental alienation syndrome’” (2002) 13 (3) J. 
Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology” 609 at 623. 
668 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 201. 
669Michael King and Christine Piper How the Law Thinks About Children above n 21 at 44. 
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invention of its parens patriae role, then parents would not seek decisions from the 
law. While we may argue that the law must be involved in order to protect 
children and vulnerable parties, it seems that the law is not proving to be very 
effective in anyway. The successful outcomes of court decisions depend on the 
particular people subject to the particular decision. 
Throughout the history of the custody and contact decisions, clearly 
identifiable and overarching beliefs, held within the legal system, can be 
identified. Quite literally, the system switched from one extreme to the next: first 
the rule of the father and then the mother as preferred custodian while the latter 
preference dominated for a much shorter period of time than the former. There 
were always exceptions and, I suggest, that this is also necessary in law in order to 
leave room for dispute because without it, the courts and the legal profession as 
structures of the legal system will cease to exist. It should perhaps not be 
surprising that the next norm for law would be shared parenting.  
However, a reality outside of the legal system as regards children’s living 
arrangements after their parents’ separation is that when parties come to their own 
arrangements, the majority of fathers still prefer that mothers take the primary 
responsibility. It is therefore doubtful whether the law is truly ‘bringing fathers 
back into their children’s lives’ as it seems to want to do. It is this desire of both 
law and politics that led to the response to minority fathers’ rights movement. 
With the shared parenting post-separation norm that I suggest is now being 
stabilised there remains much room for doubt as to whether this reflects the reality 
in the legal system’s environment. Gendered behaviour (still a definite reality in 
the environment judging by the outcome of private agreements between parents) 
may also be ignored by the new insistence on gender-neutral law. Mothers are 
still, by and large, children’s primary caregivers.670 Both political and legal 
systems seem in denial of the reality that most men today either lack the skill to 
parent in the way that is expected of, and done by (most) women or that the 
benefits of parenting are not as attractive to them as it seems to be for most 
mothers, although increasingly more women in the western world are choosing to 
remain childless. History seems to cast doubt upon the ‘truth’ that women always 
felt this way about mothering, albeit that they did care for their children; just not 
                                                
670 Julie Wallbank “Parental responsibility and the responsible parent: managing the ‘problem’ of 
contact” above n 472 at 300. 
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in the manner that is expected of them today. Nonetheless, for reasons of its own 
and about which suggestions have been made, since the turn of the nineteenth 
century, the law (the courts) chose to view mothers/women as the parent that must 
raise children after divorce and in that way also ‘legalised’ the separate spheres 
for mothers and fathers.  
Law tends to focus on the ‘ought to be’ of outcomes rather than the 
realities in family life which matches the argument that law is concerned with the 
function of establishing and stabilising normative expectations. Parents who both 
want and agree with significant shared care are likely to ender into such 
agreements of their own accord and they do not need the law to settle on such 
arrangements. However, coercing conflicted and non-collaborative parents into 
shared care in the belief that this is good for children reflects a pre-occupation 
with some social science research that found that on a statistical level children as a 
group do better in shared care. This ignores the proclaimed individualist approach. 
Perhaps the legal system also believes that it can ‘steer’ parents towards 
overcoming their differences. Even if the law could have such a steering effect, 
which Luhmann is adamant it cannot, shared care or joint physical custody orders 
cannot teach parents to parent well, and it is plausible that at least some of the 
conflict is caused by distrusts in that regard. The law may speak of parental 
responsibility, whether in statute or case law, but it is not able to determine how 
parents treat their children when they have them in their care.  
Social science custody studies do not show indisputable causality and life 
events such as divorce or separation experienced by parents may be unique thus 
making behaviour post separation as compared to pre-separation unpredictable.671 
The same is true for how children experience their parents’ care or attitudes once 
they have separated. Much more dedication, attention to detail and an 
understanding for the complexity of human emotions are required than what the 
law seems able to provide. 
                                                
671 Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe and Sanford L Braver “The effects of joint legal custody on mothers, 
fathers, and children controlling for factors that predispose a sole maternal versus joint legal 
award” (2001) 25 (1) Law and Human Behavior25; E Mavis Hetherington “An overview of the 
Virginia Longitudinal Study of Divorce and Remarriage with a focus on early adolescence” (1993) 
7 J. Fam. Psych. 39. 
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One solution that the legal system offered was to seemingly place the 
responsibility on the two disputing parties to find a solution672 but simultaneously 
legalising the concept of permanent parental responsibility post separation and the 
‘right’ of the child to have ongoing contact with both parents which serves to 
counteract the maternal preference and appeases the growing fathers’ rights 
movements. This has the effect of pressurising parties into agreements that will 
resemble the norms of law. 
This new model of the post-separation family, in reality may not serve any 
of the ‘family’ members’ interests that well, since it requires emotional, mental, 
and structural commitments, i.e. more than a court order, to have meaningful 
results. Smart, for example, in her research conducted after the implementation of 
the Children Act 1989 in the UK, found that often fathers, while not having been 
the primary day-to-day caregivers pre-separation, appeared angry about the work 
load (including emotional demands) that was ‘suddenly’ required of them under 
greater shared parenting orders.673 Some mothers also find it difficult to surrender 
their identity of being the primary caregiver,674 which indeed had been so 
adamantly reinforced by law during the during the first half of the 20th century 
albeit that this had begun during the 19th century, that is the designation of child 
care to the mother and with the creation of the bread earner father. Fathers seeking 
revenge, retribution, vindication, or simply the maintenance of power and control 
constitute a significant part of the group of parents who, under the Australian 
legislation find the opportunity to realise these negative intentions.675 As 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, for children whose parents are conflicted these 
efforts to artificially impose shared care arrangements upon them definitely do not 
affect their interests and well-being in the most helpful way. Indeed, many of 
these arrangements collapse over time and actually subject children to drawn out 
instability. Children do not need to spend more and longer periods with their non-
resident parent to be able to have a qualitatively good relationship with such a 
                                                
672 There is a wealth of judgments in which judges urge parents to settle their differences and even 
reprimand them for their inability to do so while both the Guardianship Act 1968 s __ and, with 
more vigour, the Care of Children Act 2004 s 5 (1) instruct parents that this is a ‘principle’ that 
serves the W&BIC. 
673 Carol Smart “The legal and moral ordering of child custody” (1991) 18 J of Law &Soc’y 485 at 
496. 
674 Carol Smart “The ‘new’ parenthood: fathers and mothers after divorce” in Elisabeth B Silva 
and Carol Smart (eds) The New Family (Sage, London, 1999) 108 at 111. 
675 John Dewar and Stephen Parker Family Law: Processes, practice, pressures above n 488 at 
108. 
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parent. It is the very nature, the quality of that relationship (about which the law 
can make little difference unless we believe that the legal system can teach 
relationship skills) that adds positive value to children’s lives.  
Law ‘thinks’ about the problems that it confronts by producing general 
categories or ideals and subsequently applying these produced meanings either 
directly or through interpreting the realities it is presented in the face of those 
meanings.676 Parents are now expected to ‘do’ their separation in accordance with 
the new, modern legal norms of conciliation and compromise which the legal 
system imposes as being in the welfare and best interests of the child. Recognition 
of the emotional, mental and physical demands this places on parents and children 
cannot be addressed by the operations of law, or the political system. The stress 
and stressors that the new norms may bring into family members’ lives is beyond 
the concern or scope of the law in particular, as long as the decisions were made 
in a legally appropriate manner. 
Upholding and retaining the ideological legal standard of ‘the welfare of 
the child’, serves to cover up its use to achieve political and legal programmes by 
which the post divorce family can, at the present time, be legalised677 and largely 
to serve parents interests.678 While the courts may declare parents’ rights as not 
being deciding factors, a reality is that parents themselves cannot actually be 
subjected to the welfare and best interests of the child679 because the law can do 
very little to bring about emotional and cognitive commitment by a ‘reluctant’ 
parent except for awarding such a parent liberal contact or even shared parenting 
and then to hope for the best. Sometimes, such arrangements may work relatively 
well, but the greater odds are that the children will continue to live a life marred 
with their parents’ conflict or disrespect of each other. A prominent feature of the 
current welfare and best interests programme is that the children’s needs revolve 
                                                
676 Gunther Teubner “How the law thinks: toward a constructivist epistemology” above n 17 . 
677 This legalisation of the post-divorce family has been pointed out before by. for example, 
IréneThéry “'The interests of the child' and the regulation of the post-divorce family” (1986) 14 
Int’l J. Sociol. L. 341 at 345. 
678 Gwynn Davis “Love in a cold climate – disputes about children in the aftermath of parental 
separation” in Stephen Cretney (ed) Family Law: Essays for the New Millennium (Jordan 
Publishing, Bristol, 2000) 127 at 134-135. 
679 Susan Maidment Child Custody and Divorce: The law in social context above n 212 at 149-
150; Michael King “Future uncertainty as a challenge to law’s programmes: the dilemma of 
parental disputes” above n 508 at 536-537; Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s 
Rights? above n 512 . 
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around the lack of fathering680 and the imperfection of mothering (as custodial 
parent) which has concluded “in a link between the ‘child of divorce’ and the 
pervasive but largely undefined notion of harm”.681 What is now considered as 
even more harmful for children than divorce is to not have access to their fathers. 
The idea that contact is essential for children’s well-being seems to have obtained 
the status of an indisputable truth.682 Yet, over the past three centuries, we have 
not seen much energy invested by the various social systems (social science, 
education and the political system) in fatherhood. If the desire is to convince 
fathers of the benefit of good and committed relationships with their children, 
then working with boys and men may be a good place to start. This is not to deny 
that there are men who are truly devoted to their children and prioritise their 
relationships with them thereby, most likely, transferring those values to their 
children, and most importantly, their sons. However, this is not true for the 
majority. This also does not to deny that there are mothers who also do not 
prioritise or value their children in their lives. However, this is true for the 
minority. The meaning, value, skills, and priority of being a father may be a good 
starting point for men who choose to theatrically target the legal system and stir 
up the mass media. The law cannot produce good fathers. 
 Luhmann was a social theorist, not an idealist.683 As far as finding ways to 
change the functional differentiation and closure of social systems such as law he 
suggests that “[i]It might be rewarding, however, not to look for better solutions 
of problems ... but to ask ‘what is the problem?’ in the first place.”684 This 
arguably presents the biggest challenge. Perhaps the problem started when the law 
claimed its own ability to decide over children’s lives, as the law perceived ‘a 
wise parent’ ought to.685 Perhaps the problem is law’s (and politics’) obsession 
                                                
680 See e.g. Robert van Krieken “The socio-legal construction of the ‘best interests of the child’: 
law’s autonomy, sociology and family law” in Michael Freeman (ed) Law and Sociology. Current 
Legal Issues 2005, Vol 8 (Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK), 2006) 437 at 437-438.  
681 Bren Neal and Carol Smart “In whose best interest? Theorising family life following parental 
separation and divorce” in Shelley Day Sclater and Christine Piper Undercurrents of Divorce 
(Dartmouth Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999) 33 at 37. 
682 Felicity Kaganas and Shelley Day-Sclater “Contact disputes: narrative constructions of ‘good’ 
parents” (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 1 (examining the ways in which these ideas about 
children’s interests have become embodied in a dominant W&BIC discourse in the U.K. that is 
embedded in law and informs policy thinking). 
683 Hans-Georg Moeller Luhmann Explained: From souls to systems (Open Court, Peru (IL), 2006) 
at 173. 
684 Niklas Luhmann “Globalization of world society: how to conceive of modern society?” (1997) 
7 (1) International Review of Sociology 67 at 77. 
685Davis makes the point that while the welfare principle functions as the outward focal point of 
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with the conjugal, heterosexual, patriarchal family, which had been imposed upon 
society. Perhaps the problem is that governments want good citizens but are 
unprepared to adequately assist those who take the most responsibility to raise 
them. Perhaps the starting point is to accept how the law operates and then to ask 
if this is the right system to decide matters that hardly fit into law’s operations. 
The apparent problems regarding children’s needs and their wellbeing post 
divorce are so dispersed, and the causes of children’s problems and unhappiness 
in the aftermath of parental separation so diverse, that it is difficult to see how law 
could and can reconstruct and reproduce these issues in order to make them 
subject to legal rights and wrongs. In the interim Norgrove Report delivered in the 
UK, it is stated that [f]amily matters are often more about welfare judgements and 
people skills than law.”686 Indeed. Perhaps the problem is that custody and contact 
decisions, in the absence of behaviour that can be given legal/illegal values such 
as abuse and violence, no longer ‘belong’ in the legal system. If Luhmann’s 
theory is accepted then trying harder to adapt the law will make little difference. 
With every change that has taken place in this legal area, there have been 
frustration, uneven results and negative consequences for some children because 
the law functions to create broad normative expectations aimed at society and not 
at individuals.687 As Einhorn accurately states:  
 
[I]f we restrict our focus to Anglo-American history, the most direct source of our legal and 
psychological tradition, we find sufficient contradictions and conflicts to nullify any 
prejudice in favor of fathers or mothers, or against them for that matter; and a conspicuous 
absence of knowledge about what is best for children in all but the most obvious cases...688 
 
This is why a genuine individualist approach is the only appropriate one in care 
and contact decisions. In this thesis, I found this to be beyond the scope of the 
legal system’s operations.  
                                                                                                                                 
family court jurisprudence, in reality “this is not fundamentally why courts bother” but rather “it is 
accepted (at the moment) that quarrels about children in the aftermath of separation are the 
appropriate stuff of adult litigation”: Gwynn Davis “Love in a cold climate – disputes about 
children in the aftermath of parental separation” above n 678 at 135. 
686 Family Justice Review. Interim Report above n 594 at para 3.114. 
687 Niklas Luhmann Law as A Social System above n 6 at 142. 
688 Jay Einhorn “Child custody in historical perspective: a study of changing social perceptions of 
divorce and child custody in Anglo-American law” (1986) 4 Behav. Sci. & Law 119 at 120. 
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